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Low-income women are at particularly high risk of having no or inadequate insurance. 
Welfare reform has pushed more low-income women into the labor market but women’s access 
to insurance has continued to erode. In addition, low-income women often experience work and 
family changes which affect their ability to access both private/employer-based and public 
insurance programs. We know continuity of coverage matters for women’s health, but few have 
examined the role of individual-level health insurance instability in perpetuating low-income 
women’s poverty. Cross-sectional analyses do not adequately reflect the dynamic nature of low-
income women’s lives and their lack of continuity in health insurance access.  
The goal of this dissertation is to assess the role of individual-level welfare, work, and 
family changes in predicting low-income women’s access to insurance and poverty over time in 
order to inform effective social policy. Specifically, I seek to answer the following research 
questions: 1) What is the relative importance of various welfare, work, and family changes in 
predicting low-income women’s insurance coverage over time? 2) Given the diversity of low-
income women’s experiences, are there significant differences between categories of low-income 
women (such as the poor and near-poor) in the significance of these changes and women’s 
access to insurance? And 3) given the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on low-
income women’s health insurance access, what role does health insurance stability play in 
determining changes in women’s poverty status over time?  
Results of the various statistical analyses provide consistent evidence of a hierarchy of 
risk among low-income women. For example, I find that low-income women who experience 
welfare, work, and family changes may have access to public and private forms of insurance, but 
compared to women with stable welfare, work, and family attachments low-income women who 
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experience many changes over time simply do not fare as well and are at greater risk of being 
uninsured or having unmet health needs. I also find evidence that the significance of various 
welfare, work, and family factors varies by type of insurance examined. For instance, while 
stable marriage and work patterns may increase women’s access to private forms of insurance 
while reducing their access to public forms of insurance, the same factors do not significantly 
predict women’s risk of being uninsured. Nevertheless, this should not suggest that marriage and 
work patterns are unrelated to women’s risk of being uninsured. Instead, I argue that such 
findings illustrate the complex effects of welfare, work, and family factors on women’s access to 
various forms of health insurance; while some low-income women may benefit from access to 
marriage and work opportunities, others may find themselves at greater risk of lacking access to 
sufficient insurance. The complex and contradictory nature of these effects may make them 
difficult to model statistically but illustrate the importance of examining the nuances of low-
income women’s lives.  
I also find evidence that certain factors may be more (or less) consequential for poor 
women than their near-poor peers. Such findings provide evidence of the differential strategies 
low-income women utilize in order to meet their health insurance needs – poor women’s reliance 
on public forms of health insurance creates different risks for them than their near-poor peers 
who are forced to rely on private forms of insurance to meet their health needs. Finally, I find 
some limited evidence that certain welfare, work, and family factors are indeed related to low-
income women’s movement into and out of poverty over time. I conclude by arguing that recent 
health care reforms have the potential to significantly improve low-income women’s access to 
insurance, thereby altering the hierarchy of risks many low-income women face under the status 
quo. 
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Insurance Instability in America 
In 2008 over 45.7 million Americans under the age of 65 (17.4 percent of the United 
States’ nonelderly population) had no health insurance coverage (Holahan and Cook 2009) and 
as many as 25 million more adults were underinsured, meaning they had access to insurance but 
it was insufficient to meet their needs or consumed a significant proportion of their income 
(Schoen et al. 2008:298; Raiz 2006; Schoen et al. 2005). Research shows a great deal of turnover 
among the uninsured, with very few people remaining continuously uninsured for extended 
periods of time (Short and Graefe 2003). High rates of insurance instability suggest that cross-
sectional statistics may severely underestimate the risk of being uninsured in America, 
underscoring the need to examine continuity in coverage over time (Schoen and DesRoches 
2000).  
In the U.S. two-thirds of the uninsured live in low-income families (Hoffman et al. 
2008:4). This includes approximately 8.5 million uninsured low-income women, who comprise 
19 percent of the uninsured population (Wyn et al. 2001:14). Despite their high labor force 
participation rates, low-income women are three times more likely to be uninsured than near-
poor women (Wyn et al. 2001:14) and two to three times more likely to face insurance instability 
(Anderson and Eamon 2004:397). Even as public health insurance programs have been 
expanding to catch those left behind by welfare reform, the rate of low-income women’s health 
insurance coverage has been falling (Glied, Jack, and Rachlin 2008; Kaiser Family Foundation 
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2008a; Wyn et al. 2001:52). With the cost of health care rising, more and more women are 
reporting difficulties accessing care due to cost (Patchias and Waxman 2007).  
Accurately understanding low-income women’s access to health insurance requires 
understanding health care as a central component of welfare regimes. According to welfare state 
scholars, social inequalities in postindustrial societies are shaped by the relationship between the 
labor market, state, and family (DiPrete et al 1997; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; O’Connor et 
al. 1999). Although universal health care is a central component of many industrialized welfare 
states, health insurance is merely a residual feature of the U.S. welfare regime (Hacker 2002; 
Quadagno 2004, 2005). The structure of the U.S. health insurance system relies primarily on 
employer-provided insurance schemes, which assume stable attachment to the labor market or a 
spouse, and categorical public health insurance programs designed to meet the needs of select 
categories of women (Iglehart 2007; Kaiser 2007). These programs have been developed with 
the traditional breadwinner/homemaker family model in mind. Because marriage/family, 
employment, and social policy characteristics shape low-income women’s needs for and access 
to both private/employment-based and public insurance, if we are to accurately understand low-
income women’s access to health insurance, we must examine their lives in the context of this 
state-market-family relationship.  
Current economic conditions are predicted to result in further erosion of employer-
provided benefits and greater demand for public sources of health insurance over the next decade 
(Dorn et al. 2008; Holahan and Cook 2008b). For every one percent increase in unemployment, 
we can expect 1.1 million more adults to become uninsured (Dorn et al. 2008). As the 
unemployment rate nears 10 percent, estimates suggest that we may see as many as 51 million 
uninsured (Holahan and Garrett 2009:6; Holahan and Cook 2008a; Schwartz 2008). Long-term 
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projections estimate close to 67 million uninsured by 2018 unless significant policy changes are 
implemented (Burman et al. 2008:56). Although some scholars predicted that a severe enough 
economic recession could serve as an “external traumatic event” significant enough to ignite 
greater support for expanding health insurance access in the U.S. (Enthoven and Fuchs 2006), 
few could have predicted how the divisive political climate would split public and congressional 
support for major health care reform in 2009-2010 (see Kaiser Family Foundation 2010a). The 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordability Act and Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act in March 2010 is notable given the United States’ history of failed health care 
reform efforts; during the 20
th
 Century there were six substantial efforts to mobilize support for 
expanding health insurance in the U.S., none of which resulted in universally expanded health 
insurance access (Hoffman 2003; Kahn and Pollack 2001; Starr 1982). Despite the significance 
of the 2010 health care reform law, the U.S. has yet to follow its European peers in establishing a 
comprehensive national health insurance system (Quadagno 2004). 
 
Low-income Women’s Access to Health Insurance 
A fragmented health insurance system that relies on the combination of employer-based 
benefits and residual public programs creates substantial barriers to obtaining adequate health 
insurance for low-income women (Glied, Jack, and Rachlin 2008; Pearlman 1998). Medicaid has 
primarily been designed to meet the needs of pregnant women, children, and the disabled, 
restricting access to public health insurance for many women (Iglehart 2007; Kaiser 2007). 
Although seven in ten adults on Medicaid are low-income women, less than one-quarter of all 
low-income women actually qualify for Medicaid due to the program’s strict income-eligibility 
guidelines (Wyn et al. 2001:2, 14). In fact, one study finds that a mother of a family of three 
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working full-time at minimum wage would not qualify for Medicaid in 29 states in 2007 based 
on her income (Hoffman et al. 2008:19). Medicaid’s strict categorical and income requirements 
are particularly consequential for the thousands of low-income women who have been forced 
into low-wage jobs following welfare reform (Cheng 2007; Seccombe, Newsom, and Hoffman 
2006). Ironically, although the wages of low-income women are often insufficient to meet the 
needs of their families, in many cases they are significant enough to disqualify them from 
programs like Medicaid. 
Low-income workers are more likely to be uninsured since they are less likely to be 
offered job-based coverage and are less able to afford the cost of premiums (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2008b). The employment patterns of low-income women in particular put them at 
significantly greater risk of falling into the cracks left by a patchwork of public and private 
health insurance schemes (Wyn et al. 2001). Fifty-eight percent of low-income women are 
employed and 72 percent live in working families (Wyn et al. 2001:48). Two-thirds of employed 
low-income women work in service, administrative support, or sales occupations (Wyn et al. 
2001:53). Despite their high employment rate, low-income women are two times less likely to 
have job-based health insurance than near-poor women across every occupation category (Wyn 
et al. 2001:25, 54). Whether employed full or part-time, year-round or seasonally, about one-
third of low-income working women are uninsured (Wyn et al. 2001:51). Job changes and/or job 
loss are one of the biggest reasons for a lack of insurance among the uninsured (Hoffman et al. 
2008), and low-income women’s job instability puts them at significantly greater risk of 
insurance instability than higher income women (Anderson and Eamon 2004:400). 
Family structure influences health insurance coverage by providing access to resources 
and the ability to access benefits as a dependent (Institute of Medicine 2002). Overall, women 
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are more than twice as likely as men to get access to employer-based insurance through a spouse 
(Wyn et al. 2001: 23), but their coverage is contingent on the stability of their relationships, the 
continuity of men’s employment, and the willingness of employers to continue offering family 
benefits, making dependent coverage a much less stable form of insurance for women (Patchias 
and Waxman 2007). Although many low-income women want to marry, they are often unwilling 
to assume the risk of dependency to economically unstable men, which contributes to the 
relationship instability of low-income couples (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Rogers-Dillon and Haney 
2005). One consequence is that low-income women are less likely to be married and stay married 
than near-poor women, and thus, significantly less likely to get insurance through a spouse 
(Anderson and Eamon 2004:399). In spite of their labor force participation, only 27 percent of 
low-income single moms are able to secure benefits through their employment, resulting in 
Medicaid being a significant source of insurance for 39 percent of low-income single moms 
(Wyn et al. 2001:23).  
Not having insurance or having inadequate coverage creates barriers to regular health 
care (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008b; Raiz 2006). Because low-income families are more 
likely to have no financial reserves to cover the cost of an unexpected medical need, they are 
significantly more likely to delay or forgo needed care (Hoffman et al. 2008; Vuckovic 2000). 
Even temporary gaps in coverage put one at greater risk of poor health by preventing both access 
to preventative care and early detection of illness (Marquis and Kapur 2003). Lack of access to 
adequate health insurance and resultant poor health affects worker productivity and results in 
employment disruption (Institute of Medicine 2003). Ultimately, the un- and underinsured are at 
greater risk of medical debt, bankruptcy, and even poverty (Collins et al. 2008a; Hoffman et al. 
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2001, 2008; Institute of Medicine 2004; Kaiser Family Foundation 2008b). These risks pose 
substantial barriers to low-income women’s economic progress. 
 
The Need for Further Research 
Despite a plethora of research on health insurance access among the poor in the U.S., 
much remains to be understood about the role of health insurance stability in the lives low-
income women. For example, we know that the uninsured population experiences a great deal of 
turnover over time (Short and Graefe 2003) and that continuity of insurance coverage matters for 
maintaining health (Marquis and Kapur; Schoen and DesRoches 2000). Yet relatively little 
attention has been paid to understanding the individual-level changes that make low-income 
women particularly vulnerable to insurance instability, or variability in the effects of these 
changes among categories of low-income women, or the role of these factors in either fostering 
or preventing low-income women’s movement out of poverty.  
Researchers certainly recognize the importance of examining change. For instance, Glied, 
Jack, and Rachlin (2008) provide an important analysis of the effects of demographic transitions 
on rates of women’s insurance coverage, finding evidence that family, work and policy changes 
have significantly impacted the distribution of women’s health insurance in the US. But they do 
not examine the relationship between individual-level changes in family, work, and public 
program access and individual women’s insurance instability. Scholars also recognize the 
importance of examining variability. For example, Anderson and Eamon (2004) examine 
differences in insurance instability among working women and find that low-income women are 
particularly vulnerable to gaps in coverage compared to near-poor women. Nevertheless, we 
know from the work of scholars such as Edin and Lein (1997) that within the low-income 
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population there is a great deal of variability in the work, family, and welfare opportunities these 
women have access to. Finally, social scientists have certainly been concerned about poverty. 
For instance, using Census data, DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith (2008) document in striking 
detail how the poor are disproportionally represented among the un- and underinsured. Yet little 
research has adequately attempted to assess how the instability of low-income women’s lives 
creates barriers to both their ability to be stably insured and their opportunities for socio-
economic advancement.  
 
Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to assess the role of individual-level welfare
2
, 
work, and family changes in predicting low-income women’s insurance instability over time in 
order to determine the role of insurance instability as a barrier to low-income women’s economic 
progress. Adequately measuring change necessitates the use of longitudinal data and analytic 
techniques. In addition, understanding the relationship between individual-level changes and 
insurance access also requires determining variability in the effects of these forces among 
different groups of low-income women – although we often treat low-income women (those with 
household incomes less than 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level) as a homogenous 
category, welfare, work, family, and insurance changes may be more consequential for poor 
women (those with household incomes less than 100 percent of the Federal Poverty Level) given 
their more severe economic vulnerability.  
                                                 
2
 Although I use the term “welfare” throughout this dissertation, it is important to make the distinction between 
“welfare assistance” and the “welfare state”. While the welfare state encompasses a wide range of social policies 
intended to sustain the citizens of a nation (see scholars such as Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999, among others), often 
the term “welfare” is used in public discourse as short-hand to describe cash assistance for the poor. When I use the 
term “welfare” in this dissertation I am referring to utilization of the program TANF (Temporary Aid for Needy 
Families); when discussing the “welfare state” I try to make clear that I am referencing a much larger set of social 
policies beyond targeted cash assistance for the poor. 
 8 
The second objective of this dissertation is to utilize the results to help inform social 
policy.  Reliance on an employment-based insurance system to meet the needs of most 
Americans has resulted in substantial disparities in health insurance coverage and health care 
access across race, class, and gender lines (Raiz 2006). How we organize, finance, and provide 
health care services has important gender and race implications (Zimmerman and Hill 1999, 
2000). Lack of access to adequate and affordable health care is an enduring source and 
consequence of social inequalities in the U.S. (Kawachi and Kennedy 2002; Wilkinson 2006). As 
health care costs continue to climb, the gap between the insured and uninsured in access to care 
is widening (Hoffman and Schwartz 2008). We know that marriage promotion policies have not 
worked to elevate low-income women out of poverty (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Rogers-Dillon and 
Haney 2005) and welfare-to-work policies have simply transferred welfare-reliant women into 
the ranks of the wage-reliant without substantially altering their well-being (Edin and Lein 1997; 
Hays 2003). But if it can be shown that lack of access to stable insurance poses a significant 
barrier to low-income women’s economic progress, then providing universal and comprehensive 
health insurance access would be a critical component of any effective policy solution to low-
income women’s poverty. Understanding the relative importance of welfare, family, and 
employment changes in contributing to low-income women’s health insurance stability, the 
relationship between health insurance stability and low-income women’s poverty, and possible 
differences in the effects of these factors between poor and near-poor women would provide 
justification for significant health care reform and would also allow us to develop better policies 
to meet the needs of low-income women.  
 
Outline of Subsequent Chapters 
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In Chapter Two I review relevant literature related to my research questions, including 
the effects of welfare reform, employment instability, and marriage and family changes on 
women’s ability to secure health insurance, as well as important race/ethnic variations in 
insurance access. I also describe the usefulness of a feminist welfare regime perspective for 
guiding and interpreting analyses of low-income women’s access to health insurance. This 
chapter also provides further justification for this dissertation, including the limitations of 
previous research and the need for considering work, welfare, and family sources of instability 
when examining low-income women’s insurance instability. I conclude this chapter by outlining 
the major research questions that guide this study as well as hypotheses about the relationships 
between the major variables identified. 
Chapter Three describes the data and methods utilized in this dissertation, including the 
appropriateness of the data set, sampling procedures, and variable descriptions. This chapter 
contains an explanation of the statistical methods used to examine the data, my analytic plan, and 
model summaries. This chapter also includes a summary of descriptive statistics. 
In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I test each of my major research questions using 
different measures of women’s welfare, work, family, and health insurance variables. Chapter 
Four describes the results of a series of lagged effects analyses which examine the long-term 
effects of Time 1 welfare, work, family, and health insurance statuses on women’s health 
insurance and poverty statuses at Time 2. Chapter Five contains the results of a series of analyses 
which utilize measures of women’s welfare, work, family, and health insurance changes over 
time in order to predict women’s access to various forms of insurance and poverty status at Time 
2. Chapter Six provides the results of a series of analyses testing how women’s welfare, work, 
family, and health insurance trajectories affect women’s access to various forms of health 
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insurance and poverty status over time. One of the major differences between Chapters Five and 
Six is that in Chapter Five I measure changes across two time points, whereas in Chapter Six I 
measure changes across three time points. 
Finally, Chapter Seven provides a discussion of the study results, including their 
implications for social theory and policy, an explanation of the study limitations, and directions 
for future research. In this chapter I also explore how the recent passage of health care reform 






In order to examine the relationship between individual-level change, health insurance 
instability, and poverty among low-income women, I use a welfare regime perspective. Welfare 
regime scholars argue that adequately understanding the relationship between the post-industrial 
welfare state and social inequalities requires situating analyses within the context of the state-
market-family nexus (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Hacker 2002; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 
1999). Although many health insurance scholars utilize employment, family, social policy, and 
race/ethnicity variables in their analyses, very few interpret their results using a feminist welfare 
regime framework. As opposed to treating state, market, and family institutions as separate 
forces with independent effects, a feminist welfare regime approach considers the complex 
relationships between state, market, and family forces, the racialized and gendered nature of 
these institutions, and the effects of entire welfare regimes on low-income women’s lives.  
The concept welfare regime was made popular by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) who 
used the term to describe the broad complex of state and economic policies which constitute the 
welfare state. The utility of this concept was in its call to think about the welfare state in terms 
beyond simple welfare benefits. Instead, Esping-Andersen asked that we also consider the 
institutional arrangements and rules that shape policy decisions, program definitions, and “even 
the response and demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers” (Esping-Andersen 
1990:80). Esping-Andersen’s analysis drew attention to decommodification (one’s ability to 
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exist outside of formal attachment to the labor market) and the dynamic relationship between the 
state and the economy, illustrating how changes in one institution created changes in the other.  
Although Esping-Anderson’s welfare regime typology provided a useful theoretical 
starting point for many scholars, feminists have criticized his schema for not taking gender 
seriously (Hobson 1991; Orloff 1993, 1996: Fraser 1994; Sainsbury 1996, 1999; O’Connor, 
Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Goodin et al. 1999; Korpi 2000). Feminists were particularly critical of 
his implicit assumption of the citizen as male worker, his neglect of women’s unpaid labor, and 
his underdevelopment of the family dimension of welfare regimes. In response, Orloff (1993) 
called for a gendered conceptualization of Esping-Andersen’s decommodification that would 
better consider gender inequalities in access to paid work and women’s capacity to form and 
maintain an autonomous household. Sainsbury (1996) similarly called for analyses of welfare 
regimes’ support for defamilialization, or the ability to thrive outside of traditional family 
relationships.  
Feminist welfare state scholars recognize that the U.S. welfare regime is not a uniform 
structure, but a network of competing institutions composed of multiple gender arrangements 
shaping recognition and redistribution (Haney 1996, 2000). One of the important contributions 
they make is drawing attention to the role of social policies in shaping social inequalities 
produced through families and markets (Chow and Berheide 1994; Christopher et al. 2002; 
DiPrete and McManus 2000; Folbre 1984).  In particular, their work highlights the significance 
of the traditional, gendered, nuclear family wage scenario in shaping the structure of the post-
industrial labor market and welfare state (Fraser 1994; Gordon 1994). Their work also illustrates 
how inequality is not “natural” but the result of social policies that foster disparities (Fischer et 
al. 1996; Hernes 1987; Pascall 1986). 
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Although the gendered nature of the welfare state has been established, some argue that 
state narratives have only recently considered national politics of race and ethnicity (Glenn 2002; 
Lewis 2000; Williams 1995). Contemporary scholars now more readily acknowledge that race is 
embedded in state policies (Gilens 1999; MacKinnnon 1998; Naples 1998), particularly through 
systematic exclusion of minority and immigrant populations from access to “legitimate” social 
benefits (Glenn 2002; Quadagno 2000). Their work shows how the effects of social policies vary 
dramatically by race and gender, perpetuating inequalities in poverty (Bashevkin 2002; Moller 
2002), and resulting in the overrepresentation of minorities and women in residual, means-tested 
social programs (Quadagno 2000). Further reinforcing race and gender inequalities, welfare 
discourses utilize images such as the “underclass” to imply blackness and sexual impropriety, 
which creates hostility toward program recipients (Neubeck and Cazenave 2001) and fosters a 
lack of wide-spread public support of social programs (Gans 1995; O’Connor 2000; Whitaker 
2002).  
Because healthcare in the U.S. is provided primarily through the private market, few 
welfare state scholars have examined health insurance as they have other components of welfare 
regimes - such as mother’s pensions (e.g., Cauthen and Amenta 1996) or poverty reduction 
programs (e.g., Korpi and Palme 1998). But the U.S. system of private benefits relies heavily on 
public subsidies, making it a critical component of the welfare state (Hacker 2002). Thus, I argue 
that a welfare regime perspective provides an appropriate and useful framework for 
understanding the complex relationship between macro-level state and market forces, meso-level 
family factors, and individual-level welfare, work, and family changes that shape low-income 
women’s access to health insurance and perpetuate race, class, and gender inequalities in health 




Neoliberal economic restructuring and welfare state retrenchment have resulted in 
substantial cuts in public benefits both globally and nationally (Harvey 2005; Korpi 2003; Myles 
and Quadagno 2002). But because retrenchment is politically risky, these reforms have been 
carried out using subtle discourses that obscure cuts by blaming budget deficits, the impending 
crisis of the aging baby boomers, and the effects of global competition (Quadagno 1999; Schram 
2000). These changes, combined with the erosion of wages, loss of manufacturing jobs, and 
cutbacks in social programs such as food stamps and housing supports, have had particularly 
important impacts on the lives of low-income women who have suffered most from the further 
feminization of poverty (Mittelstadt 2005).  
One of the most consequential neoliberal reforms for low-income women in the U.S. was 
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which 
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Aid for Needy 
Families (TANF). TANF ended cash benefits for the poor, limited lifetime benefits to five years, 
and required workfare (participation in paid employment) for public assistance (Abromovitz 
1996 [1988]; Trattner 1999). In effect, this reform removed support for low-income women’s 
unpaid care giving and entitlements based on social rights (Myles and Quadagno 2002). In an 
effort to encourage workforce participation the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was expanded. 
In fact, for many low-income women EITC credits are now larger than direct cash assistance 
benefits, making it an important source of supplementary income for low-income women 
(Cherlin and Fomby 2004). Despite the expansion of EITC, because the work requirements and 
incentives introduced with welfare reform were not accompanied by guaranteed employment 
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opportunities (Schram 2000), the ultimate result has been the expansion of the working poor 
(O’Connor 2000).  
Welfare reform was intended to curb low-income women’s access to cash benefits and 
encourage their labor force participation, but these policy changes also had the consequence of 
affecting their access to health insurance. Although welfare reform officially delinked TANF 
with other programs such as Medicaid and food stamps, 13 states, including Kansas, elected to 
cut off Medicaid eligibility as a TANF sanction for work noncompliance (Cheng 2007; Chavkin 
and Wise 2002; Chavkin, Romero, and Wise 2000). TANF legislation did include requirements 
for states to provide at least six months of Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) through 
Medicaid, but a plethora of research suggests that transitioning to work actually increased the 
likelihood of insurance instability, especially following the expiration of transitional coverage 
(Anderson and Eamon 2004; Cheng 2007; Danziger et al. 2008; Hartley, Seccombe, and 
Hoffman 2005; Holl, Slack and Stevens 2005; Kronebusch 2001; Seccombe, Newsom, and 
Hoffman 2006).  
Even in states where Medicaid eligibility was effectively delinked from TANF, the 
pressure to discourage welfare enrollment may have indirectly discouraged the use of other 
programs as well – many low-income women simply did not know that they could qualify for 
Medicaid even if they were not enrolled in TANF (Chavkin, Romero, and Wise 2000). For 
example, one study found that only 33 percent of low-income women who left welfare for work 
were able to get health insurance coverage through their jobs and that rates of uninsurance 
increased over time as Medicaid coverage declined, resulting in 25-50 percent of former TANF 
recipients being uninsured 2-3 years later (Garrett and Holahan 2000). Others have found health 
insurance employment eligibility rates as low as 15 percent among TANF leavers (Hartley, 
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Seccombe, and Hoffman 2005). The ultimate consequence is that low-income women exiting 
TANF have had less access to necessary regular health care. 
 
Employment  
Family formation, social policies, and economic opportunities and constraints directly 
affect women’s employment decisions. Family dynamics and the changing availability and 
structure of women’s employment shape women’s perceptions of need and opportunity, 
influencing their decisions to work (Gerson 1985; Taniguchi and Rosenfeld 2002). For example, 
whereas marriage may hasten women’s reentrance into the workforce, part-time employment 
often hastens their exit from the labor market, while the availability of higher wages tends to 
slow women’s employment transitions (Taniguchi and Rosenfeld 2002). Whether by choice or 
force, job changes and/or job loss is one of the biggest reasons for a lack of insurance among the 
uninsured (Hoffman et al. 2008; Marquis and Kapur 2003). Despite widespread acceptance of 
this fact, few have examined the unique characteristics of low-income women’s job instability 
and its effect on their insurance instability (for an exception, see Anderson and Eamon 2004).  
Employment opportunities certainly affect women’s health insurance options (Holahan 
and Cook 2008b). Perhaps more interesting though, research on women’s labor supply shows 
that access to health insurance also directly affects women’s employment decisions (Adams 
2004; Bradley et al. 2007; Buchmueller and Valletta 1999; Wellington and Cobb-Clark 2000). 
Many women are working more hours then they would prefer in order to secure health insurance 
benefits for their families (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999). Wellington and Cobb-Clark 
(2000:316) find that when a married man has access to insurance, the hours his wife works 
decreases 7-15 percent annually; when a married woman has access to insurance, the hours her 
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husband works decreases less than 4 percent annually. Some find that parents who have health 
insurance coverage for themselves or whose children are enrolled in a plan through their 
employment are less likely to willfully exit a job (Marquis and Kapur 2003). And others show 
that even when they experience a health shock, women who maintain employment-contingent 
health insurance are less likely to reduce their labor supply or exit work than women who have 
insurance through their spouse in order to maintain their insurance coverage (Bradley et al. 
2007).  
Low-income women’s employment trajectories are diverse and influenced by factors 
such as mental health, family violence, human capital, educational opportunities (Acs and 
Blumberg 2001; DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2008), access to resources such as a working 
vehicle (Yoshikawa et al. 2006), and changes in social policy (Hays 2003). Low-income 
women’s wages are often critical for their family well-being (Edin and Lein 1996, 1997; Hays 
2003; Johnson 2002). Nevertheless, many low-income women are keenly aware that the kinds of 
employment they have access to often do not provide benefits or a sufficient wage that will allow 
them to afford employer-based or private health insurance for themselves and their children 
(Hartley, Seccombe, and Hoffman 2005). Thus, low-income women who do not have employer-
based coverage sometimes resort to other strategies to secure health insurance, such as limiting 
their work hours in order to remain qualified for public health insurance (Hartley, Seccombe, and 
Hoffman 2005).  
 
Marriage and Family 
A secondary wage-earner has the potential to significantly alter a low-income family’s 
economic status, while lack of access to a partner increases women and children’s risk of poverty 
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(Meyer and Herd 2007; Stacey 1998 [1990]). Despite this, single, female-headed families are 
increasing as a result of economic and cultural changes that have made traditional families less 
stable (Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997; Zinn 1990). Although the demand for female labor 
has resulted in more dual-earner families (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2001), globalization 
and deindustrialization are causing greater economic insecurity, inequality, and poverty, 
especially for low-income, single-parent, and minority families (Abramovitz 1991; Cheal 1996).  
Marriage is not a haven for low-income women. Although many low-income women 
want to marry, they are often unwilling to assume the risk of dependency to economically 
unstable men or to endure the family violence that often accompanies economic strain (Edin and 
Kefalas 2005; Rogers-Dillon and Haney 2005). While 67 percent of near-poor women are 
married, only 37 percent of low-income women are married (Wyn et al. 2001:9). In addition to 
being more likely to be unmarried, low-income women are also more likely to be single mothers. 
The rate of single motherhood among near-poor women is about 7 percent, whereas the rate of 
single motherhood among low-income women is about 29 percent (Wyn et al. 2001:9). 
Health insurance is a family matter and a lack of access to insurance for even some 
family members puts entire households at risk for insurance instability (Institute of Medicine 
2002; Schwartz 2007). Spouses play a particularly important role in securing health insurance for 
many women (Institute of Medicine 2002). Overall, of women enrolled in employment-based 
insurance, 52 percent are covered directly as an employee and 48 percent are covered as the 
dependent of an employee (Hoffman et al. 2008:2). Although women are more likely to access 
employer-based insurance through a spouse, because of changes in marital relationships, 
dependent coverage is a much less stable form of insurance for women (Anderson and Eamon 
2004; Patchias and Waxman 2007; Wyn et al. 2001).  
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Even when in stable relationships, the health insurance advantages of marriage may not 
translate for low-income women. For example, Angel, Frias, and Hill (2005) find evidence that 
low-income families may face a marriage penalty for health insurance, in that being married 
actually lowers the odds of complete household coverage among low-income families. Marriage 
and the pooling of resources often disqualify low-income families from public health insurance, 
although the kinds of work they have access to may not provide affordable benefits in return, 
leaving low-income families partially or entirely uninsured (Angel, Frias, and Hill 2005). As 
men’s employment becomes more unstable, more women are trying to get insurance through 
their own employment (Merzel 2000). 
 
Race and Ethnicity 
Understanding the relationship between welfare, work, and family changes on low-
income women’s health insurance and poverty status also requires considering important patterns 
in insurance access by race. Overall statistics show that 19.5 percent of Blacks and 32.1 percent 
of Hispanics are uninsured compared to 10.4 percent of whites (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Smith 2008:21; Hoffman et al. 2008). In addition to being at greater individual risk, Blacks and 
Hispanic-Mexicans also have an elevated risk of incomplete household coverage (Angel, Frias, 
and Hill 2005). When we focus in on racial disparities in health insurance access among the 
population of low-income women, several important patterns emerge. For example, whereas 
low-income Latina women have the highest rates of uninsurance (51 percent), there is no race 
disparity between low-income Black and white women in the proportion of uninsured – in both 
populations about one-third do not have health insurance (Wyn et al. 2001:31).  
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Nevertheless, source of health insurance varies considerably across race and ethnic 
groups. Research shows that employment often provides the best pathway to health insurance 
coverage, but groups like Hispanics are significantly less likely to be offered coverage through 
their work than whites (Zuvekas and Taliaferro 2003). In fact, low-income Latina women have 
the lowest rates (12 percent) of job-based health insurance coverage (Wyn et al. 2001:32). 
Whereas a larger proportion of Black low-income women get health insurance through Medicaid 
(33 percent), white low-income women have the highest proportion of job-based dependent 
coverage (18 percent) (Wyn et al. 2001:32).  
One significant consequence of welfare reform is that immigrant and minority women 
now report greater difficulties in getting insurance and delays in receiving medical care (Kaushal 
and Kaestner 2007). Because more low-income Black women rely on Medicaid as a source of 
health insurance than other groups of women, welfare reform has had much more of an impact 
on their health insurance access. Further contributing to racial disparities in health insurance, 
welfare reform effectively banned new immigrants from Medicaid coverage (Wyn et al. 2001). 
Although 86 percent of low-income women are either U.S. born or immigrant citizens (4 
percent), low-income women born outside of the U.S. have seen the greatest reductions in 
Medicaid coverage and the greatest increases in uninsurance. In fact, 56 percent of low-income 
noncitizen women are uninsured (Wyn et al. 2001: 40). Research consistently shows that race, 
nativity, and city of residence have important effects on the insurance status of low-income 
women (see Angel, Frias, and Hill 2005; Taniguchi and Rosenfeld 2002; Zuvekas and Taliaferro 
2003). 
 
Limitations of Previous Research 
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Expanding our understanding of the complex relationship between welfare, work, and 
family changes, health insurance instability, and changes in poverty status, requires a 
longitudinal analysis of individual-level data that allows us to model the dynamic nature of low-
income women’s lives and health insurance coverage (Angel, Frias, and Hill 2005). Many low-
income women live on the edge of poverty daily, making changes in their work, family, and 
welfare status particularly consequential for their economic well-being.  
Although cross-sectional analyses of health insurance coverage provide important 
information about the distribution of health insurance access at any given time, they may not 
adequately represent the fluctuating life circumstances of low-income workers, the contingent 
nature of insurance eligibility, or the long-term effects of prior conditions. Such models may 
work well for describing families who have access to stable sources of employment and 
economic resources, but are less appropriate for describing the lives of low-income women who 
are more likely to face frequent job changes and/or job loss resulting in a disruption of health 
insurance coverage (Dodson and Bravo 2005; Dubay and Kenney 2004; Feder et al. 2001; 
Schoen and Puleo 1998; Tallon and Rowland 2007; Wyn et al. 2001; Yoshikawa et al. 2006). 
Thus, if we only examine insurance status at one point in time, then we severely underestimate 
the risks associated with being unstably insured (Graefe and Short 2003; Schoen and DesRoches 
2000). Therefore, analyzing a panel of low-income women living in low-income neighborhoods 
provides the ideal opportunity to examine the effects of individual-level changes on low-income 
women’s insurance instability and poverty status over time. 
In addition, research examining the lives of low-income women often treats those with 
incomes below 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) as one cohesive group. There is 
some justification for grouping these women together for comparative purposes, but we also 
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know there is a great deal of variability among categories of the poor (Iceland 2003).  As McCall 
(2000) describes, the “new inequality” is between groups of women. As opportunities for some 
women have improved, others have eroded. Thus, it is vital that we look at within gender 
variability when examining women’s lives. Edin and Lein (1997), for example, make the 
important distinction between “welfare reliant” and “wage reliant” women in their in-depth 
analysis of low-income women’s lives post welfare reform. Although these women share many 
of the same social and economic struggles, their strategies for survival are somewhat different 
based on their relationship to the labor market and welfare state. Utilizing a welfare regime 
perspective causes us to consider the “family reliant” woman and the unique constraints she 
faces in maintaining health insurance. Are the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on 
women’s health insurance stability and poverty consistent across categories of low-income 
women? Or are certain changes more or less consequential for poor and near-poor women?  
Finally, because of their unique vulnerabilities, general population data may not 
accurately represent low-income women’s experience. Immediately following welfare reform 
and up to five years later (when some women would begin hitting the five year time-limit on 
benefits) there was a plethora of research examining the consequences of welfare-to-work 
programs on the lives of low-income women. Some of this work did include examining the 
effects of welfare reform on women’s health insurance access. But soon after this work was 
accomplished, the attention of health insurance scholars turned to examining the effects of 
skyrocketing health care costs on the middle-class (i.e., Pandey and Cantor 2004). What has 
happened to low-income women 10 years after welfare reform? What changes have these women 
endured? And what are the consequences of these changes on low-income women’s access to 
health insurance and economic progress? 
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In order to assess how changes in women’s work, family, and welfare situations affect 
changes in their access to health insurance, and the effects of health insurance stability on low-
income women’s poverty, I will conduct a secondary analysis of three waves of data from the 
Welfare, Children, and Families Project: A Three-City Study using a series of logistic regression 
models. The analysis will be driven by three specific research questions. Informed by existing 




Research Question 1 
What is the relative importance of individual-level welfare, work, and family factors in 
predicting low-income women’s health insurance access over time? 
 
Hypotheses Set 1  
I hypothesize that there will be differential effects for low-income women’s welfare, work, and 
family changes dependent upon the type of insurance examined. 
 
H1a: Given the economic benefits of full-time employment, in the Chapter 4 lagged effects 
models I expect to find that full-time employment at T1 will have strong and consistent effects 
across models predicting women’s insurance access at T2; full-time employment at earlier time 
points should reduce women’s odds of being uninsured or publicly insured, and increase their 
odds of having access to private or employment based insurance at later time points. Similarly, in 
Chapter 5 I expect to find that employment changes that result in access to full-time work will 
                                                 
3
 Because my first research question is primarily descriptive, it may seem inappropriate to formulate strict 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this dissertation I have offered some specific hypotheses describing 
my expectations regarding the relationships between certain variables in order to guide discussion of my statistical 
findings in later chapters.   
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have effects consistent with stable access to full-time employment, resulting in increased 
likelihood of being privately insured and reduced likelihood of being uninsured or having public 
insurance. In Chapter 6 I also expect to find that employment trajectories that reflect stable and 
continuous access to full-time work will increase women’s odds of having private or 
employment based insurance while reducing their odds of being uninsured or having public 
insurance. Nevertheless, it is also possible that because of the kinds of work low-income women 
have access to (low-pay, low-skill occupations), full-time employment (particularly new full-
time employment) may not provide sufficient protection against being uninsured or guarantee 
access to private or employment based insurance options.  
 
H1b: Although Medicaid was officially delinked from welfare receipt in 1996, I expect to find 
that women’s welfare status will have a significant effect on women’s access to public insurance, 
but less of an impact on their access to private insurance. For example, in Chapter 4 I expect to 
find that women on welfare at T1 are more likely to have public insurance and less likely to have 
private or employer based insurance at T2. Because of the protection public insurance provides 
to low-income women, we could also reasonably expect to find that women on welfare at T1 
may also be less likely to be uninsured at T2. Similarly, in Chapter 5 I expect to find that 
changes that results in women’s loss of welfare benefits will also negatively impact their access 
to public health insurance. Given the economic vulnerability following loss of welfare benefits, 
we might also expect to find that these women are more likely to be uninsured and less likely to 
have private or employment based insurance. In Chapter 6 I can reasonably expect to find that 
women with trajectories displaying either stable access to welfare or new access to welfare are 
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more likely to have access to public insurance and less likely to be uninsured or have private or 
employment based insurance. 
 
H1c: I also hypothesize that marriage stability will increase the likelihood of having private 
insurance, while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of having public insurance or being 
uninsured. Given the economic benefits of marriage, in Chapter 4 I expect to find that marriage 
at T1 will reduce women’s odds of having access to public insurance and being uninsured, while 
increasing their odds of having access to private or employment based insurance at T2. In 
Chapter 5, I also expect to find that getting married or staying married have similar effects – 
reducing women’s access to public insurance and odds of being uninsured, while increasing their 
odds of having private or employment based benefits. Similarly, in Chapter 6 I expect to find that 
trajectories that do not lead to formal marriage will have minimal effects on women’s access to 
private or employment based insurance or uninsured status, while increasing women’s odds of 
access to public insurance. Despite the potential for resource pooling among cohabiting couples, 
across all models I suspect that cohabitation will not have the same level of effects on women’s 
access to insurance as formal marriage. Nevertheless, as expressed in hypothesis H1a, because of 
the kinds of work low-income men often have access to, it is also possible that marriage, while 
reducing women’s access to public insurance and providing opportunities to qualify for employer 
health insurance as a dependent, may not provide sufficient protection against being uninsured or 
guarantee access to private or employment based insurance options.  
 
H1d: Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6 I hypothesize that although static measures of women’s 
welfare, work, and family statuses may help us predict their insurance status, measures of change 
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and trajectory will do a better job of explaining the variance in women’s health insurance status 
by better accounting for the dynamic nature of low-income women’s lives. Similarly, although in 
Chapter 4 I expect to observe the lagged effects described above, I also expect to find that 
measures of the lagged effects of static status are less helpful in explaining the variance in 
women’s insurance status than change or trajectory measures. 
 
Research Question 2 
Are there significant differences between women who are poor and near-poor at Wave 1 in 
the effects of welfare, work, and family factors on their health insurance access over time?  
 
Hypotheses Set 2 
I hypothesize that there will be significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the 
importance of various welfare, work, and family factors due to poor women’s increased 
vulnerability. Nevertheless, I expect that the significance of differences between poor and near-
poor women will be dependent on the type of insurance instability analyzed.  
 
H2a: Because of poor women’s ability to qualify for public health insurance (despite the strict 
eligibility guidelines) I expect to find that employment factors will have relatively little impact 
on their access to any form of insurance but may have more profound effects for near-poor 
women. For example, in Chapter 4 I expect to find that near-poor women’s access to full-time 
employment at T1 will make them more likely to have private or employer based insurance at 
T2, whereas poor women’s access to full time employment will not provide the same benefit due 
to their particularly low wages and access to public insurance options. In Chapter 5 we might 
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similarly expect to find that employment changes that result in access to full-time employment 
may not provide poor women the same benefits in terms of access to private or employment 
based insurance due to their low wages. Consistent with this, I expect to find in Chapter 6 that 
trajectories leading to full-time employment will have less significant effects for poor than near 
poor women.  
 
H2b: I expect to find that poor women’s welfare receipt will have more pronounced effects on 
their access to insurance and poverty than near-poor women. For example, in Chapter 4 I 
anticipate that poor women’s access to welfare at T1 will increase their likelihood of being 
publicly insured and reduce their likelihood of being uninsured or privately insured at T2, and 
that these effects will be more pronounced for poor women than near-poor women. In Chapter 5 
I hypothesize that even when they experience welfare changes poor women will have a greater 
likelihood of being publicly insured and a reduced likelihood of being uninsured, whereas near-
poor women who experience welfare changes may not benefit from these same protections. 
Nevertheless, near-poor women’s loss of welfare status may result in greater likelihood of 
obtaining private or employer based insurance, whereas poor women may not obtain similar 
access to private or employer based benefits upon loss of welfare. Finally, in Chapter 6 I expect 
to find that even when poor women experience less stable welfare trajectories (i.e., lose welfare 
benefits) they will experience less significant impacts on their health insurance access than near-
poor women who, when loosing welfare benefits, may be at greater risk of losing public health 
insurance and being uninsured than poor women.   
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H2c: I also hypothesize that family factors will have a much greater impact on near-poor 
women’s access to public insurance and risk of being uninsured than poor women as poor 
women’s access to public programs protects them better from the negative effects of family 
changes than near-poor women. For example, in Chapter 4 I expect to find that near-poor 
women’s marital status at T1 plays a more significant role in affecting their access to both public 
and private insurance at T2 than poor women, namely, by reducing their likelihood of qualifying 
for public insurance due to resource pooling, while increasing opportunities for access to 
employer-based insurance options through marriage. In Chapter 5, I expect to observe that 
family changes that result in the ending of a marriage or beginning of a marriage will have more 
significant effects on near-poor women’s access to both public and private insurance than poor 
women. Similarly, I also expect to find in Chapter 6 that trajectories representing stable marriage 
or movement into marriage will have more profound effects for near-poor women by increasing 
their access to private insurance while reducing their access to public insurance. I also expect to 
find that stable cohabitation may not provide the same level of benefits for near-poor women that 
stable marriage provides given women’s ability to access private insurance benefits as 
dependents through marriage. 
 
Research Question 3 
Given the effects of welfare, work, and family factors on low-income women’s health 
insurance access, is health insurance access a significant barrier to low-income women’s 
economic progress over time?  
 
Hypotheses Set 3 
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Finally, I hypothesize that different forms of insurance access and instability will have 
differential effects on women’s poverty over time.  
 
H3a: I first hypothesize that being uninsured will significantly reduce women’s economic 
progress over time. For example, in Chapter 4 I expect to observe that compared to those who 
are uninsured at T1, women with private forms of insurance will be less likely to move into 
poverty and more likely to move out of poverty at T2. In Chapter 5 I also expect to find that 
becoming uninsured or staying uninsured results in greater risk of moving into poverty and 
reduced odds of moving out of poverty at T2. Similarly, in Chapter 6, we might expect that 
trajectories leading to loss of insurance will result in greater odds of moving in to poverty.  
 
H3b: Although I expect to find that having access to public insurance may protect women from 
the economic costs of health care, it is also possible that the benefits of public insurance access 
may not be observable or consistent across models because too much economic progress may 
result in loss of public insurance benefits. So, for example, although in Chapter 4 I anticipate that 
women’s access to public insurance at T1 reduces their odds of moving into poverty at T2 (i.e., 
by reducing their risk of medical debt, etc.), in Chapter 5, the loss of public insurance may 
actually represent women’s movement out of poverty. Similarly, in Chapter 6 we might also 
expect to find that stable public insurance trajectories are an indication of sustained poverty over 
time. 
 
H3c: Finally, I hypothesize that having access to private insurance should improve women’s 
economic progress. For example, in Chapter 4 we might expect to find that access to private or 
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employer-based insurance at T1 increases the odds of moving out of poverty at T2. Similarly, in 
Chapter 5 we might expect to find that transitioning into private or employment based insurance 
increases women’s odds of moving out of poverty. And in Chapter 6 we might also expect to 
observe that trajectories that represent both stable access to and movement into private or 
employment based insurance produce positive effects on women’s economic progress by 
reducing their odds of moving into poverty.  Nevertheless, it is also possible that because of 
variability in the extensiveness and cost of private insurance, access to this form of insurance 
may not have consistent effects on women’s economic progress over time. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Introduction 
 Examining how low-income women’s changing relationships to work, family, and the 
welfare state affect both their access to health insurance and economic resources requires use of 
data that are first, representative of low-income families and second, longitudinal by design in 
order to allow me to adequately examine changes in women’s lives over time. Although there are 
many different sources of data on health insurance access available for public use, I have chosen 
to use data from the Welfare, Children, and Families Project: A Three-City Study to answer my 
research questions. Interested in the effects of welfare reform on low-income women, children, 
and families, a large collaborative research team (supported in part by Johns Hopkins University) 
collected extensive data over a six year period from over 2,000 low-income families regarding 
their employment opportunities, family arrangements, use of public benefits, health insurance 
access, and general well-being (Angel et al. 2009).
4
 Given the Three-City Study’s explicit focus 
on low-income women and longitudinal research design, I believe these data are ideal for 
answering my research questions. 
 
                                                 
4
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The Data  
Data for the Three-City Study were collected in 1999 (Wave 1), 2001 (Wave 2), and 
2005 (Wave 3) and drawn from a representative sample of low-income families living in low-
income neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio (Angel et al. 2009). These cities 
were chosen by the principal investigators to reflect the race/ethnic and policy diversity of US 
cities and states (Coley and Fomby 2008). Research shows that state policy and population 
composition play an important role in shaping individuals’ access to health insurance (Angel, 
Frias, and Hill 2005; Zimmerman and Legerski 2010). For example, in the late 1990s 
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Texas were among the top eight states with the largest non-citizen 
populations (Angel, Frias, and Hill 2005) and among the top 12 states with the largest Medicaid 
enrollments (Ellis and Smith 2000), yet Medicaid eligibility guidelines for immigrants in each 
state varied considerably.  
Boston was chosen by the principal investigators for inclusion in the Three-City Study 
because of its large population of African American (29 percent) and Hispanic (11 percent) 
residents and its historically liberal state government (Coley and Fomby 2008). The poverty rate 
in Massachusetts in 1999 was 9.3 percent (Bishaw and Iceland 2003:4). Following welfare, from 
1996-1998, Massachusetts experienced a 27 percent decline in TANF recipients – which 
although significant, actually represents a rate much lower than the U.S. average decline of 32 
percent (Chavkin, Romero and Wise 2000: 902). Despite imposing strict workfare requirements 
and a family cap in aid, the state’s TANF amendments also included a number of measures 
intended to support recipients, including guaranteed childcare and support for victims of family 
violence (Chavkin, Romero and Wise 2000). During the 1990s the state was experimenting with 
a mix of state-based and market-based health insurance reforms (Barrilleaux and Brace 2007). 
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While most states were experiencing declines in Medicaid enrollments during this time, 
Massachusetts actually posted consistent gains in Medicaid enrollment following implementation 
of the Mass Health program which expanded eligibility for working adults in categories that do 
not normally qualify for Medicaid (Ellis and Smith 2000). From 1999-2005 the state’s non-
elderly uninsured population fluctuated around ten percent (U.S. Census 2009). State legislation 
supporting universal healthcare coverage was signed into law in 2006, reducing the state’s non-
elderly uninsured population to six percent, but this did not occur until after the third wave of 
data were collected (U.S. Census 2009). Despite the overall improvement, by the end of the 
study period (2006-2007) the state’s proportion of uninsured non-elderly, low-income women 
remained at about 16 percent (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008c). 
Chicago was chosen as the second site for its large population of African American (39 
percent) and Hispanic (19 percent) residents and its historically moderate state government 
(Coley and Fomby 2008). The poverty rate in Illinois in 1999 was 10.7 percent (Bishaw and 
Iceland 2003:4). Like Massachusetts, following welfare reform (1996-1998) Illinois experienced 
a 25 percent decline in TANF enrollments (Chavkin, Romero and Wise 2000: 902). With the 
exception of imposing a family cap in aid and guaranteeing childcare for TANF recipients, the 
state did not make many other amendments to the new federal welfare regulations (Chavkin, 
Romero and Wise 2000). During the 1990s the state was also experimenting with market-based 
health insurance reforms (Barrilleaux and Brace 2007) and experienced both periods of growth 
and loss in Medicaid enrollments (Ellis and Smith 2000). From 1999-2005 the state’s non-elderly 
uninsured population fluctuated around 15 percent (U.S. Census 2009). Despite a relatively low 
overall rate of uninsured, the state’s proportion of uninsured low-income women (non-elderly) 
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remained much higher at 34 percent following the study period, from 2006-2007 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2008c).  
Finally, San Antonio was chosen for its large population of Hispanic (55 percent) and 
African American (7 percent) residents and its historically limited state government (Coley and 
Fomby 2008). The poverty rate in Texas in 1999 was 15.4 percent (Bishaw and Iceland 2003:4). 
Following welfare reform (1996-1998) Texas experienced a 44 percent reduction in TANF 
enrollments after instituting a number of deterrent policies, such as offering one-time cash 
payments to delay application for TANF and requiring recipients to attend family planning 
counseling and/or educational activities (Chavkin, Romero and Wise 2000: 902). Although 
federal welfare reform prevented new immigrants from receiving TANF for five years after 
entering the U.S., Texas extended the ban until new immigrants receive citizenship (Frazer, 
Gold, and Lyons 1999). The state’s welfare reform program also resulted in significant declines 
in Medicaid enrollment by discouraging applicants from seeking any form of state assistance 
(Frazer, Gold, and Lyons 1999; Ellis and Smith 2000). Exceptionally restrictive financial 
eligibility criteria and mandatory face-to-face recertification made Texas “one of the 10 most 
limited Medicaid programs in the nation” (Frazer, Gold, and Lyons 1999:8). Perhaps 
unsurprising, the state’s focus on health insurance reforms in the 1990s emphasized market-
based approaches and limited state government (Barrilleaux and Brace 2007; Frazer, Gold, and 
Lyons 1999). From 1999-2005 the state’s non-elderly uninsured population fluctuated around 26 
percent – well above the national average (U.S. Census 2009). Even more notable is the state’s 
rate of uninsured low-income women (non-elderly), which at 51 percent in 2006-7 represented 
the highest rate of uninsured low-income women in the nation (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2008c). 
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The completion of the third survey of the Three-City Study provides an ideal opportunity 
to examine the effects of low-income women’s welfare, work, and family transitions on their 
access to health insurance, the role of health insurance instability as a barrier to women’s 
economic progress, and differences in the nature of these relationships between categories of 
low-income women. Although many scholars are using this data to examine various aspects of 
low-income families, previous research has not yet taken advantage of the time dimensions of 
the dataset. For example, Angel, Frias, and Hill (2005) have used Wave 2 data to examine the 
correlates of child coverage and household insurance coverage, their analysis was cross-
sectional, and they did not examine how employment changes over time affect insurance status 
over time. Similarly, Cherlin and Fomby (2004) have used Wave 1 and Wave 2 data to examine 
how work and welfare transitions influence marriage transitions, but they did not analyze how 
these transitions influence health insurance access over time. The timing of the second data 
collection in 2001 is particularly important given that it marked the five year anniversary of 
PRWORA, and meant some women would begin to reach the five year time limit on welfare 
benefits. From a historical perspective, these data allow us to examine the condition of low-
income women nearly 10 years after welfare reform, providing the opportunity to assess the 
long-term consequences of welfare-to-work policies on low-income women’s health insurance 
status and the role of health insurance instability as a barrier to women’s economic progress.  
 
Sampling 
 The principal investigators utilized a population based sampling strategy for selecting 
participants. The first sampling stage included random selection of high-poverty neighborhoods 
(Census blocks with a 20 percent poverty rate or higher) stratified by the predominant 
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race/ethnicity of each neighborhood in each of the three cities. Within each neighborhood a 
random segment of households was selected. Then within each segment of households, dwelling 
units were randomly sampled for screening. A total of 40,000 households were selected for 
screening based on eight stratifying criteria, including household head’s race/ethnicity, family 
income, female caregiver’s marital status, age of children in the home, and receipt of social 
services such as Medicaid or food stamps. The actual sampling unit was a single focal child 
within the household, but data were also collected from that child’s primary female caregiver.  
Of the qualifying households, 2,402 families participated in interviews at Wave 1 (for a 
response rate of 74 percent). Of the children and families interviewed at Wave 1, 80 percent were 
re-interviewed at Wave 3 (N=1,921), but 131 children were living with new female caregivers at 
Wave 2 and Wave 3. In addition to surveying these new caregivers, every effort was also made 
to collect data from the separated caregiver at Wave 2 and Wave 3 (if still separated at this time). 
Data from the 131 new caregivers are excluded from my analysis since no data was collected 
from them at Wave 1. Thus, the valid response rate for my study of families participating at all 
three time points is 74.5 percent of the original Wave 1 respondents (N=1,790). The results of 
my analysis are based on only the data collected from the primary female caregivers who 
participated in all three surveys. Although not shown here, comparisons between panel 
respondents and those who did not participate in all three surveys reveal minimal differences 
between groups, with the only statistically significant difference being that panel respondents 
were more likely to be from Chicago and San Antonio. Greater attrition among Boston 
respondents provides further justification for the use of household panel weights to correct for 
any biases in point estimates. 
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Since I am primarily interested in women’s access to Medicaid and private/employer 
based insurance, I also exclude from the models 82 individuals who had military or other forms 
of health insurance as well as 46 respondents who had both public and private/employer 
insurance simultaneously since these women represent a small, yet special case (N=1,662).
5
  
There are many ways to utilize longitudinal data, each providing a different way of 
measuring the changes women experience over time. In this dissertation I have chosen to focus 
on three different kinds of longitudinal measures in order to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of low-income women’s access to health insurance and poverty over time. In 
Chapter 4 I model the lagged effects of welfare, work, and family factors at T1 on women’s 
health insurance and poverty status at T2. Understanding the effects of a set of conditions at one 
time point on women’s opportunities at later time points provides us with a long-term 
perspective and may allow us to develop better interventions that will help women “down the 
road.” While Chapter 4 examines the lagged effects of T1 measures, in Chapter 5 I take a 
different approach by using measures of welfare, work, and family change to predict women’s 
health insurance and poverty status. By comparing models using static measures with models 
using measures of change I can determine if experiencing change in any particular status impacts 
women’s health insurance access and poverty differently than one’s current marital, 
employment, or welfare status. Then in Chapter 6, I examine change over time by using 
trajectory measures to explore how welfare, work, and family patterns prior to Wave 3 might 
affect women’s access to health insurance and poverty status. Some argue that trajectories are 
better able to represent the dynamic nature of people’s lives than simple cross-sectional measures 
of individual characteristics. Instead of measuring one’s status at a certain time point, trajectories 
                                                 
5
 Comparisons between those included in the analyses and those dropped because they had military/other insurance 
or multiple forms of insurance simultaneously (results not shown) reveal few statistically significant differences 
between groups. The exceptions being that those dropped tend to be older and/or have fewer children. 
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give us important information about an individual’s experience prior to their current status, 
which may help explain variation between respondents who share a similar status at Wave 3, for 
example. After all, how a person arrived at a certain place may play a role in their ability to 
access certain opportunities at any given point in time. 
I chose several variables to represent the welfare, work, and family factors that may 
affect low-income women’s health insurance access and poverty status. Tables 3.1a-c display 
summaries of the independent and dependent variables used in the models. Although the models 
use many of the same variables, the data collection time points vary and in some cases the 
response categories and coding of certain variables also varies, thus variables for each set of 
analyses are described separately where appropriate. 
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Table 3.1a Variable Descriptions for Chapter 4 Lagged Effects Models 
Independent Variables  
Controls Time Data collection time point identifier (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Months Months between collection points 
 City Boston, Chicago, San Antonio 
 Race/Ethnicity White, Black, Hispanic, Other 
 Citizenship US Citizen, No or Yes (Wave 1 or Wave 2) 
 Kids # of Children in Household Responsible for (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Age Respondent Age in years (Wave 1 or 2) 
   
Employment 
Factors  
Education No Degree, HS Diploma/GED, College Degree (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Employment Unemployed, Work < 35 hours, Work 35+ hours (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Income Total Household Income in Thousands (Wave 1 or 2) 
   
Welfare  
Factors 
Welfare On Welfare, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
   
Family 
Factors 
Marital Status Single (not cohabiting), Cohabiting, Separated/Spouse Not 
Present, Married (spouse present) (Wave 1 or 2) 
   
Health 
Factors 
Health General Health Excellent/Very Good, Good, Fair/Poor (Wave 1 
or 2) 
 Health Problem Health Problem Prevents Working, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Health Need Could Not Afford Needed Care, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Uninsured Uninsured, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Public HI On Medicaid, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
 Private/Employer Have Private/Employer HI, No or Yes (Wave 1 or 2) 
   
Poverty 
Status 
Poor In Poverty (Total Household Income < FPL), No or Yes (Wave 
1 or 2) 
   
Dependent Variables  
 Uninsured Uninsured, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Public Enrolled in Medicaid, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Private/Employer  Enrolled in Private or Employer HI, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 




Table 3.1b Variable Descriptions for Chapter 5 Change Variable Models 
Independent Variables  
Controls Time Data collection time point identifier (Time 2 or 3) 
 Months Months between collection points 
 City Boston, Chicago, San Antonio 
 Race/Ethnicity White, Black, Hispanic, Other 
 Citizenship US Citizen, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Kids # of Children in Household Responsible for (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Age Respondent Age in years (Wave 2 or 3) 
   
Employment 
Factors  
Education No Degree, HS Diploma/GED, College Degree (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Income Total Household Income in Thousands (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Employment Unemployed, Work < 35 hours, Work 35+ hours (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Employment 
Change 
Stayed < FT Employed, Lost FT Employment, Got FT 
Employment, Stayed Employed FT (Wave 2 or 3) 
   
Welfare  
Factors 
Welfare On Welfare, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Welfare Change Stayed On Welfare, Moved On Welfare, Moved Off Welfare, 
Stayed Off Welfare (Wave 2 or 3) 
   
Family 
Factors 
Marital Status Single (not cohabiting), Cohabiting, Separated/Spouse Not 
Present, Married (spouse present) (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Marriage Change Stayed Unmarried, Left Marriage, Got Married, Stayed Married 
(Wave 2 or 3) 
   
Health 
Factors 
Health General Health Excellent/Very Good, Good, Fair/Poor (Wave 2 
or 3) 
 Health Problem Health Problem Prevents Working, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Health Need Could Not Afford Needed Care, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Insurance Change Stayed Uninsured, Lost Insurance, Got Insurance, Stayed 
Insured (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Public HI Change Stayed On Public HI, Got On Public HI, Lost Public HI,  Stayed 
Off Public HI (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Private/Employer 
HI Change 
Stayed Off Private/Employer HI, Lost Private/Employer HI, Got 
Private/Employer HI, Kept Private/Employer HI (Wave 2 or 3) 
   
Poverty 
Status 
Poor In Poverty (Total Household Income < FPL), No or Yes (Wave 
1 or 2) 
   
Dependent Variables  
 Uninsured Uninsured, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Public HI Enrolled in Medicaid, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 
 Private/Employer  Enrolled in Private or Employer HI, No or Yes (Wave 2 or 3) 




Table 3.1c Variable Descriptions for Chapter 6 Trajectory Models 
Independent Variables  
Controls City Boston, Chicago, San Antonio 
 Race/Ethnicity White, Black, Hispanic, Other 
 Citizenship US Citizen, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Kids # of Children in Household Responsible for (Wave 3) 
 Age Respondent Age in years (Wave 3) 
   
Employment  Education No Degree, HS Diploma/GED, College Degree (Wave 3) 
Factors Income Total Household Income (Wave 3) 
 Employment Unemployed, Work < 35 hours, Work 35+ hours (Wave 3) 
 Employment 
Trajectory 
Continuously Unemployed, Became Unemployed, Stayed or 
Moved Into PT Work, Continuously FT Employed, Moved Into 
FT Work (by Wave 3) 
   
Welfare  
Factors 
Welfare On Welfare, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Welfare Trajectory Continuously Off Welfare, Moved Off Welfare, Continuously 
On Welfare, Moved Onto Welfare (by Wave 3) 
   
Family 
Factors 
Marital Status Single (not cohabiting), Cohabiting, Separated/Spouse Not 
Present, Married (spouse present) (Wave 3) 
 Marriage 
Trajectory 
Continuously Single, Became Single, Started or Stayed 
Cohabiting, Continuously Married, Got Married, Continuously 
Separated or Spouse Not Present, Moved Into Separation (by 
Wave 3) 
   
Health 
Factors 
Health General Health Excellent/Very Good, Good, Fair/Poor (Wave 3) 
 Health Problem Health Problem Prevents Working, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Health Need Could Not Afford Needed Care, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Insurance Uninsured, Medicaid, Private or Employer HI (Wave 3) 
 Insurance 
Trajectory 
Continuously Uninsured, Became Uninsured, Continuous Public 
HI, Moved Into Public HI, Continuous Private/Employer HI, 
Moved Into Private/Employer HI (by Wave 3) 
   
Poverty 
Status 
Poor In Poverty (Total Household Income < FPL), No or Yes (Wave 
1) 
   
Dependent Variables  
 Uninsured Uninsured, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Public HI Enrolled in Medicaid, No or Yes (Wave 3) 
 Private/Employer  Enrolled in Private or Employer HI, No or Yes (Wave 3) 




In this analysis I am primarily interested in the factors that affect low-income women’s 
access to public and private or employer based insurance and their risk of being uninsured or in 
poverty. Thus, the dependent variables of interest in the following chapters include: women’s 
health insurance status (uninsured versus insured), access to public health insurance (on 
Medicaid or not), access to private or employer based insurance (enrolled in a private/employer 
health insurance plan or not) and change in poverty status (fell below the FPL or not). Since few 
respondents indicated they had military or other health coverage, I do not examine predictors of 
these forms of insurance coverage.  
Uninsured:  Respondents were asked if they were covered by any health insurance. Those 
who indicated No, they did not have any form of health insurance, are coded as 1, while 
those who indicated Yes, they had some form of health insurance, are coded as 0. 
 
Public HI: Respondents who indicated they were covered by some form of health 
insurance were asked if they were covered by Medicaid. Those who indicated No, they 
were not on Medicaid, are coded as 0, while those who indicated Yes, they were enrolled 
in Medicaid, are coded as 1. 
 
Private/Employer HI: Respondents were also asked if they were covered by private or 
employer based health insurance. Those who indicated No to either question are coded as 
0, while those who indicated Yes, they were enrolled in either private or employer based 
insurance, are coded as 1. 
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Poverty Change: Change in women’s poverty status is measured as a categorical 
variable. Respondents who maintained their poverty status across time points are coded 
as 0, while respondents who experienced a change in their poverty status are coded as 1. 
 
Grouping Variable 
Because poverty status affects women’s ability to qualify for public programs, poverty 
status is treated as a grouping variable in some models. Separating analyses by women’s poverty 
status at T1 allows me to look for differences between poor and near-poor women in the effects 
of welfare, work, and family factors that shape low-income women’s risk of being uninsured and 
their access to private and public forms of insurance. I calculated women’s poverty status using 
the Health and Human Services 1999, 2001, and 2005 Poverty Guidelines and data collected on 
women’s total household income (from all sources) and the total number of household members. 
Consistent with other analyses, those with total household incomes 100 percent or less of the 
FPL are defined as poor and coded as 1.  
All women selected for inclusion in the study were considered low-income at T1 – 
meaning they had total household incomes less than 200 percent of the FPL. Although women’s 
incomes changed over time, most women included in this study remained low-income across all 
three time points. In the literature, those with incomes between 100 percent and 200 percent of 
the FPL are typically considered near-poor. Nevertheless, in the following analyses I group all 
women with total household incomes above 100 percent of the FPL in the near-poor category, 
which is coded as 0. 
 
Employment Independent Variables 
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Access to stable, full-time employment can provide access to health insurance through an 
employer and may affect one’s eligibility for public forms of insurance. Educational attainment 
plays an important role in shaping the kinds of work one has access too. Both factors influence 
the income of respondents.  
Education: Respondents were asked to indicate their highest educational degree or 
certificate earned by the time of the interview. Responses were recoded to reflect three 
major response categories: No Degree, High School Diploma or General Education 
Degree (GED, including a Vocational Tech Diploma), and College Degree (defined as an 
Associate’s Degree or higher). Educational status is included in each of the models as a 
series of dummy variables where those with No Degree serve as the reference category. 
Using imputation by chained equations I imputed values for respondents with missing 
data (described below). 
 
Employment: Respondents were asked how many hours they usually worked per week at 
their main job. Those who indicated they worked 35 hours or more per week are 
classified as Working Full-time. Those who worked 1-34 hours per week are classified as 
Working Part-Time. The few individuals who indicated that their work hours varied from 
week to week are grouped with those working part-time because like part-time work, 
variable work schedules often disqualify workers from access to standard full-time 
benefits such as health insurance. Employment status is included in each of the models as 
a series of dummy variables where those who are Unemployed (working no hours) serve 
as the reference category.  
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Income: Income represents a ratio level measure of total monthly household income per 
$1,000. Using imputation by chained equations I imputed values for respondents with 
missing data (described below). Total household income is more appropriate to use than 
individual income in this context since household income is often used to determine 
eligibility for public programs. Although I tested for the appropriateness of using income-
squared and income-cubed in the models (in order to reflect a curvilinear relationship 
between income and insurance status) neither transformation significantly improved the 
fit of the model or changed the results of the analyses, so transformations of income were 
not used in any of the models presented here. 
 
Employment Change: For Chapter 5 I created a change variable to reflect changes in 
women’s employment status at Times 2 and 3. Because working full time appears to have 
the strongest impact on women’s insurance access and poverty, only transitions into and 
out of full-time employment were coded. The employment change categories include: 
those who Stayed Less than FT Employed at Times 2 and 3, those who Lost FT 
Employment, those who Got FT Employment, and those who Stayed Employed FT at 
Times 2 and 3. Employment change is included in each of the models as a series of 
dummy variables where those who Stayed Less than FT Employed serve as the reference 
category. 
 
Employment Trajectory: For Chapter 6 I created a trajectory variable to reflect changes in 
women’s employment status over all three data collection time points. Although a total of 
27 unique trajectories were observed, categories were grouped to reflect five basic 
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trajectories determined by women’s status at Wave 3: those who were Continuously 
Unemployed across all three time points, those who Became Unemployed by Wave 3, 
those who Stayed or Moved Into PT Work by Wave 3, those who were Continuously 
Employed FT across all three time points, and those who Moved Into FT Work by Wave 
3. Employment Trajectory is included in each of the models as a series of dummy 
variables where those who were Continuously Unemployed across all three time points 
serve as the reference category. 
 
Welfare Independent Variables 
Although welfare status was technically delinked from Medicaid with welfare reform, 
many states use the same eligibility criteria for both public programs and several states maintain 
Medicaid penalties for TANF violations. Thus, in many states welfare status maintains a direct 
relationship with one’s access to Medicaid. 
Welfare Status: Respondents were asked if they were currently receiving welfare at the 
time of the interview. Those who indicated they were On Welfare are coded as 1 while all 
others are coded as 0. 
 
Welfare Change: For Chapter 5 I created a variable to measure changes in women’s 
welfare status at Times 2 and 3. The categories of responses include: Those who Stayed 
Off Welfare at either Time 2 or 3, those who Got Off Welfare, those who Got On 
Welfare, and those who Stayed On Welfare. Welfare change is included in each of the 
models as a series of dummy variables where those who Stayed Off Welfare at either 
Time 2 or 3 serve as the reference category 
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Welfare Trajectory: For Chapter 6 I created a trajectory variable to reflect changes in 
women’s welfare status over the three data collection time points. Although a total of 
eight unique trajectories were observed, categories were grouped to reflect four basic 
trajectories determined by women’s welfare status at Wave 3: those who were 
Continuously Off Welfare across all three time points, those who Moved Off Welfare by 
Wave 3, those Continuously On Welfare across all three time points, and those who 
Moved Onto Welfare by Wave 3. Welfare Trajectory is included in each of the models as 
a series of dummy variables where those who were Continuously Off Welfare across all 
three time points serve as the reference category. 
 
Family Independent Variables 
Women’s marital status has important implications for their access to health insurance 
options. For example, married women are significantly more likely to access employer-based 
insurance through a spouse. In many cases marital status may also affect one’s access to public 
programs.  
Marital Status: Respondents were asked to indicate their marital and cohabitation status. 
Responses were grouped into four categories: those who indicated they were Single (and 
Not Cohabitating), Cohabiting, Separated or Spouse Not Present, and Married (Spouse 
Present). Marital Status is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables 
where those who indicated they were Single (and Not Cohabitating) serve as the 
reference category. Using imputation by chained equations I imputed values for 
respondents with missing data (described below). 
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Marital Change: For Chapter 5 I created a marital change variable to reflect changes in 
women’s marriage status at Times 2 and 3. Because marriage appears to have the largest 
effects on women’s access to various forms of insurance, only transitions into and out of 
marriage are considered. Possible response categories include: those who Stayed 
Unmarried from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3), those who Left a Marriage, 
those who Got Married, and those who Stayed Married. Marital Change is included in 
each of the models as a series of dummy variables where those who Stayed Unmarried 
from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3) serve as the reference category. 
 
Marriage Trajectory: For Chapter 6 I created a trajectory variable to reflect changes in 
women’s marital status over the three data collection time points. Although a total of 61 
unique trajectories were observed, categories were grouped to reflect seven basic 
trajectories determined by women’s marital status at Wave 3: those who were 
Continuously Single (Not Cohabiting) across all three time points, those who Became 
Single by Wave 3, those who Started or Stayed Cohabiting, those Continuously Married 
across all three time points, those who Got Married by Wave 3, those Continuously 
Separated (Spouse Not Present), and those who Moved Into Separation by Wave 3. 
Marriage Trajectory is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables 
where those who were Continuously Single (Not Cohabiting) across all three time points 
serve as the reference category. 
 
Health Independent Variables 
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One’s health status may shape both their need for insurance as well as their access to 
various insurance programs. Several measures are used to assess respondents’ health needs and 
medical care access.   
Health: Respondents were asked to rate their general health. I recoded the original 
variable to reflect three simplified categories: those who indicated that their general 
health was Excellent or Very Good, those who indicated Good, and those who said their 
health was Fair or Poor. Health is included in each of the models as a series of dummy 
variables where those who indicated that their general health was Excellent or Very Good 
serve as the reference category. 
 
Health Problem: Respondents were asked if any health problems they experienced 
affected their ability to work. Those who indicated No serve as the reference category 
and are coded as 0, while those who indicated Yes, health problems prevented them from 
working are coded as 1.  
 
Health Need: Respondents were asked if over the previous 12 months they ever needed 
but could not afford necessary care. Those who indicated No serve as the reference 
category and are coded as 0, while those who indicated Yes, they needed but could not 
afford need care were coded as 1. 
 
Uninsured: In Chapter 4 insurance status is measured as a dichotomous variable. Those 
who had some form of insurance are coded as 0, and those who were Uninsured are 
coded as 1. 
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Public HI: In Chapter 4 public health insurance status is measured as a dichotomous 
variable. Those who were not on Medicaid are coded as 0, and those who were on 
Medicaid are coded as 1. 
 
Private/Employer HI: In Chapter 4 private or employer health insurance status is 
measured as a dichotomous variable. Those who did not have private or employer health 
insurance are coded as 0, and those who did have private or employer health insurance 
are coded as 1. 
 
Insurance Change: For Chapter 5 I created a variable to measure changes in women’s 
uninsured status at Times 2 and 3. Possible categories include: those who Stayed Insured 
from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3), those who Got Insurance, those who 
were previously insured but Lost Insurance, and those who Stayed Uninsured. Insurance 
Change is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables where those 
who Stayed Insured from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3) serve as the 
reference category. 
 
Public HI Change: For Chapter 5 I also created a variable to measure changes in 
women’s public health insurance access at Times 2 and 3. Possible categories include: 
those who Stayed Off Public HI from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3), those 
who Got Off Public HI, those who Got On Public HI, and those who Stayed On Public 
HI. Public HI Change is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables 
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where those who Stayed Off Public HI from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3) 
serve as the reference category. 
 
Private/Employer HI Change: Again, for Chapter 5, I created a variable to measure 
changes in women’s access to private or employer health insurance at Times 2 and 3. 
Possible categories include: those who Stayed Off Private/Employer HI from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3), those who Lost Private/Employer HI, those who Got 
Private/Employer HI, and those who Kept Private/Employer HI. Private/Employer HI 
Change is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables where those 
who Stayed Off Private/Employer HI from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (or Wave 2 to Wave 3) 
serve as the reference category. 
 
Insurance Trajectory: For Chapter 6 I created a trajectory variable to reflect changes in 
women’s health insurance status over the three data collection time points. Although a 
total of 27 unique trajectories were observed, categories were grouped to reflect 6 basic 
trajectories: those who were Continuously Uninsured across all three waves, those who 
Became Uninsured by Wave 3, those who were Continuously on Public HI, those who 
Moved Into Public HI by Wave 3, those who were Continuously on Private/Employer HI 
across all three time points, and those who Moved Into Private/Employer HI by Wave 3. 
Insurance Trajectory is included in each of the models as a series of dummy variables 





Several important control variables are also included in the models where appropriate.  
Time: In both the Chapter 4 lagged effects models and the Chapter 5 change variable 
models, data collection time point identifiers are used to control for historical moment. 
This variable indicates which survey (Wave 1, Wave 2, or Wave 3) independent variables 
are being drawn from. 
 
Months: A ratio level Months variable is also used in all models to control for amount of 
time between data collection time points and is measured in total number of months. 
 
City: City of residence (Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio) is included in the models as a 
series of dummy variables where Boston serves as the reference category.  
 
Citizenship: Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were US-born, US 
territory-born, or Foreign-born. Those who indicated they were foreign-born were then 
asked to indicate if they were a US citizen. Citizens (both foreign-born and US-born) are 
coded as 1 and non-citizens are coded as 0. Using imputation by chained equations I 
imputed values for respondents with missing data (described below).  
 
Race/Ethnicity: Self-reported race/ethnicity is measured as a categorical variable with 
four options: white (Non-Hispanic), Black (Non-Hispanic), Hispanic, and “Other.” 
Race/Ethnicity is included in the models as a series of dummy variables where whites 
serve as the reference category.  
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Age: Age is a ratio level variable measured in years. 
 
Kids: Also measured as a ratio level variable, respondents were asked to identify the 
number of children in their household that they were legally responsible for at each wave. 
 
Imputation of Missing Values 
 Although the problem of missing data is common in large studies, ignoring missing data 
can result in biased estimates and reduced statistical power (Acock 2005). In order to assess the 
implications of missing data for my research, I performed a series of analyses examining 
differences between respondents with complete and missing data. The findings (not shown) 
suggest that losing cases in my analyses to listwise deletion may result in underrepresentation of 
non-citizen minorities and individuals with low levels of education and income. Fortunately, 
advanced statistical techniques have been developed for dealing with missing data. In order to 
prevent the loss of cases to listwise deletion, I used Stata’s Imputation by Chained Equations 
(ICE) program to impute missing values on four key demographic variables: income, citizenship, 
education, and marital status.  
A total of 149 values were imputed for missing data on citizenship (2 at W1, 74 at W2, 
and 73 at W3), 848 values were imputed for missing data on income (448 at W1, 220 at W2, 180 
at W3), 76 values were imputed for missing data on marital status (4 at W1, 25 at W2, 47 at W3), 
and 186 values were imputed for missing data on education (3 at W1, 57 at W2, 126 at W3). 
Thirty-four percent (572) of the sample required imputation on one variable, 13 percent (223) 
required imputation on two variables, three percent (54) required imputation on three variables, 
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and one percent (17) required imputation on all four of the variables for which imputation of 
missing values was conducted. 
Using available data for all other variables included in the models, ICE uses the most 
appropriate estimation method based on each variable’s level of measurement (regression, 
logistic regression, or multinomial regression) to predict the missing values for each case 
(StataCorp 2007). The program also “injects a degree of random error to reflect uncertainty of 
imputation” (Acock 2005: 1018). Although multiple imputation, which generates several 
imputed datasets and then pools the results to account for missing data uncertainty, provides 
superior estimates to a single imputation approach and unbiased standard errors, single 
imputation is preferable over mean substitution and acceptable for producing preliminary 
analyses when dealing with many different models (Acock 2005).  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
See Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for a summary of descriptive statistics. Eight percent of the 
families were white, 42 percent Black, and 48 percent Hispanic. The number of white 
respondents is not proportional to the number of Black and Hispanic respondents due to a lack of 
high-poverty white neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the study is generalizable to low-income 
families living in low-income neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio (ICPSR 
2008). Overall, about 35 percent of the sample was from Boston, 33 percent from Chicago, and 
32 percent from San Antonio. At Wave 1 about 86 percent of respondents indicated they were 
U.S. citizens. The average age of respondents at Wave 1 was 32.8 years and about 38 percent 
had no high school degree or GED while only six percent had a college degree. The average 
number of children women were responsible for was about 2.7 across all three time points.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables by Wave (N=1662) 
  Wave 1 (1999) Wave 2 (2001) Wave 3 (2005) 
City     Boston 35.1% (584)   
 Chicago 33.2% (551)   
 San Antonio 31.7% (527)   
     
Race Black 42.4% (705)   
 Hispanic 47.7% (793)   
 White 8.0% (133)   
 Other 1.9% (31)   
     
Not US Citizen, Imputed  14.4% (239) 13.2% (220) 12.2% (202) 
     
Mean Age (Std. Deviation) 32.76 (9.68) 34.12 (9.64) 38.54 (9.65) 
     
Marital Status, Imputed                        Single 68.2% (1134) 56.4% (938) 55.1% (916) 
 Cohabiting 6.4% (106) 10.8% (179) 9.5% (158) 
 Separated 11.4% (190) 15.6% (260) 15.8% (263) 
 Married 14.0% (232) 17.1% (285) 19.6% (325) 
     
Mean Kids Responsible For (Std. Dev) 2.66 (1.43) 2.69 (1.45) 2.77 (1.52) 
     
Education, Imputed No Degree 37.8% (629) 39.9% (664) 35.4% (589) 
 HS Grad/GED 56.1% (933) 52.9% (879) 55.0% (914) 
 College 6.0% (100) 7.2% (119) 9.6% (159) 
     
Mean Monthly Total Household Income, 







Total Household Income 100-200% FPL 22.6% (376) 30.7% (510) 34.4% (572) 
Total Household Income Below 100% FPL 73.3% (1218) 59.6% (990) 53.2% (884) 
     
On Welfare (Enrolled in TANF) 36.7% (610) 25.8% (429) 14.6% (243) 
     
Employment Employed 40.0% (658) 55.8% (927) 54.6% (908) 
Employed 35+ Hrs at Main Job 22.8% (379) 36.0% (599) 33.7% (560) 
     
Respondent HI Medicaid 53.0% (881) 49.3% (819) 48.9% (812) 
Private or Employer HI 15.5% (257) 20.2% (336) 21.0% (349) 
 Uninsured 30.0% (499) 28.7% (477) 27.9% (464) 
     
General Health Excellent/Very Good 38.9% (646) 38.0% (631) 32.9% (546) 
 Good 31.5% (523) 33.6% (559) 32.8% (545) 
 Fair/Poor 29.6% (492) 28.1% (467) 34.2% (568) 
     
Health Problems Prevent Working 14.5% (241) 16.2% (270) 22.5% (374) 




The summary statistics provided in Table 3.2 also reveal that the women experienced a 
great deal of aggregate level change over the six year study period. For example, the proportion 
of women with incomes below the federal poverty line decreased 20 percent (from 73 percent at 
Wave 1, to 53 percent at Wave 3). A comparable reduction in welfare recipients was also 
observed; at Wave 1, 36.7 percent of the women were receiving TANF benefits, but by Wave 3 
only 14.6 percent of the panel was on welfare. Consistent with the goals of welfare reform, the 
proportion of women gainfully employed increased almost 15 percent (from 40 percent at Wave 
1, to 54.6 percent at Wave 3). The proportion of women working full-time (35 hours or more) 
increased about 11 percent (from 22.8 percent at Wave 1, to 33.7 percent at Wave 3). Also 
consistent with welfare reform, the proportion of women married increased from 14 percent at 
Wave 1 to 19.6 percent at Wave 3. Nevertheless, the number of women experiencing separation 
from a spouse also increased from 11.4 percent at Wave 1 to 15.8 percent at Wave 3. These 
trends are consistent with other research examining the effects of welfare reform on low-income 
women. 
Despite the increase in women’s labor force participation and marriage, overall trends in 
health insurance status were far less substantial. For example, the proportion of women who 
were uninsured decreased only slightly from 30 percent at Wave 1 to about 28 percent at Wave 
3, whereas the proportion of women who had private or employer-provided health insurance 
increased 5.5 percent (from 15.5 percent at Wave 1, to 21 percent at Wave 3). Consistent with 
the existing literature on welfare reform, the proportion of women receiving Medicaid decreased 
4.1 percent over the study period (from 53 percent at Wave 1, to 48.9 percent at Wave 3). In 
addition, the proportion of women who self-rated their health as excellent or very good 
decreased from 38.9 percent at Wave 1 to 32.9 percent at Wave 3, while the proportion of 
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women reporting fair or poor health increased from 29.6 percent to 34.2 percent over the study 
period. Similarly, the proportion of women reporting that they needed but could not afford care 
increased by about 2.8 percent, while the proportion of women reporting that health problems 
prevented them from working increased eight percent to a total of 22.5 percent at Wave 3.  
Although interesting, these overall trends mask important individual level changes that 
were occurring (see Table 3.3). When we examine the proportion of women who experienced 
change in any of the aforementioned statuses, we begin to learn more about the dynamic work, 
family, and welfare patterns of this population. For example, from Wave 1 to Wave 2, 13.6 
percent of the women moved into full-time work (35 hours or more), while only 2.9 percent lost 
access to full-time work. But from Wave 2 to Wave 3, only 7.3 percent of the women moved into 
full-time work, while 6.9 percent lost full-time status, revealing much more variability in 
employment opportunities over the data collection period. A similar trend was observed in 
marriage transitions. From Wave 1 to Wave 2, 6.6 percent of the women moved into marriage 
while 3.4 percent left a marriage. But from Wave 2 to Wave 3, 9.3 percent of women moved into 
a marriage while 6.9 percent left a marriage. Changes in women’s poverty status were just as 
dynamic. While 24.7 percent of women moved out of poverty from Wave 1 to Wave 2, 11 
percent of women moved into poverty during this same period. From Wave 2 to Wave 3, 15.7 
percent of the women moved into poverty, while 22.1 percent moved out of poverty. In addition, 
over both time periods more women moved out of Medicaid than into Medicaid, while more 
women moved into private or employment based health insurance than out of such insurance.  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Change Variables by Wave (N=1662) 
 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Mean Months Between Time Points (Std. Dev.) 16.34 (2.8) 53.10 (3.1) 
    
Poverty Status Change Stayed in Poverty 48.6% (808) 37.5% (623) 
 Into Poverty 11.0% (182) 15.7% (261) 
 Out of Poverty 24.7% (410) 22.1% (367) 
 Stayed above Poverty 15.8% (262) 24.7% (411) 
    
Marital Status Change Stayed Unmarried 79.4% (1320) 73.6% (1223) 
 Out of Marriage 3.4% (57) 6.9% (114) 
 Into Marriage 6.6% (110) 9.3% (154) 
 Stayed Married 10.5% (175) 10.3% (171) 
    
FT Employment Change Stayed < Employed FT 67.3% (1119) 64.5% (1072) 
 Out of FT Work 2.9% (49) 6.9% (114) 
 Into FT Work 13.6% (226) 7.3% (122) 
 Stayed Employed FT 16.1% (268) 21.2% (353) 
    
Welfare Change Stayed On Welfare 19.7% (328) 8.0% (133) 
 Into Welfare 6.1% (101) 6.5% (108) 
 Out of Welfare 16.9% (281) 17.7% (295) 
 Stayed Off Welfare 56.7% (942) 67.2% (1117) 
    
Insurance Transition Stayed Uninsured 15.5% (257) 14.5% (241) 
 Out of Insurance 13.2% (219) 13.4% (223) 
 Into Insurance 14.6% (242) 14.1% (235) 
 Stayed Insured 56.4% (937) 57.5% (955) 
    
Public Insurance Transition Stayed on Medicaid 38.7% (643) 36.3% (604) 
 Into Medicaid 10.6% (176) 12.5% (208) 
 Out of Medicaid 14.3% (238) 12.9% (215) 
 Stayed Off Medicaid 36.4% (605) 38.2% (635) 
    
Private/Employer HI Transition Stayed Out of 
Private/Employer HI 75.6% (1256) 70.6% (1173) 
 Out of Priv/Employ HI 4.2% (70) 8.4% (140) 
 Into Priv/Employ HI 9.0% (149) 9.2% (153) 
 Stayed On Priv/Emp HI 11.3% (187) 11.8% (196) 
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In other areas, change across the two time intervals was more stable. For example, just 
over 6 percent of the sample moved on to welfare from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and a comparable 
proportion moved on to welfare from Wave 2 to Wave 3. Similarly, the proportion of women 
moving off of welfare remained at about 17 percent during both intervals. Consistent patterns of 
change in insurance coverage were also observed between time points; about 14 percent of the 
women gained insurance over both time periods, while 13 percent of women lost insurance 
coverage over both intervals.  
The amount of change these women experienced illustrates the need to consider how 
patterns of change across the three time points might affect women’s access to health insurance 
and economic well-being over time. By generating measures of subsequent work, welfare, and 
marital transitions, trajectory variables may best represent the dynamic nature of low-income 
women’s lives. Using measures of work, welfare, and marital status at Wave 1, Wave 2, and 
Wave 3, trajectory variables were created that describe the unique patterns of statuses for each 
respondent across the three time points. Although notable patterns emerged for each variable, 
there were also many unique patterns that emerged. Table 3.4 shows the number of respondents 
in each trajectory category and also provides examples of unique patterns within each category to 
illustrate how trajectories were grouped.
6
 These trajectories reveal important patterns over the 
study period. For example, while over 26 percent of the sample remained continuously 
unemployed, only 6.4 percent were continuously on welfare at all three data collection time 
points. While nearly 41 percent of the sample was continuously single (not cohabiting), only 7.2 
percent were continuously married. In terms of health insurance access, only a relatively small 
proportion of women were continuously uninsured (9.2 percent) or on private/employer based 
                                                 
6
 All change and trajectory measures represent differences in statuses from the previous data collection time point. 
Measures of transitions between Waves were not collected for most variables. Thus, both the change and trajectory 
measures represent conservative estimates of the changes these women may have experienced. 
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health insurance (8.1 percent) at all three time points, while there was greater stability in access 
to public health insurance; 29.3 percent of women were continuously on public health insurance 
across all three time points. Fewer women also slipped into poverty than moved out of poverty 
over time; while 35.7 percent of the women moved out of poverty by Wave 3, 21.5 percent 
actually slipped into poverty by Wave 3. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Trajectory Variables (N=1662) 
Trajectory Sample Patterns* Percent (n) 
Employment    
 Continuously Unemployed U-U-U 26.4% (438) 
 Became Unemployed F-F-U, F-U-U, L-U-U, L-L-U 19.0% (315) 
 Stayed or Moved into PT Work L-L-L, U-U-L, U-L-L, U-F-L 20.9% (348) 
 Continuously Employed FT F-F-F 11.2% (186) 
 Moved into FT Work U-F-F, U-U-F, L-F-F, U-L-F 22.5% (374) 
    
Welfare Status   
 Continuously Off Welfare O-O-O 52.2% (868) 
 Moved Off Welfare W-O-O, W-W-O, O-W-O 32.6% (541) 
 Continuously On Welfare W-W-W 6.4% (107) 
 Moved Onto Welfare O-O-W, O-W-W, W-O-W 8.0% (133) 
    
Marriage   
 Continuously Single S-S-S 40.7% (676) 
 Became Single S-C-S, C-S-S, S-D-S, D-D-S 14.4% (240) 
 Became or Stayed Cohabiting C-C-C, S-S-C, S-C-C 9.5% (158) 
 Continuously Married M-M-M 7.2% (120) 
 Got Married S-S-M, S-M-M, S-C-M, C-C-M 12.3% (205) 
 Continuously Separated D-D-D 4.0% (66) 
 Became Separated M-M-D, S-M-D, S-S-D, S-D-D 11.9% (197) 
    
Health Insurance   
 Continuously Uninsured U-U-U 9.2% (153) 
 Became Uninsured P-P-U, P-U-U, E-E-U, E-U-U 17.0% (283) 
 Continuously on Public HI P-P-P 29.3% (487) 
 Got on Public HI U-P-P, U-U-P, U-E-P, E-E-P 18.9% (314) 
 Continuous Private/Employer HI E-E-E 8.1% (135) 
 Got on Private/Employer HI P-P-E, P-E-E, U-U-E, U-E-E 12.5% (207) 
    
Poverty   
 Continuously Out of Poverty OP-OP-OP 11.1% (185) 
 Got Out of Poverty IP-OP-OP, IP-IP-OP 35.7% (593) 
 Continuously In Poverty IP-IP-IP 31.6% (526) 
 Slipped Into Poverty OP-OP-IP, OP-IP-IP 21.5% (358) 
*Note: F=Employed Full-time (35+ hours), L=Employed Less than Full-time, U=Unemployed, W=On 
Welfare, O=Off Welfare, M=Married, S=Single (Not Cohabiting), C=Cohabiting, D=Separated or Spouse 
not Present, U=Uninsured, E=Private/Employer Health Insurance, P=Public Health Insurance, OP=Out of 





A practical benefit of analyzing panel data is that it allows us to observe change over 
time. In each model the dependent variable is categorical, violating simple linear regression 
assumptions regarding the homoscadasticity of error terms, and necessitating use of a logistic 
regression approach (Long and Freese 2006). Given the benefits of panel data and the categorical 
nature of my dependent variables, I use Stata 10 (StataCorp 2007) to run a series of logistic 
regression models that will be used to assess how women’s welfare, employment, and family 
statuses affect their health insurance status and poverty status.  
In the first set of analyses, presented in Chapter 4, I examine the lagged effects of Time 1 
measures on women’s opportunities at Time 2. In these analyses the data are “stacked,” meaning 
each respondent is represented twice in the dataset. Stacking the data allows me to test 
simultaneously how factors at Wave 1 are related to statuses at Wave 2 and how factors at Wave 
2 are related to statuses at Wave 3. Organizing the data in this way allows the independent 
variables to be Wave 1 or Wave 2 data and the dependent variables to be Wave 2 or Wave 3 
data. For ease of reference and clarity, in the lagged effects analysis models the abbreviation T1 
is used to represent data collected at Wave 1 or Wave 2, while T2 is used to represent data 
collected at Wave 2 or Wave 3. As described above, stacking the data increases the total number 
of observations by representing each respondent twice in the dataset. To control for this, the 
lagged effects analyses are clustered by respondent. Controls for which time point the data are 
drawn and the length of time in between data collection time points are also included.  
In Chapter 5 I test the effects of several measures of change on women’s insurance and 
poverty status. Like Chapter 4, the data remain stacked to allow me to test the effects of changes 
from Waves 1 to 2, and 2 to 3 simultaneously. But unlike Chapter 4, I do not test for lagged 
 63 
effects. Instead, all control variables in Chapter 5 are measured at T2 while the new welfare, 
work, family, and insurance change variables included in the models measure changes from 
either Wave 1 to 2, or Wave 2 to 3. Because the data remain stacked for these analyses, cluster, 
time point, and months lapsed controls are still included in these models. In the trajectory models 
presented in Chapter 6, the data are not stacked, reducing the total number of observations and 
eliminating the need for cluster and time controls in these models. Nevertheless, lapse controls 
are still included in the trajectory models to control for the amount of time between waves since 
the longer the time between surveys, the more likely a woman is to experience change in her 
welfare, work, or family status. Normalized household panel weights are used in all models to 
prevent bias in point estimates (Cherlin, Fomby, and Moffitt 2002). 
In all models the dependent variables of interest are measured dichotomously. Using 
standard binary logistic regression models will allow me to predict the odds of women’s 
insurance coverage and poverty status at Time 2 or 3 (depending on the model) controlling for 
their welfare, work, and family status at earlier time points. The results of the logistic regression 
models will provide estimates of the probability of being uninsured, being on Medicaid, or 
having private/employer insurance for one group of individuals compared to a comparison group 
at the specified time point (or the probability of being in poverty for one group of individuals 
compared to a comparison group) controlling for the effects of individual welfare, work, and 
family factors at Wave 1, Wave 2, and Wave 3. 
The logistic regression model is represented by the following equation: 
P(Y = 1) = [ exp(α + β1X1+ β2X2…+ βKXK) / (1 + exp(α + β1X1+ β2X2…+ βKXK)) ], 
where Y represents the dependent variable, α represents the intercept, X1…K represent the 
independent variables, and β1…K represent “the marginal effect of the corresponding XK” on the 
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log-odds of Y (Liao 1994:8). Exponentiating each βK to produce odds-ratios provides a more 
intuitive interpretation of the model estimates; exp(β) can be interpreted as “the odds of having 
an event occurring versus not occurring, per unit change in the explanatory variable, other things 
being equal” (Liao 1994:16).  
With the exception of the ratio level variables (e.g., Kids, Age, Income, and Months), in 
the following analyses all other independent variables are treated as dummy variables composed 
of two categories (e.g., US Citizen versus non-US Citizen). Where variables have more than one 
response category, each category is treated as a separate dummy variable comparing the 
specified group to a reference category (e.g., Black versus White, Hispanic versus White). 
Reference categories are identified in parentheses in the results tables. Thus, “a unit change” in 
these variables represents changing from one category to the other. So, for example, in Models 1-
9, 12-23, and 30-41 (see Tables 3.5a-c) the estimates produced can be interpreted as the odds of 
one group having the specified type of insurance compared to the reference category, controlling 
for the other variables in the model. In models 10-11, 24-29, and 42-43 the estimates can be 
interpreted as the odds of one group moving into or out of poverty compared to the reference 
category, controlling for the other variables in the model. In the results tables I present the odds-
ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for each variable included in the models.  
 
Analysis 
Tables 3.5a-c outline the sequence of models that will be analyzed in order to answer my 
research questions. Models 1-3, 12-17, and 30-35 address the first major research question: what 
is the relative importance of various welfare, work, and family factors in predicting low-income 
women’s health insurance status over time? Whereas Chapter 4 Models 1-3 examine the lagged 
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effects of independent variables on health insurance access at later times, Chapter 5 Models 12-
17 and Chapter 6 Models 30-35 examine how using measures of change and trajectory might 
improve our understanding of women’s health insurance access. In Model 1, the dependent 
variable will be women’s general insurance status, a measure indicating whether respondents 
have insurance or are uninsured at T2. In Model 2, the dependent variable will be whether 
respondents are on public insurance at T2. In Model 3, the dependent variable will be whether 
respondents have private/employer based insurance at T2. In these models, the independent 
variables will include T1 measures for welfare, family, and work factors, including use of TANF, 
full-time employment, education, total household income, marital status, and control variables 
such as data collection time point, months between interviews, race/ethnicity, citizenship, 
number of children responsible for, and city of residence. Several health measures are also 
included, such as respondents’ self rated general health status, whether health problems affect 
their ability to work, and a measure indicating if they needed care in the past year but were 
unable to afford it.  
In Chapter 5, Models 12-17 replicate this process by comparing static models (Models 
12, 14, and 16) with models using change measures (Models 13, 15, and 17) in order to 
determine if using change measures helps to better explain women’s access to certain forms of 
insurance or poverty status. Unlike Chapter 4, the control variables used in the Chapter 5 models 
are measured at T2 since the change measures reflect women’s T2 statuses. Similarly, in Chapter 
6, Models 30-35 also replicate this process by comparing cross-sectional models (Models 30, 32, 
and 34) with trajectory models (Models 31, 33, and 35). In these models the control variables are 
measured at Wave 3. 
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Models 4-9, 18-23, and 36-41 address the second major research question: are there 
significant differences between low-income women, specifically poor and near-poor women, in 
the importance of welfare, work, and family factors in determining women’s health insurance 
status over time? As described above, the category of low-income women (often defined as those 
with household incomes less than 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Level) is frequently treated 
as a homogenous category of economically marginalized women for descriptive purposes. 
Despite similar social and economic struggles, previous research reveals significant differences 
in the extent of their vulnerabilities and access to supports and services based on their poverty 
status. For example, even small income changes influence women’s access to certain social 
services. Thus, it is important to determine if the effects of the aforementioned welfare, family, 
and work factors vary among groups of low-income women.  
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Table 3.5a Chapter 4 Lagged Effects Analysis Model Summaries 
Question & Model Variables 
What is the relative importance of various T1 welfare, work, and family factors in predicting low-
income women’s health insurance status at T2? 
Model 1 Dependent Uninsured (T2) 
 Independent Time (T1) 
  Months (T2) 
  City (reference category Boston) 
  Race/Ethnicity (reference category White) 
  Citizenship (T1, reference category Non-Citizen) 
  Kids (T1) 
  Age (T1) 
  Education (T1, reference category No Degree) 
  FT Work (T1, reference category Unemployed) 
  Income (T1) 
  Welfare Status (T1, reference category Not On Welfare) 
  Marital Status (T1, reference category Single, not cohabiting) 
  Health (T1, reference category Excellent) 
  Health Problem (T1, reference category No) 
  Health Need (T1, reference category No) 
   
Model 2 Dependent Public HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 1 
   
Model 3 Dependent: Private/Employer HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 1 
   
Are there significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the lagged effects of T1 
welfare, work, and family factors on their health insurance access at T2? 
Model 4  Same as Model 1, selected for the Near-poor ( T1) 
 
Model 5  Same as Model 1, selected for the Poor (T1) 
 
Model 6  Same as Model 2, selected for the Near-poor (T1) 
 
Model 7  Same as Model 2, selected for the Poor (T1) 
 
Model 8  Same as Model 3, selected for the Near-poor (T1) 
 
Model 9  Same as Model 3, selected for the Poor (T1) 
 
Given the lagged effects of welfare, work, and family factors on low-income women’s health insurance 
access at T2, what role does health insurance access play in determining women’s poverty status over 
time?  
Model 10 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were not poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement into poverty by T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 1, except add Insurance (T1, reference category Uninsured) 
   
Model 11 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were poor at Wave 1 
(represents movement out of poverty by T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 1, except add Insurance (T1, reference category Uninsured) 
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Table 3.5b Chapter 5 Change Variable Model Summaries 
Question & Model Variables  
What is the relative importance of various welfare, work, and family changes in predicting low-income 
women’s health insurance status over time? 
Model 12 Dependent Uninsured (T2) 
 Controls Time (T2) 
  Months (T-2) 
  City (reference category Boston) 
  Race/Ethnicity (reference category White) 
  Citizenship (T2, reference category Non-Citizen) 
  Kids (T2) 
  Age (T2) 
  Education (T2, reference category No Degree) 
  Income (T2) 
  Health (T2, reference category Excellent) 
  Health Problem (T2, reference category No) 
  Health Need (T2, reference category No) 
 Independent Welfare Status (T2, reference category Not On Welfare) 
  Marital Status (T2, reference category Single, not cohabiting) 
  FT Work (T2, reference category Unemployed) 
   
Model 13 Dependent Uninsured (T2) 
 Controls Same as Model 12 
 Independent Employment Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed < FT Employed) 
  Welfare Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed Off Welfare) 
  Marital Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed Single) 
   
Model 14 Dependent Public HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 12 
   
Model 15 Dependent Public HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 13 
   
Model 16 Dependent Private/Employer HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 12 
   
Model 17 Dependent Private/Employer HI (T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 13 
   
Are there significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the effects of welfare, work, 
and family changes on their health insurance access over time? 
Model 18  Same as Model 13, selected for the Near-poor (T1) 
 
Model 19  Same as Model 13, selected for the Poor (T1) 
 
Model 20  Same as Model 15, selected for the Near-poor (T1) 
 
Model 21  Same as Model 15, selected for the Poor (T1) 
 
Model 22  Same as Model 17, selected for the Near-poor (T1) 
 
Model 23  Same as Model 17, selected for the Poor (T1) 
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Table 3.5b Chapter 5 Change Variable Model Summaries, continued 
Question & Model Variables 
Given the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on low-income women’s health insurance 
access, what role do health insurance changes play in determining women’s poverty status over time? 
Model 24 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were not poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement into poverty by T2) 
 Controls Time (T2) 
  Months (T2) 
  City (reference category Boston) 
  Race/Ethnicity (reference category White) 
  Citizenship (T2, reference category Non-Citizen) 
  Kids (T2) 
  Age (T2) 
  Education (T2, reference category No Degree) 
  Health (T2, reference category Excellent) 
  Health Problem (T2, reference category No) 
  Health Need (T2, reference category No) 
  Employment Change (T2 or 3, reference category Stayed Less Than Full-
time Employed) 
  Welfare Change (T2 or 3, reference category Stayed Off Welfare) 
  Marital Change (T2 or 3, reference category Stayed Single) 
 Independent Insurance Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed Insured) 
   
Model 25 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were poor at Wave 1 
(represents movement out of poverty by T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 24, Plus Controls 
   
Model 26 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were not poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement into poverty by T2) 
 Independent Public HI Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed Off Public HI), Plus 
Model 24 Controls 
   
Model 27 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were poor at Wave 1 
(represents movement out of poverty by T2) 
 Independent Same as Model 26  
   
Model 28 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were not poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement into poverty by T2) 
 Independent Private/Employer HI Change (T2 or T3, reference category Stayed Off 
Private/Employer HI), Plus Model 24 Controls 
   
Model 29 Dependent Poverty Status Change (T2) – Selected for those who were poor at Wave 1 
(represents movement out of poverty by T2) 




Table 3.5c Chapter 6 Trajectory Model Summaries 
Question & Model Variables 
What is the relative importance of various welfare, work, and family trajectories in predicting low-
income women’s health insurance status over time? 
Model 30 Dependent Uninsured (Wave 3) 
 Independent FT Work (Wave 3, reference category FT Employed) 
  Welfare Status (Wave 3, reference category Not On Welfare) 
  Marital Status (Wave 3, reference category Married, spouse present) 
 Controls Months 2 (Wave 2) 
  Months 3 (Wave 3) 
  City (reference category Boston) 
  Race/Ethnicity (reference category White) 
  Citizenship (Wave 3, reference category Non-Citizen) 
  Kids (Wave 3) 
  Age (Wave 3) 
  Education (Wave 3, reference category No Degree) 
  Income (Wave 3) 
  Health (Wave 3, reference category Excellent) 
  Health Problem (Wave 3, reference category No) 
  Health Need (Wave 3, reference category No) 
   
Model 31 Dependent Uninsured (Wave 3) 
 Independent Employment Trajectory (reference category Continuously Employed FT) 
  Welfare Trajectory (reference category Continuously Off Welfare) 
  Marriage Trajectory (reference category Continuously Married) 
  Plus Model 30 Controls 
   
Model 32 Dependent Public HI (Wave 3) 
 Independent Same as Model 30 (Cross-sectional Variables) 
   
Model 33 Dependent Public HI (Wave 3) 
 Independent Same as Model 31 (Trajectory Variables) 
   
Model 34 Dependent Private/Employer HI (Wave 3) 
 Independent Same as Model 30 (Cross-sectional Variables) 
   
Model 35 Dependent Private/Employer HI (Wave 3) 
 Independent Same as Model 31 (Trajectory Variables) 
 
Are there significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the effects of welfare, work, 
and family factors on their health insurance access over time? 
Model 36  Same as Model 31, selected for the Near-poor (Wave 1) 
 
Model 37  Same as Model 31, selected for the Poor (Wave 1) 
 
Model 38  Same as Model 33, selected for the Near-poor (Wave 1) 
 
Model 39  Same as Model 33, selected for the Poor (Wave 1) 
 
Model 40  Same as Model 35, selected for the Near-poor (Wave 1) 
 
Model 41  Same as Model 35, selected for the Poor (Wave 1) 
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Table 3.5c Chapter 6 Trajectory Model Summaries, continued 
Question & Model Variables 
Given the effects of welfare, work, and family trajectories on low-income women’s health insurance 
access, what role do health insurance trajectories play in determining women’s poverty status over 
time? 
Model 42 Dependent Poverty Status Change (Wave 3) – Selected for those who were not poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement into poverty by Wave 3) 
 Independent Months 2 (Wave 2) 
  Months 3 (Wave 3) 
  City (reference category Boston) 
  Race/Ethnicity (reference category White) 
  Citizenship (Wave 3, reference category Non-Citizen) 
  Kids (Wave 3) 
  Age (Wave 3) 
  Education (Wave 3, reference category No Degree) 
  Health (Wave 3, reference category Excellent) 
  Health Problem (Wave 3, reference category No) 
  Health Need (Wave 3, reference category No) 
  Employment Trajectory (reference category Continuously Employed FT) 
  Welfare Trajectory (reference category Continuously Off Welfare) 
  Marriage Trajectory (reference category Continuously Married) 
  Insurance Trajectory (reference category Continuous Private/Employer HI) 
   
Model 43 Dependent Poverty Status Change (Wave 3) – Selected for those who were poor at 
Wave 1 (represents movement out of poverty by Wave 3) 
 Independent Same as Model 42 
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In order to examine differences in the lagged effects of women’s work, welfare, and 
family statuses between poor women (those with total household incomes less than or equal to 
100 percent FPL) and near-poor women (those with total household incomes greater than 100% 
FPL), in Chapter 4 Models 4-9 I rerun the previous models using separate models by women’s 
poverty status at T1. Models 4, 6, and 8 test the lagged effects of the independent variables for 
near-poor women, whereas Models 5, 7, and 9 test the lagged effects of the same variables for 
poor women. A similar process is replicated in Chapter 5, where I run separate analysis utilizing 
change variables by women’s poverty status at T1. Models 18, 20, and 22 test the effects of 
change variables for near-poor women, while Models 19, 21, and 23 test the effects of these 
same variables for poor women. Again, in Chapter 6, I run separate analyses utilizing change 
variables by women’s poverty status at T1. Models 36, 38, and 40 test the effects of trajectory 
variables for near-poor women, whereas Models 37, 39, and 41 test the effects of the same 
variables for poor women. Postestimation nonlinear Wald tests will also be performed to test the 
hypothesis that individual coefficients are equal across the poor and near-poor models.  
Finally, Models 10-11, 24-29, and 42-43 address the third question: given the effects of 
welfare, work, and family factors on low-income women’s health insurance access, what role 
does health insurance access play in determining changes in women’s poverty status over time? 
In Chapter 4, Models 10-11, the dependent variables will be whether women experience a 
change in poverty status at T2 (0 represents no change, 1 represents a change in poverty status). 
Model 10 selects for women who were near-poor at T1. Since the dependent variable in this 
model is whether a respondent experienced a change in poverty status at T2 (or not) this model 
tests the factors that are related to women’s movement into poverty at T2. Model 11 selects for 
women who were poor at T1. Once again, since the dependent variable in this model is whether a 
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respondent experienced a change in poverty status at T2 (or not) this model tests the factors that 
are related to women’s movement out of poverty at T2. The independent variables for these 
models will remain the same as the models described above, but I also include an additional 
measure of women’s insurance coverage at T1 in order to test for the lagged effects of insurance 
access on women’s economic status.  
A similar process is repeated in Chapter 5, where I compare models that utilize change 
measures to predict women’s movement into poverty at T2 (Models 24, 26, and 28) with models 
that utilize change measures to predict women’s movement out of poverty at T2 (Models 25, 27, 
and 29). Finally, this process is repeated in Chapter 6, where I use a model containing trajectory 
measures to predict women’s movement into poverty by W3 (Model 42) and a separate model to 
predict women’s movement out of poverty by W3 (Model 43), in order to determine the utility of 
using a trajectory approach for our understanding of the effects of health insurance stability on 




LAGGED EFFECTS ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
 
In this Chapter I model the lagged effects of employment, welfare, and family variables 
on women’s health insurance status over time. Utilizing longitudinal data in this way allows us to 
understand the long-term effects of a set of conditions on women’s future opportunities. Using a 
series of logistic regression analyses we can determine how welfare, work, and family status at 
one time point affects low-income women’s insurance access at later time points, if the lagged 
effects of welfare, work, and family factors vary for different groups of low-income women, and 
whether health insurance access at one time point affects low-income women’s economic 
stability at later time points.  
  
Research Question 1 
What is the relative importance of individual-level welfare, work, and family factors in 
predicting low-income women’s health insurance status over time? 
  
Models 1-3 test the effects of welfare, work, and family factors on low-income women’s 
health insurance access. Because there are different pathways to various forms of insurance, we 
might expect to observe differential effects for various factors by the type of health insurance 
being examined. Specifically, I expect to find that given the economic benefits of employment, 
full-time employment at T1 will have strong and consistent effects across models predicting 
women’s insurance access at T2; full-time employment at earlier time points should reduce 
women’s odds of being uninsured or publicly insured, and increase their odds of having access to 
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private or employment based insurance at later time points (H1a).  In addition, I expect to find 
that although Medicaid was officially delinked from welfare in 1996, women on welfare at T1 
are more likely to have public insurance and less likely to have private or employer based 
insurance at T2. Also, because of the protection public insurance provides to low-income 
women, I also expect to find that women on welfare at T1 may also be less likely to be uninsured 
at T2 (H1b). Finally, I expect to find that marriage at T1 will reduce women’s odds of having 
access to public insurance and being uninsured, while increasing their odds of having access to 
private or employment based insurance at T2 (H1c).  
Table 4.1 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 1-3. Model 1 
uses women’s insurance status (insured or uninsured) at T2 as the dependent variable. Model 2 
uses women’s public health insurance status at T2 as the dependent variable. And Model 3 uses 
women’s private or employer health insurance status at T2 as the dependent variable. All 
independent variables are measured at T1. The table provides the odds ratios and 95 percent 
confidence intervals for each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more 
than two response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance 
are also provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
In Model 1, almost 17 percent of the variance in T2 insurance status is explained by the 
model, as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 value provided at the bottom of Table 4.1. In Models 2 and 
3 the amount of variance explained increases dramatically; about 30 and 24 percent of the 
variance (respectively) is explained by the T1 welfare, work, family, and control variables 
included in the models.  
As described below, the results also provide evidence that public programs like welfare 
and Medicaid provide important long-term protection against being uninsured or experiencing 
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unmet health needs at later time points. Nevertheless, careful examination reveals that the 
benefits of public programs may be limited to non-Hispanic citizens. As intended, younger 
women, those with children, and those with health problems appear to benefit most from access 
to public health insurance options. But what about women who do not qualify for public 
programs? The results of my analysis show that protective factors such as greater income may 
produce bifurcated long-term results among low-income women – although greater income may 
provide some women with access to private or employer based health insurance options, it also 
reduces their ability to qualify for public health insurance programs. Results also confirm that 
city differences play an important role in shaping the policy contexts which determine women’s 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 As predicted, working full-time at T1 consistently and significantly affected women’s 
health insurance status: compared to the unemployed, working full-time reduced low-income 
women’s odds of being uninsured (0.572, p < .01) and having public health insurance (0.420, p < 
.01), while substantially increasing their odds of having access to private insurance at T2 (3.691, 
p <.001). Despite this finding, income produced less consistent effects, suggesting that the 
benefits of greater income do not necessarily translate into protection against being uninsured for 
low-income women. For example, as we might expect, each unit increase in income at T1 
reduced women’s odds of having public insurance (0.866, p < .05), while increasing women’s 
odds of having private or employment based insurance (1.276, p < .01) at T2. But perhaps 
surprisingly, when examining low-income women’s risk of being uninsured, increased income 
does not necessarily translate into reduced odds of being uninsured at T2 (as signified by no 
statistically significant effect for income in Model 1).  
Welfare 
 As expected, compared to respondents who were not on welfare at T1, welfare recipients 
were significantly more likely to receive public health insurance (3.060, p < .001) and 
significantly less likely to be uninsured (0.612, p < .01) or have private insurance at T2 (0.303, p 
< .001).  
Family 
 Marital status also had some significant lagged effects on low-income women’s health 
insurance access. As hypothesized, compared to women who were single (and not cohabiting) at 
T1, being married reduced low-income women’s odds of having public health insurance (0.546, 
p < .01) while significantly increasing their odds of having private or employer-provided health 
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insurance at T2 (2.383, p < .001). Despite these findings, there was little support for the 
hypothesis that marriage provides low-income women with long-term protection against being 
uninsured. Similarly, despite the opportunity for resource pooling, there was little evidence to 
support that cohabiting affects women’s access to health insurance. 
Health  
Across all models, having a health problem that affected women’s ability to work 
significantly affected their insurance access at later time points. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
compared to those who did not experience health problems that affected their work, having a 
health problem at T1 reduced women’s odds of having private or employment based insurance at 
T2 (0.368, p < .05). These women were also less likely to be uninsured (0.315, p < .001) and 
over four times more likely to have public health insurance at T2 (4.560, p < .001). In addition, 
those who experienced a health problem that they could not afford to address were significantly 
less likely to have access to public health insurance (0.572, p < .01) and more likely to be 
uninsured at T2 (1.895, p < .01). Together, these results suggest that public health insurance 
plays an important role in meeting the needs of low-income women with health problems and 
that those who are unable to qualify for such programs are at greater risk of having unmet 
medical needs due to cost.   
Controls 
 In addition to the influence of welfare, work, family, and health factors in shaping low-
income women’s insurance status, several other factors also significantly affected women’s 
access to various forms of health insurance at T2. For example, both Hispanic (2.770, p < .05) 
and non-citizen (1.984, p < .01) women faced significantly greater odds of being uninsured. 
Similarly, compared to non-citizens, citizens were more likely to have public health insurance at 
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T2 (1.967, p < .01). In addition, compared to those living in Boston, women living in Chicago 
and San Antonio faced significantly greater odds of being uninsured (3.816, p < .001; 6.675, p < 
.001) and lower likelihood of having public insurance (0.336, p < .001; 0.082, p < .001). Women 
in San Antonio also experienced greater odds of having private or employer-based health 
insurance (2.025, p < .01). These results suggest that despite the protective benefits of public 
programs for some women in some areas, other categories of women may face greater risk and 
vulnerability due to the rules and regulations of such programs and lack of access to private or 
employment based options.   
 
Research Question 2 
Are there significant differences between poor and near-poor women at Wave 1 in the 
lagged effects of welfare, work, and family status on their health insurance access over 
time?  
 
Some of the findings described above, such as the effects of women’s marital status on 
their access to public insurance, may be explained by separately exploring the effects of welfare, 
work, and family variables on different categories of women. Analyzing separate models for 
poor and near-poor women (as opposed to simply adding an interaction variable for poverty 
status in a combined model) allows me to determine if the variables in question operate 
differently for poor and near-poor women. In the following analyses (Models 4-9) I test for 
differences in the lagged effects of welfare, work, and family factors on low-income women’s 
health insurance access at T2 by poverty status at T1. Although all low-income women 
experience significant vulnerabilities, because poor women may have greater access to public 
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programs and supports, we can expect to observe significant differences between poor and near-
poor women in the importance of various welfare, work, and family factors in shaping their 
access to each form of insurance.  
Specifically, I expect to find that near-poor women’s access to full-time employment at 
T1 will make them more likely to have private or employer based insurance at T2, whereas poor 
women’s access to full time employment will not provide the same benefit due to their 
particularly low wages and access to public insurance options (H2a). In addition, I expect to find 
poor women’s access to welfare at T1 will increase their likelihood of being publicly insured and 
reduce their likelihood of being uninsured or privately insured at T2 and that these effects will be 
more pronounced for poor women than near-poor women (H2b). Finally, I expect to find that 
near-poor women’s marital status at T1 plays a more significant role in affecting their access to 
both public and private insurance at T2 than poor women, namely, by reducing their likelihood 
of qualifying for public insurance due to resource pooling, while increasing opportunities for 
access to employer-based insurance options through marriage (H2c).   
Table 4.2 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 4 and 5 
examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of being uninsured at T2. Table 4.3 displays the 
results for Models 6 and 7 examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of having public 
insurance at T2. And Table 4.4 displays the results of Models 8 and 9 examining poor and near-
poor women’s odds of having private or employment based health insurance at T2. All 
independent variables are measured at T1. All tables provide the odds ratios and 95 percent 
confidence intervals for each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more 
than two response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance 
are also provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
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When examining the odds of being uninsured at T2 (see Table 4.2), the model explains 
more of the variance for poor women than near-poor women. But in the public and private 
insurance models more variance in insurance status at T2 is explained for the category of near-
poor women as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 values provided at the bottom of Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
Specifically, in Model 4, nearly 17 percent of the variance in insurance status is explained by the 
model for near-poor women, whereas about 21 percent of the variance is explained in the same 
model for poor women (Model 5). In both the public and private insurance models the amount of 
variance explained is in the reverse direction; in Model 6 (see Table 4.3), 32 percent of the 
variance in public insurance access is explained by the model for near-poor women, while about 
30 percent of the variance is explained in the model for poor women (Model 7). In the private or 
employer based health insurance models (see Table 4.4) there is an even larger disparity in the 
amount of variance explained; in Model 8, about 27 percent of the variance in health insurance 
status is explained in the model for near-poor women, while in Model 9, about 20 percent of the 
variance is explained in the model for poor women.   
As described below, the results provide evidence of the differential effects of several 
variables on poor and near-poor women’s risk of uninsurance and access to public and private 
forms of health insurance at T2. For example, although race and welfare access appear to play a 
more significant role in shaping poor women’s odds of being uninsured, citizenship and 
employment appear to play a more significant role in shaping near-poor women’s odds of being 
uninsured. The lagged effects of marriage and income are other factors that play differential roles 
in shaping poor and near-poor women’s access to insurance. In addition, the effects of city 
characteristics suggest that city specific policy contexts make an important difference in shaping 
women’s access to various public programs. Taken together the results provide evidence that 
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public programs play an important role in protecting poor women, while near-poor women must 
seek private insurance through employment in order to reduce the risk of negative outcomes 
across time.  
 
Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Uninsured 
Status T2 (0=Has Insurance, 1=Uninsured) 












Time 0.221 0.009 5.376  3.037 0.275 33.530 
Months 0.965 0.884 1.054  1.034 0.970 1.103 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 2.969 0.688 12.810  1.349 0.486 3.748 
Hispanic 3.483 0.783 15.496  2.864* 1.039 7.898 
Other 1.316 0.178 9.711  1.658 0.326 8.425 
US Citizen 0.458* 0.235 0.892  0.598 0.353 1.013 
Kids 0.807* 0.655 0.994  0.898 0.785 1.027 
Age 1.020 0.994 1.047  1.005 0.986 1.023 
Income 0.790 0.585 1.068  1.086 0.736 1.604 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 3.436*** 1.882 6.273  4.497*** 2.761 7.326 
San Antonio 4.435*** 2.324 8.465  9.638*** 5.907 15.724 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Diploma/GED 0.670 0.394 1.140  0.814 0.551 1.202 
College Degree 0.607 0.247 1.488  0.375 0.119 1.178 
Work (Unemployed)        
Employed PT 1.009 0.468 2.174  1.059 0.665 1.686 
Employed FT 0.398** 0.219 0.726  0.675 0.395 1.152 
On Welfare 0.858 0.424 1.734  0.541** 0.349 0.837 
Marital Status (Single)       
Cohabiting 1.243 0.594 2.601  0.843 0.386 1.839 
Separated 1.048 0.536 2.047  0.693 0.423 1.134 
Married 0.723 0.392 1.335  1.012 0.620 1.653 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 2.028** 1.192 3.450  0.988 0.645 1.514 
Fair/Poor 0.701 0.348 1.410  1.351 0.813 2.246 
Health Problem 0.254 0.055 1.168  0.333*** 0.195 0.567 
Health Need 3.079*** 1.576 6.014  1.550 0.883 2.723 
N 1121    2155   
Log-likelihood -537.269    -1044.297   
Chi
2 
80.899    161.462   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.173    0.209   






Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Public HI 
T2 (0=Not on Medicaid, 1=Has Medicaid) 












Time 0.463 0.029 7.311  0.442 0.043 4.600 
Months 0.989 0.918 1.064  0.984 0.925 1.046 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.841 0.339 2.090  0.893 0.468 1.706 
Hispanic 0.655 0.275 1.556  0.713 0.373 1.364 
Other 2.029 0.581 7.086  1.234 0.416 3.661 
US Citizen 2.047* 1.050 3.990  2.015** 1.261 3.221 
Kids 1.156 0.965 1.383  1.090 0.973 1.221 
Age 0.950*** 0.925 0.975  0.985 0.967 1.003 
Income 0.908 0.722 1.142  1.308 0.888 1.927 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 0.327*** 0.186 0.574  0.287*** 0.195 0.422 
San Antonio 0.099*** 0.048 0.203  0.064*** 0.041 0.099 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Diploma/GED 0.660 0.351 1.241  0.769 0.531 1.112 
College Degree 0.699 0.237 2.059  0.238*** 0.120 0.471 
Work (Unemployed)        
Employed PT 1.495 0.691 3.234  0.775 0.508 1.182 
Employed FT 0.451** 0.250 0.815  0.452*** 0.293 0.699 
On Welfare 2.625** 1.369 5.031  3.256*** 2.173 4.878 
Marital Status (Single)       
Cohabiting 0.918 0.449 1.875  0.645 0.380 1.096 
Separated 1.039 0.490 2.201  1.199 0.723 1.987 
Married 0.612 0.326 1.149  0.468*** 0.301 0.728 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.554* 0.323 0.950  0.878 0.592 1.301 
Fair/Poor 1.360 0.718 2.576  0.799 0.525 1.218 
Health Problem 15.353*** 4.535 51.973  2.464** 1.413 4.296 
Health Need 0.581 0.275 1.228  0.550* 0.331 0.912 
N 1121    2155   
Log-likelihood -484.262    -1048.818   
Chi
2 
181.424    291.569   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.322    0.297   




Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on 
Private/Employer HI T2 (0=No Priv/Emp HI, 1=Has Priv/Emp HI) 












Time 5.079 0.334 77.295  0.557 0.019 16.164 
Months 1.031 0.957 1.112  0.973 0.891 1.062 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.532 0.152 1.859  1.083 0.485 2.420 
Hispanic 0.562 0.142 2.223  0.658 0.287 1.510 
Other 0.469 0.087 2.546  0.421 0.075 2.376 
US Citizen 1.147 0.548 2.399  0.865 0.465 1.611 
Kids 1.066 0.875 1.298  1.014 0.876 1.175 
Age 1.022 0.995 1.051  1.017 0.992 1.042 
Income 1.276* 1.005 1.621  0.712 0.446 1.137 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.118 0.614 2.035  1.285 0.764 2.160 
San Antonio 1.991* 1.093 3.628  2.128** 1.240 3.652 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Diploma/GED 2.198** 1.237 3.903  2.271** 1.362 3.787 
College Degree 2.134 0.848 5.372  8.502*** 4.157 17.386 
Work (Unemployed)        
Employed PT 0.649 0.301 1.398  1.306 0.749 2.277 
Employed FT 3.671*** 2.101 6.414  3.584*** 2.137 6.010 
On Welfare 0.319* 0.116 0.878  0.278*** 0.158 0.488 
Marital Status (Single)       
Cohabiting 0.843 0.383 1.853  2.379 0.936 6.049 
Separated 1.000 0.502 1.994  1.338 0.682 2.624 
Married 2.026** 1.194 3.438  2.446** 1.396 4.287 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.885 0.539 1.453  1.179 0.710 1.959 
Fair/Poor 1.138 0.557 2.328  0.872 0.451 1.686 
Health Problem 0.026*** 0.006 0.113  0.970 0.368 2.555 
Health Need 0.417* 0.212 0.818  1.338 0.736 2.433 
N 1121    2155   
Log-likelihood -550.573    -803.904   
Chi
2 
134.231    133.997   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.269    0.202   









 Contrary to hypothesis H2a, nearly all models provide strong and consistent support for 
the effects of full-time employment on women’s insurance access regardless of poverty status. 
Specifically, compared to the unemployed, both poor and near-poor women working full-time at 
T1 face significantly greater odds of having private or employment based insurance (see Table 
4.4) and reduced odds of having public insurance at T2 (see Table 4.3). The only exception to 
this is found in Models 4 and 5 (see Table 4.2) which test the effects of the variables in question 
on poor and near-poor women’s lack of access to insurance. Consistent with hypothesis H2a, 
full-time employment at T1 does not seem to provide the same protection against being 
uninsured for poor women as it does for near-poor women who, compared to unemployed 
women, are significantly less likely to be uninsured at T2 (0.398, p < .01). This may be due to 
poor women’s use of differential strategies for guarding against being uninsured (i.e., the use of 
public health insurance), which is explored below.  
In addition, the bifurcated effects of income on low-income women’s lack of access to 
insurance (as described above and shown in Model 1) may be partially explained by women’s 
poverty status at T1. For near-poor women, unit increases in income at T1 resulted in a 
significant increase in the odds of having private insurance at T2 (1.276, p < .05) while a similar 
effect was not observed for poor women (see Model 9). Post estimation hypothesis tests confirm 
a statistically significant difference between the income coefficients for poor (Model 9) and near-
poor women (Model 8) in the private health insurance models (F(1, 1712) = 5.10, Prob > F = 
.024). These results suggest that the positive effects of increased income for women’s insurance 
access may be limited to improving near-poor women’s access to private insurance benefits, 
while there is little support that increased income results in improved outcomes for poor women. 
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Welfare 
 Contrary to hypothesis H2b, strong and consistent effects for welfare status were 
observed across both public and private health insurance models for both poor and near-poor 
women. Compared to women not on welfare, both poor and near-poor women on welfare at T1 
were significantly more likely to have public health insurance (see Table 4.3) and significantly 
less likely to have private or employer based insurance at T2 (see Table 4.4). The only exception 
to this trend, and consistent with hypothesis H2b, was observed in the uninsured model (see 
Table 4.2), where compared to women not on welfare, poor women on welfare at T1 experienced 
significantly reduced odds of being uninsured at T2 (0.541, p < .01). A similar effect was not 
observed for near-poor women, suggesting that the benefits of welfare in protecting women 
against being uninsured are limited to poor women. Combined with the differential findings for 
full-time employment described above, these findings illustrate how poor and near-poor women 
use distinct strategies to protect themselves against being uninsured – for near-poor women full-
time employment provides at least some level of protection against being uninsured, while poor 
women are able to utilize public programs and health insurance benefits to meet their health 
insurance needs. One potential consequence of this is that near-poor women may face greater 
risk and instability in their access to insurance than their poorer peers. 
Family 
 As predicted, the effects of marriage were not always consistent for poor and near-poor 
women across all models. Nevertheless, contrary to hypothesis H2c, compared to single (not 
cohabiting) women, poor women married at T1 faced significantly reduced odds of being on 
public health insurance (see Table 4.3; 0.468, p < .001) although a similar effect was not 
observed for near-poor women. Also contrary to hypothesis H2c, marriage did not appear to have 
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a significant effect on either poor or near-poor women’s lack of access to insurance (see Models 
4 and 5), while compared to single women at T1, both near-poor (2.026, p < .01) and poor 
married women (2.446, p < .01) experienced increased odds of having private or employment 
based health insurance at T2 (see Table 4.4). Such results illustrate the nuanced mixed effects of 
marriage for low-income women; while marriage may act as a risk factor by reducing poor 
women’s access to public forms of health insurance, the risk of marriage may be mitigated by 
improved access to private or employment based health insurance options as a dependent.   
Health 
 Health measures produced extremely mixed results across models and groups of women 
providing evidence that near-poor women are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of 
poor health and at greater risk of having unmet needs due to cost than their poorer peers, yet 
significantly more likely to gain access to public insurance options when they have health 
problems that affect their ability to work. For example, the only common finding across models 
for poor and near-poor women in the effects of health problems was observed in the public 
health insurance models (see Table 4.3) where compared to women who did not have a health 
problem that affected their ability to work at T1, both poor (2.464, p < .001) and near-poor 
(15.353, p < .001) women with health problems were significantly more likely to have public 
health insurance at T2. Nevertheless, post estimation hypothesis tests show that the difference in 
odds for poor and near-poor women was quite substantial with near-poor women being over 15 
times more likely to be on public insurance at T2 when they have a health problem that affects 
their ability o work at T1 (F(1, 1712) = 6.96, Prob > F = 0.0084).  
Although this finding would suggest that both poor and near-poor women benefit from 
public health insurance options, closer examination reveals that near-poor women may still 
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remain particularly vulnerable. For example, compared to women who did not have a health 
problem that affected their ability to work at T1, poor women with health problems were 
significantly less likely to be uninsured at T2 (0.333, p < .001) while a similar effect was not 
observed for near-poor women. In addition, compared to women who did not have a health need 
that went unmet due to cost, poor women with an unmet health need at T1 were significantly less 
likely to have public health insurance at T2 (0.550, p < .05). Both findings suggest that public 
health insurance programs play an important role in protecting poor women from being 
uninsured or failing to get access to care due to cost. The finding that compared to women in 
excellent/good health, near-poor women with good health were more likely to be uninsured 
(2.028, p < .01) and less likely to have public health insurance at T2 (0.554, p < .05) suggests 
that near-poor women with relatively good health may be more willing than their poorer peers to 
“risk” being uninsured due to the cost of private insurance and their inability to qualify for public 
programs. 
Near-poor women, on the other hand, appeared to face more significant risks. For 
example, near-poor women with health problems affecting their ability to work at T1 were 
significantly less likely to have private or employment based insurance at T2 (0.026, p < .001). 
Compared to women who did not have a health need they were unable to meet due to cost at T1, 
near-poor women with unmet health needs were also significantly less likely to have private or 
employment based insurance at T2 (0.417, p < .05). In addition, compared to women who did not 
have an unmet health need, near-poor women with unmet health needs due to cost were also 
more likely to be uninsured at T2 (3.079, p < .001). Although these findings may be 
unsurprising, similar results were not observed for poor women. In fact, post estimation 
hypothesis tests also confirm statistically significant differences between the health need (F(1, 
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1712) = 6.73, Prob > F = 0.0096) and health problem (F(1, 1712) = 16.21, Prob > F = 0.0001) 
coefficients for poor (Model 9) and near-poor women (Model 8) in the private or employer based 
health insurance models (see Table 4.4). Such findings suggest that near-poor women may not 
benefit as readily from public programs as their poorer peers and thus face greater risk of being 
uninsured. 
Controls 
In addition to differences between poor and near-poor women in the influence of the 
welfare, work, family, and health factors described above, other important differences in the 
effects of several control variables were also observed. For example, the race and citizenship 
disparities identified in Model 1 and discussed above, appear to be specific to certain groups of 
women (see Models 4 and 5); whereas race seems to be more consequential for poor women, 
with Hispanic women being more likely to be uninsured at T2 (2.864, p < .05), citizenship 
appears to be more consequential for near-poor women, with non-citizen women significantly 
more likely to be uninsured at T2 (2.183, p < .05).  
Several interesting findings were also observed for the city variables. For example, 
compared to those living in Boston, both poor and near-poor women living in Chicago and San 
Antonio faced significantly greater odds of being uninsured (see Table 4.2) with poor women in 
San Antonio facing the greatest increase in odds of being uninsured at T2 (9.638, p < .001). In 
fact, post estimation hypothesis tests confirm statistically significant differences between the San 
Antonio coefficients for poor (Model 5) and near-poor women (Model 4) in the uninsured 
models (F(1, 1712) = 4.12, Prob > F = 0.0425). Similarly, compared to those living in Boston, 
both poor and near-poor women in Chicago and San Antonio were significantly less likely to be 
on public health insurance at T2 (see Table 4.3). Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, 
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compared to women in Boston, both poor and near-poor women in San Antonio were also 
significantly more likely to have private health insurance at T2 (see Table 4.4) although a similar 
finding was not observed for Chicago. Such findings suggest that state specific policies play a 
particularly important role in shaping women’s access to health insurance programs either 
through the market or state. 
 
Research Question 3 
Given the lagged effects of welfare, work, and family statuses on low-income women’s 
health insurance access, does health insurance access play a significant role in determining 
low-income women’s economic status over time?  
 
Models 10-11 test for the effects of welfare, work, family, and health and insurance 
factors on changes in low-income women’s poverty status at T2. Because of the role of health 
insurance in affecting families’ economic vulnerability, we can expect to observe that access to 
different forms of insurance will have differential effects on women’s poverty over time. 
Specifically, I expect to find compared to those who are uninsured at T1, women with private 
forms of insurance will be less likely to move into poverty and more likely to move out of 
poverty at T2 (H3a). Although the benefits of public insurance access may not be observable 
because too much economic progress may result in loss of public insurance benefits, I hope to 
observe that women’s access to public insurance at T1 reduces their odds of moving into poverty 
at T2 (i.e., by reducing their risk of medical debt, etc.) (H3b). Similarly, I also expect to find that 
access to private or employer-based insurance at T1 increases the odds of moving out of poverty 
at T2, although, once again, it is possible that because of variability in the extensiveness and cost 
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of private insurance, access to this form of insurance may not have consistent effects on 
women’s economic progress over time (H3c). 
Table 4.5 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 10-11 to 
determine if women’s health insurance status at T1 affects changes in women’s poverty status at 
T2. The dependent variable in these models measures women’s change in poverty status from T1 
to T2, where 0 represents no change, and 1 represents a change in poverty status. Model 10 is 
selected for women who were not poor at T1 and thus displays the factors that predict women’s 
movement into poverty at T2. Model 11 is selected for women who were poor at T1 and thus 
displays the factors that predict women’s movement out of poverty at T2. All independent 
variables are measured at T1. The table provides the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence 
intervals for each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more than two 
response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance are also 
provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
Although the work, family, welfare, health and control variables focused on in this study 
explained as much as almost 32 percent of the variance in public insurance access (see Model 6), 
they explain substantially less of the variance in poverty status, as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 
values provided at the bottom of the table. Model 10 explains almost 13 percent of the total 
variance in women’s movement into poverty at T2, and only 7 percent of the total variance in 
women’s movement out of poverty at T2 (see Model 11). These findings alone suggest that the 
proposed models are insufficient for predicting changes in women’s economic status over time. 
Nevertheless, as described below, the results do show that resource pooling through 
cohabitation or marriage increases women’s odds of moving out of poverty, while having fair or 
poor health significantly reduces women’s odds of moving out of poverty. In addition, being on 
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public health insurance and welfare at T1 is associated with in an increase in women’s odds of 
moving into poverty at T2, suggesting that near-poor women who qualify for public programs 
(despite strict income eligibility guidelines) must have other (unobserved) compelling 
circumstances that result in their movement into poverty over time.  
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Table 4.5 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Models With and Without Health Insurance 
Measures on Poverty Change T2 (0=No Change, 1=Change) 
 Near-poor T1 Model 10 
(Movement Into Poverty at T2) 
 Poor T1 Model 11 












Time 0.187 0.018 1.965  1.255 0.161 9.769 
Months 0.962 0.902 1.026  1.005 0.952 1.062 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.891 0.394 2.013  0.754 0.390 1.455 
Hispanic 0.936 0.395 2.219  0.704 0.360 1.376 
Other 1.148 0.312 4.220  0.331 0.093 1.178 
US Citizen 1.869* 1.019 3.429  1.009 0.608 1.673 
Kids 1.093 0.914 1.308  0.979 0.874 1.096 
Age 0.989 0.966 1.013  0.991 0.973 1.008 
Income 0.796* 0.634 0.998  0.936 0.654 1.341 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.247 0.753 2.064  0.672* 0.462 0.977 
San Antonio 0.919 0.498 1.697  0.669 0.434 1.032 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Diploma/GED 0.722 0.437 1.193  1.346 0.958 1.889 
College Degree 0.767 0.334 1.763  1.807 0.917 3.559 
Work (Unemployed)        
Employed PT 1.326 0.685 2.565  1.284 0.844 1.954 
Employed FT 0.656 0.376 1.144  1.547 0.996 2.404 
On Welfare 2.073* 1.157 3.714  0.769 0.534 1.108 
Marital Status (Single)       
Cohabiting 0.669 0.351 1.273  2.459** 1.298 4.657 
Separated 0.765 0.388 1.506  0.803 0.517 1.246 
Married 0.599 0.337 1.063  1.774** 1.166 2.700 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.713* 1.057 2.776  0.745 0.516 1.076 
Fair/Poor 1.086 0.564 2.092  0.676* 0.458 0.999 
Health Problem 1.370 0.556 3.376  1.522 0.974 2.379 
Health Need 0.822 0.417 1.619  1.621* 1.018 2.582 
Insurance (Uninsured)        
Public HI 2.045* 1.152 3.631  0.742 0.492 1.119 
Private/Employer HI 1.154 0.632 2.106  1.633 0.912 2.923 
N 1117    2146   
Log-likelihood -645.908    -1321.580   
Chi
2 
86.659    74.538   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.126    0.073   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work, Welfare, and Family 
As Table 4.5 shows, several welfare, work, and family variables play important roles in 
predicting changes in low-income women’s poverty status over time. For example, as might be 
expected, Model 10 shows that unit increases in income at T1 reduce women’s odds of moving 
into poverty at T2 (0.796, p < .05). Perhaps surprising though, the reverse effect is not observed 
in Model 11 predicting women’s movement out of poverty. Model 10 also shows that being on 
welfare at T1 increases women’s odds of moving into poverty at T2 (2.073, p < .05), which may 
indicate that near-poor women who qualify for welfare at T1 are experiencing significant 
(unobserved) life circumstances that make them likely to be in poverty over time. Model 11 
provides evidence that compared to those who were single, married (1.774, p < .01) or 
cohabitating (2.459, p < .01) women (at T1) are more likely to move out of poverty at T2, 
suggesting an important lagged effect for resource pooling among couples. Model 11 also shows 
that compared to women who have excellent or very good health, women with fair or poor health 
at T1 are much less likely to move out of poverty at T2 (0.676, p < .05).  
Contrary to my hypotheses, I find little evidence to support that women’s health 
insurance status at T1 plays a significant role in shaping changes in women’s poverty status over 
time. Specifically, in contrast to hypothesis H3b, Model 10 shows that compared to women who 
are uninsured, women on public insurance at T1 are significantly more likely to move into 
poverty at T2 (2.045, p < .05). Nevertheless, like the effect for welfare status (described above) 
this finding may simply indicate that near-poor women who qualify for public health insurance at 
T1 have significant unobserved factors that make them more likely to move into poverty over 
time. In this way, public health insurance access may serve as in indicator of poor economic 
health as opposed to a causal force affecting changes in women’s economic status over time. 
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Several other surprising findings were observed. For example, Model 10 shows that both 
citizens (compared to non-citizens; 1.869, p < .05) and those with good health at T1 (compared 
to those with excellent or very good health; 1.713, p < .05) are more likely to move into poverty 
at T2. Although we might expect that having an unmet health need puts women at greater risk of 
moving into poverty over time, Model 11 shows that compared to those without a health need, 
women with a health need that goes unmet due to cost at T1 are actually more likely to move out 
of poverty at T2 (1.621, p < .05). Such perplexing results provide further support that these 
models are insufficient for predicting changes in low-income women’s poverty status over time 
 
Summary 
In regards to my first research question I find that one’s welfare, work, and family status 
at T1 does indeed have important lagged effects influencing one’s insurance status at T2, that 
certain factors are more important in predicting changes in low-income women’s health 
insurance status than others, and that the effects of these changes do vary by the type of 
insurance examined. The results of Models 1-3 show evidence that public programs like welfare 
and Medicaid provide important long-term protection against being uninsured or experiencing 
unmet health needs at later time points. Nevertheless, careful examination reveals that the 
benefits of public programs may be limited to certain segments of the low-income population 
such as non-Hispanic citizens.  
But what about women who do not qualify for public programs? The results of my 
analysis show that protective factors related to employment, such as greater income, may 
produce bifurcated long-term results among low-income women – although greater income may 
provide some women with access to private or employer based health insurance options, others 
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are left more vulnerable at later time points due to their inability to qualify for public health 
insurance programs.  
Marital status also had some significant lagged effects on low-income women’s health 
insurance access. As hypothesized, compared to women who were single (and not cohabiting), 
being married reduced low-income women’s odds of having public health insurance while 
significantly increasing their odds of having private or employer-provided health insurance at  
later time points. Despite these findings, there was little support for the hypothesis that marriage 
provides low-income women with long-term protection against being uninsured. Similarly, 
despite the opportunity for resource pooling, there was little evidence to support that cohabiting 
affects women’s access to health insurance. 
In addition to the effects of these welfare, work, and family factors, I find health related 
variables also play an important role in shaping women’s access to various forms of insurance at 
later time points. These results suggest that public health insurance plays an important role in 
meeting the needs of low-income women with health problems and that those who are unable to 
qualify for such programs are at greater risk of having unmet medical needs due to cost.   
In regards to my second research question, some of the initial findings - such as the 
bifurcated effects of increased income on women’s health insurance status - may be partially 
explained by women’s poverty status; for near-poor women, increased income results in a 
significant increase in the odds of having private insurance at later time points, but a similar 
effect is not observed for poor women. The lack of significant effects for income in the 
uninsured and public health insurance models may represent complex effects for increased 
income on women’s access to public insurance options (while increasing income may reduce 
near-poor women’s ability to qualify for public health insurance, the benefits of increased 
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income may not be realized immediately through a reduction in their risk of being uninsured). I 
attempted to capture the complex (perhaps curvilinear) effects of income using several 
transformations of income in several models (not shown), but these transformations similarly 
failed to capture these effects or improve the fit and explanatory power of the models so they 
were not included in the final analyses. 
Nevertheless, the results do provide evidence of differential effects for several other 
variables on poor and near-poor women’s risk of being uninsured and access to public and 
private forms of health insurance at later time points. For example, although race and marriage 
appear to play a more significant role in shaping poor women’s odds of being uninsured and on 
public health insurance, income and health factors play a much more significant role in shaping 
near-poor women’s access to insurance at later time points. In addition, full-time employment at 
T1 does not seem to provide the same protection against being uninsured for poor women as it 
does for near-poor women who, compared to near-poor unemployed women are significantly 
less likely to be uninsured at T2.  
Finding that only poor women on welfare at T1 experienced significantly reduced odds of 
being uninsured at T2 suggests that the benefits of welfare in protecting women against being 
uninsured may be limited to poor women. Combined with the differential findings for full-time 
employment described above, these findings illustrate how poor and near-poor women use 
distinct strategies to protect themselves against being uninsured – for near-poor women full-time 
employment provides at least some women a level of protection against being uninsured, while 
their poorer peers are able to utilize public programs and health insurance benefits to meet their 
health insurance needs. One potential consequence of this is that near-poor women may face 
greater risk and instability in their access to insurance than poor women. 
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As predicted, the lagged effects of marriage are another factor that plays a differential 
role in shaping poor and near-poor women’s access to insurance; while marriage may act as a 
risk factor for some poor women by reducing their access to public forms of health insurance, 
this risk may be mitigated by improved access for both poor and near-poor women to private or 
employment based health insurance options as a dependent.   
 Health measures also produced mixed results across models and groups of women 
providing evidence that near-poor women are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of 
poor health and at greater risk of having unmet needs due to cost than their poorer peers. For 
example, poor women with health problems were significantly less likely to be uninsured at T2 
while near-poor women with health problems were significantly less likely to have private 
insurance at T2. The solution for both groups of women may be public health insurance options, 
as both poor and near-poor women with health problems were more likely to have public health 
insurance. Despite this, near-poor women appeared to be particularly vulnerable to having unmet 
health needs due to cost as shown in the uninsured and private health insurance models.  Such 
findings suggest that public health insurance programs play an important role in protecting low-
income women from being uninsured or failing to get access to care due to cost. 
Results also confirm that city differences play an important role in shaping the policy 
contexts which determine women’s health insurance access. Compared to women living in 
Boston, women living in Chicago and San Antonio faced significantly greater odds of being 
uninsured and lower likelihood of having public insurance. Poor women in San Antonio 
appeared to face some of the greatest risks. State specific policies and income guidelines play a 
particularly important role for near-poor women in shaping their access to health insurance 
programs by either improving or hindering their access to public programs. These results suggest 
 100 
that despite the protective benefits of public programs for some women in some areas, other 
categories of women may face greater risk and vulnerability due to the rules and regulations of 
such programs and lack of access to private or employment based options.   
Despite the importance of women’s health in shaping their economic prospects, in 
regards to my third research question, I find that including measures of health insurance access at 
T1 only offers a slight improvement in our ability to predict women’s poverty status at T2. 
Although I hoped to observe a positive effect for women’s access to both public and private 
health insurance on women’s poverty status over time, it appears that being on Medicaid or 
having private health insurance may simply be an indicator of one’s economic well-being instead 
of a causal force affecting one’s economic status. Nevertheless, I do find that including health 
insurance measures provides evidence that public health insurance is an important program for 
women in poverty and women who do not qualify for such programs are at greater risk of having 
unmet health needs due to cost. This result provides further support for the findings described 
above, which illustrate the economic vulnerability of the near-poor who are unable to benefit 
from access to public programs like Medicaid. The implications and possible explanations of 
these findings are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHANGE ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
In Chapter 4 I examined how factors at one time point affect women’s access to 
insurance at later time points. In this Chapter I take a different approach to modeling the effects 
of various welfare, work and family factors on women’s health insurance access over time by 
using measures of change to predict women’s health insurance and poverty status. By comparing 
models using static measures with models using measures of change from T1 to T2, I can 
determine if experiencing change in any particular status impacts women’s health insurance 
access and poverty differently than one’s current marital, employment, or welfare status. One 
benefit of using measures of change is that they may provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the factors that affect women’s access to insurance. For example, we know that one’s marital 
status affects their options for health insurance, but does experiencing marital change, which 
may cause disruption in women’s financial resources and program eligibility, similarly affect 
women’s options? Are marital changes more or less consequential for low-income women’s 
access to insurance? Using a series of logistic regression analyses we can determine how 
welfare, work, and family changes over time affect low-income women’s insurance access, if the 
effects of these changes vary for different groups of low-income women, and whether health 
insurance changes affect low-income women’s economic stability over time.  
  
Research Question 1 
What is the relative importance of individual-level welfare, work, and family changes in 
predicting low-income women’s health insurance status over time? 
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Models 13, 15, and 17 test the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on low-
income women’s health insurance access. Models 12, 14, and 16 provide comparisons using 
static welfare, work, and family measures. Because there are different pathways to various forms 
of insurance, we might expect to observe differential effects for various changes by the type of 
health insurance being examined. Specifically, I expect to find that given the economic benefits 
of employment, employment changes that result in a reduction of work hours to fewer than 35 
hours per week will have the biggest and most consistent effects on women’s insurance access 
over time, resulting in increased likelihood of being uninsured or having public insurance and 
reduced likelihood of having private or employment based insurance (H1a). In addition, I expect 
to find that although Medicaid was officially delinked from welfare in 1996, changes that results 
in women’s loss of welfare benefits will negatively impact their access to public health 
insurance. Given the economic vulnerability following loss of welfare benefits, I also expect to 
find that these women are more likely to be uninsured and less likely to have private or 
employment based insurance (H1b). Finally, given the legal and economic benefits of marriage, I 
expect to find that getting married or staying married have similar effects – reducing women’s 
access to public insurance and odds of being uninsured, while increasing their odds of having 
private or employment based benefits (H1c).  
Tables 5.1-5.3 display the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 12-17. 
Models 12 and 13 use women’s insurance status (insured or uninsured) at T2 as the dependent 
variable. Models 14 and 15 use women’s public health insurance status at T2 as the dependent 
variable. And Models 16 and 17 use women’s private or employment based health insurance 
status at T2 as the dependent variable. All independent variables included in these models are 
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measured at T2; the change variables measure changes in statuses from either Wave 1 to 2, or 
Wave 2 to 3. The results tables provide the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for 
each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more than two response 
categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance are also provided in 
parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
In Models 12 and 13, about 25 percent of the variance in insurance status is explained by 
the model, as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 value provided at the bottom of Table 5.1, with the 
change model offering little improvement in the amount of variance explained over the static 
model. In Models 14 and 15 the amount of variance explained increases dramatically, with the 
change model (Model 15) explaining slightly more of the variance in public health insurance 
status (40.2 percent) than the static model (38.4 percent). In Models 16 and 17, a similar 
improvement in the amount of variance explained is observed with the change model (Model 17) 
explaining 36.7 percent of the variance in private or employer based insurance and the static 
model explaining 34.2 percent. The improved fit and slight increase in the amount of variance 
explained by the change models suggests that including measures of one’s welfare, work, and 
family changes helps us predict low-income women’s insurance status at T2.  
As described below, the results also provide evidence that examining measures of change 
provides a more nuanced understanding of how women’s lives may affect their access to health 
insurance. In most models the effects of the change variables are consistent with their static 
counterparts. Nevertheless, variation in the odds between change categories shows that certain 
changes (or stability) may have more (or less) pronounced effects. For example, the benefits and 
risks associated with marriage in regards to women’s access to public and private forms of health 
insurance appear to be restricted to those who are stably married as similar effects are not 
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observed for the newly married. In contrast, more mixed effects are observed for full-time 
employment change categories. For example, protection against being uninsured appears to be 
limited to those who are stably employed full-time, whereas women both newly employed full-
time and stably employed full-time experience a reduction in access to public health insurance 
options. Finally, I also find mixed evidence that the delinking of welfare and public health 
insurance benefits has been successful in protecting women who are experiencing welfare 
changes from also losing their public health insurance benefits; even women with only 
temporary access to welfare appear to have improved odds of being on public insurance and 
reduced odds of being uninsured compared to those who have no access to welfare, yet their 
odds of having access to public insurance options are greatly reduced when compared to those 
with stable access to welfare.  
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Table 5.1 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Static and Change Variables for Uninsured T2 
(0=Has Insurance, 1=Uninsured) 
 Static Model 12  Change Model 13 
T2 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Time 0.208 0.030 1.463  0.286 0.043 1.918 
Months 1.043 0.989 1.099  1.035 0.983 1.089 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 1.498 0.537 4.175  1.585 0.588 4.267 
Hispanic 2.897* 1.005 8.354  2.904* 1.042 8.093 
Other 1.536 0.378 6.254  1.735 0.443 6.797 
US Citizen 0.413*** 0.261 0.653  0.447*** 0.279 0.717 
Kids 0.935 0.836 1.046  0.945 0.843 1.059 
Age 1.007 0.989 1.025  1.005 0.986 1.024 
Income 0.796** 0.683 0.927  0.807** 0.693 0.941 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 3.317*** 2.233 4.925  3.578*** 2.390 5.357 
San Antonio 6.563*** 4.327 9.953  6.648*** 4.330 10.208 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.797 0.563 1.129  0.763 0.533 1.090 
College 0.511* 0.263 0.995  0.503* 0.263 0.963 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.120 0.785 1.598  1.039 0.720 1.499 
Fair/Poor 0.809 0.500 1.308  0.803 0.496 1.301 
Health Problem 0.259*** 0.145 0.463  0.295*** 0.168 0.519 
Health Need 7.199*** 4.794 10.810  6.669*** 4.468 9.954 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 0.633* 0.419 0.957     
Employed FT 0.483*** 0.320 0.730     
On Welfare 0.295*** 0.177 0.492     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 1.202 0.750 1.926     
Separated 0.609* 0.379 0.976     
Married 0.715 0.458 1.115     
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment     0.575 0.264 1.254 
Got FT Employment     0.731 0.433 1.235 
Stayed Employed FT     0.386*** 0.240 0.618 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare     0.583* 0.372 0.913 
Moved On Welfare     0.251*** 0.124 0.509 
Stayed On Welfare     0.273*** 0.141 0.525 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage     0.991 0.528 1.857 
Got Married     0.735 0.405 1.334 
Stayed Married     0.752 0.464 1.218 
N 3269    3269   
Log-likelihood -1475.303    -1470.960   
Chi
2 
263.065    268.256   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.248    0.250   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 5.2 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Static and Change Variables for Public HI T2 
(0=Not on Medicaid, 1=Has Medicaid) 
 Static Model 14  Change Model 15 
T2 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Time 2.007 0.321 12.541  3.943 0.612 25.405 
Months 0.990 0.943 1.039  0.974 0.928 1.024 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.912 0.508 1.638  0.808 0.440 1.485 
Hispanic 0.637 0.359 1.129  0.636 0.347 1.165 
Other 1.354 0.484 3.790  1.373 0.481 3.918 
US Citizen 2.067** 1.338 3.193  1.808** 1.178 2.776 
Kids 1.264*** 1.129 1.415  1.232*** 1.103 1.376 
Age 0.958*** 0.944 0.973  0.966*** 0.951 0.981 
Income 0.776*** 0.678 0.889  0.787*** 0.688 0.901 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 0.331*** 0.227 0.484  0.300*** 0.207 0.437 
San Antonio 0.069*** 0.045 0.106  0.069*** 0.045 0.106 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.719 0.508 1.017  0.783 0.550 1.114 
College 0.443** 0.246 0.798  0.551* 0.311 0.979 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.896 0.633 1.269  0.933 0.653 1.332 
Fair/Poor 1.166 0.794 1.714  1.218 0.833 1.781 
Health Problem 5.721*** 3.192 10.252  5.018*** 2.835 8.881 
Health Need 0.265*** 0.163 0.432  0.251*** 0.153 0.410 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 1.130 0.705 1.811     
Employed FT 0.342*** 0.231 0.506     
On Welfare 5.418*** 3.333 8.808     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 0.952 0.619 1.464     
Separated 1.390 0.883 2.189     
Married 0.587** 0.402 0.856     
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment     0.642 0.373 1.106 
Got FT Employment     0.467*** 0.303 0.720 
Stayed Employed FT     0.228*** 0.151 0.343 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare     2.442*** 1.628 3.664 
Moved On Welfare     6.284*** 3.095 12.758 
Stayed On Welfare     7.946*** 4.493 14.052 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage     0.849 0.468 1.540 
Got Married     1.075 0.656 1.762 
Stayed Married     0.453** 0.281 0.732 
N 3269    3269   
Log-likelihood -1384.958    -1344.669   
Chi
2 
405.882    481.908   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.384    0.402   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 5.3 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Static and Change Variables for 
Private/Employer HI T2 (0=No Priv/Emp HI, 1=Has Priv/Emp HI) 
 Static Model 16  Change Model 17 
T2 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Time 1.791 0.201 15.966  0.662 0.069 6.363 
Months 0.974 0.918 1.033  0.996 0.939 1.058 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.723 0.223 2.345  0.804 0.279 2.321 
Hispanic 0.593 0.154 2.290  0.588 0.180 1.925 
Other 0.483 0.101 2.310  0.409 0.087 1.931 
US Citizen 1.200 0.619 2.324  1.254 0.684 2.301 
Kids 0.807** 0.705 0.924  0.840** 0.737 0.957 
Age 1.039*** 1.016 1.063  1.033** 1.009 1.057 
Income 1.583*** 1.353 1.853  1.567*** 1.341 1.831 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.317 0.843 2.057  1.335 0.853 2.089 
San Antonio 2.396** 1.389 4.133  2.247** 1.303 3.873 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 2.120** 1.343 3.347  2.128** 1.345 3.367 
College 4.509*** 2.258 9.004  3.950*** 2.005 7.779 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.127 0.762 1.666  1.192 0.805 1.766 
Fair/Poor 1.239 0.737 2.084  1.123 0.663 1.900 
Health Problem 0.342** 0.173 0.676  0.361** 0.187 0.697 
Health Need 0.197*** 0.107 0.362  0.253*** 0.139 0.459 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 2.137* 1.189 3.841     
Employed FT 7.059*** 4.459 11.176     
On Welfare 0.315** 0.140 0.708     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 0.864 0.512 1.458     
Separated 1.296 0.802 2.096     
Married 2.186** 1.360 3.515     
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment     3.631*** 1.860 7.088 
Got FT Employment     3.429*** 1.997 5.888 
Stayed Employed FT     7.751*** 5.036 11.931 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare     0.518* 0.289 0.928 
Moved On Welfare     0.572 0.254 1.290 
Stayed On Welfare     0.054*** 0.018 0.165 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage     1.427 0.748 2.723 
Got Married     1.444 0.711 2.932 
Stayed Married     2.466*** 1.508 4.033 
N 3269    3269   
Log-likelihood -1235.702    -1189.449   
Chi
2 
296.763    281.335   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.342    0.367   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work 
 Consistent with hypothesis H1a, the static models show that compared to the 
unemployed, full-time employment significantly reduces low-income women’s odds of being 
uninsured (Model 12; 0.483, p < .001) and having public health insurance (Model 14; 0.342, p < 
.001), while increasing their odds of having private or employment based insurance (Model 16; 
7.059, p < .001). Perhaps surprisingly, Models 12 and 16 also show that compared to the 
unemployed, part-time employment also improves women’s odds of having access to private or 
employer based insurance (2.137, p < .05) and reduces their odds of being uninsured (0.633, p < 
.05), although the effects of full-time employment are much stronger than the effects of part-time 
employment in both models.  
The results produced in the change models are consistent with the static model findings, 
yet also provide important information about differences between categories of employment 
women based on whether the employment was sustained across time or is new. For example, in 
Model 13 we learn that the positive effects of full-time employment in reducing women’s odds 
of being uninsured are limited to those women who are stably employed full-time (0.386, p < 
.001) as a similar significant effect is not observed for women who moved into full-time 
employment by T2. Nevertheless, Model 15 shows that the risks associated with loss of public 
health insurance options for the full-time employed are not limited to those who are stably 
employed full-time (0.228, p < .0001); even women who were newly employed full-time (i.e., 
had moved into full-time employment by T2) experienced reduced odds of being on public 
health insurance compared to those who did not have access to full-time employment across 
Waves 1 and 2 (0.467, p < .001).  
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Also consistent with its static counterpart, Model 17 shows that both new full-time 
employment (3.429, p < .001) and stable full-time employment (7.751, p < .001) are associated 
with increased odds of having private or employer based insurance at T2, although stable full-
time employment results in more than double the odds of having access to private benefits than 
new full-time employment (see Table 5.3). Nevertheless, I was surprised to find that compared to 
women who stayed less than full-time employed, even women who lost full-time employment 
across Waves 1 or 2 also experienced an increase in odds of having private or employer based 
insurance at T2 (3.631, p > .001). Such findings suggest that there may be long-term benefits for 
women’s access to full-time work in increasing their access to private insurance options, possibly 
through the use of programs such as COBRA, although this seems unlikely given the high cost of 
COBRA and the low-income of the sample women. It may be more likely that women leaving 
full-time employment may be doing so because of marriage, which improves their access to 
employment based health insurance as a dependent. Taken together, these results illustrate the 
complex effects of full-time employment for low-income women; while some women benefit 
from improved access to private forms of insurance, other women may suffer from reduced 
access to public health insurance options, putting them at greater risk of being uninsured.  
Welfare 
 Although welfare was officially delinked from Medicaid in 1996, the static models 
provide strong evidence that having access to welfare is associated with improved health 
insurance access for low-income women. For example, although compared to women not on 
welfare, women on welfare are much less likely to have access to private or employment based 
insurance (Model 16; 0.315, p < .01); they are also significantly more likely to be on public 
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health insurance (Model 14; 5.418, p < .001) and much less likely to be uninsured (Model 12; 
0.295, p < .001).  
The change models provide more nuanced results that reveal some particularly interesting 
findings. Consistent with hypothesis H1b, the benefits associated with access to welfare for 
women’s access to health insurance are extended to both those stably on welfare (0.273, p < 
.001) as well as those who are new to welfare (0.251, p < .001), resulting in reduced odds of 
being uninsured (see Model 13). Perhaps surprising, compared to women who were stably not on 
welfare, even women who recently moved off of welfare were less likely to be uninsured  at T2 
(0.583, p < .05), although the reduction in odds of being uninsured for this group of women was 
much less than for those with new or stable access to welfare (see Model 13). Similarly, even 
temporary welfare access was also associated with improved access to public health insurance 
benefits (see Model 15); compared to women who were not on welfare across Waves 1 or 2, both 
women who moved on to welfare (6.284, p < .001) and those who were stably on welfare (7.946, 
p < .001) were more likely to be on public health insurance. Nevertheless, as Table 5.1 shows, 
even women who moved off of welfare were also more likely to have public health insurance 
compared to women who stayed off welfare across Waves 1 or 2 (2.442, p < .001), although, 
once again, this group of women’s odds of having access to public health insurance was much 
lower than women with new or stable access to welfare (see Model 15). These findings would 
appear to challenge hypothesis H1b by providing some evidence of a successful delinking of 
welfare and Medicaid benefits.  
Nevertheless, a separate analysis (not shown) provides some evidence of much more risk 
for women leaving welfare. By altering the comparison group of the Welfare Change variable to 
women who were stably on welfare from Wave 1 to 2, or Wave 2 to 3, women who lost welfare 
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benefits from either wave faced significantly increased odds of being uninsured (2.253, p < .05) 
and reduced odds of having access to public health insurance benefits (0.323, p < .001). 
Together, the results show that when compared to women with no access to welfare, women who 
experience welfare changes have improved chances of getting access to public health insurance 
options which reduces their risk of being uninsured. But when compared to women who have 
stable access to welfare, women who experience welfare changes do not fare as well and are less 
likely to get access to public health insurance options which increases their odds of being 
uninsured. 
Change Model 17 provides further support for the mixed effects of welfare access on 
women’s access to private or employer based health insurance. As shown in Table 5.3, and 
perhaps unsurprising, compared to women who were stably off welfare from Wave 1 to 2, or 
Wave 2 to 3 women who stayed on welfare were significantly less likely to have private or 
employment based insurance (0.054, p < .001). More interesting is the finding that compared to 
women who were stably off welfare, women who moved off welfare across either wave were 
also significantly less likely to have private or employment based insurance (0.518, p < .05). 
Although this might suggest that women leaving welfare are at greater risk of being uninsured, 
the results of Model 15 suggest that some of these women may actually be able to maintain 
access to public health insurance, mitigating the risk of being uninsured (see Model 13).  
Family 
 Contrary to hypothesis H1c, I find little evidence that either static or marital change 
measures affect low-income women’s odds of being uninsured. Nevertheless, I do find consistent 
evidence across both static and change models to support the hypotheses regarding stable 
marriage and women’s access to public and private forms of insurance. In static Models 14 and 
 112 
16, compared to women who are single (and not cohabiting), married women are significantly 
less likely to have access to public health insurance (0.587, p < .01) and more likely to have 
access to private or employment based insurance (2.186, p < .01). Change Models 15 and 17 
produce similar results; compared to women who stayed single across either Wave 1 or 2, 
women who stayed married were less likely to have public health insurance (0.453, p < .01) and 
more likely to have private or employer based insurance (2.466, p < .001). Nevertheless, contrary 
to hypothesis H1c, these results also suggest that the benefits and risks associated with marriage 
in regards to women’s access to public and private forms of health insurance appear to be 
restricted to those who are stably married as similar effects were not observed for those who 
moved into marriage at T2.  
Health  
Consistent with the results of Chapter 4, women who experienced health problems that 
affected their ability to work were significantly less likely to have private insurance (see Table 
5.3) but more likely to be on public health insurance (see Table 5.2) and less likely to be 
uninsured (see Table 5.1) than women who did not have health problems. Similarly, women who 
had health needs that went unmet due to cost were significantly more likely to be uninsured (see 
Table 5.1) and less likely to have either public health insurance (see Table 5.2) or private or 
employer based health insurance (see Table 5.3). These results are consistent across both the 
static and change models and provide evidence that public health insurance programs play an 
important role in both providing insurance to women with health problems and protecting low-
income women from having unmet health needs. Low-income women without insurance, on the 
other hand, are at great risk of being unable to meet their healthcare needs. 
Controls 
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 Also consistent with the results of Chapter 4, in addition to the influence of welfare, 
work, family, and health factors in shaping low-income women’s insurance status, several other 
factors also significantly affected women’s access to various forms of health insurance at T2. For 
example, both Hispanic and non-citizen women faced significantly greater odds of being 
uninsured (see Table 5.1). Similarly, compared to non-citizens, citizens were more likely to have 
public health insurance at T2 (see Table 5.2). In addition, compared to those living in Boston, 
women living in Chicago and San Antonio faced significantly greater odds of being uninsured 
(see Table 5.1) and lower likelihood of having public insurance (see Table 5.2), while women in 
San Antonio also experienced greater odds of having private or employer-based health insurance 
(see Table 5.3). Finally, and also consistent with Chapter 4, both the static and change models 
show that while increased income reduces women’s access to public health insurance options 
(see Table 5.2), it also increases their access to private or employer based health insurance (see 
Table 5.3) while reducing their risk of being uninsured (see Table 5.1). Taken together, these 
results suggest that despite the protective benefits of public programs for some women in some 
areas, other categories of women may face greater risk and vulnerability due to the rules and 
regulations of such programs and lack of access to private or employment based options.   
 
Research Question 2 
Are there significant differences between women who are poor and near-poor (at Wave 1) 




The results of the following analyses suggest that some of the effects of various welfare, 
work, and family changes on women’s health insurance access may be specific to certain 
categories of low-income women. Analyzing separate models for poor and near-poor women (as 
opposed to simply adding an interaction variable for poverty status in a combined model) allows 
me to determine if the variables in question operate differently for poor and near-poor women. In 
the following analyses (Models 18-23) I test for differences in the effects of welfare, work, and 
family changes on low-income women’s health insurance access at T2 by women’s poverty 
status at T1. Although all low-income women experience significant vulnerabilities, because 
poor women may have greater access to public programs and supports, we can expect to observe 
significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the importance of various welfare, 
work, and family changes in shaping their access to each form of insurance.  
Specifically, I expect to find that employment changes may have more profound effects 
for near-poor women than poor women due to poor women’s ability to access public programs. 
Employment changes that result in access to full-time employment may also not provide poor 
women the same benefits in terms of access to private or employment based insurance as near-
poor women due to their particularly low wages (H2a). In addition, I expect to find that even 
when they experience welfare changes, poor women will have greater likelihood of being 
publicly insured and reduced likelihood of being uninsured, whereas near-poor women who 
experience welfare changes may not benefit from these same protections. Nevertheless, near-
poor women’s loss of welfare status may result in greater likelihood of obtaining private or 
employer based insurance, whereas poor women may not obtain similar access to private or 
employer based benefits upon loss of welfare (H2b). Finally, I expect to find that family changes 
that result in the ending of a marriage or beginning of a marriage will have more significant 
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effects on near-poor women’s access to both public and private insurance than poor women as 
poor women’s access to public programs may protect them better from the negative effects of 
family changes (H2c).   
Table 5.4 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 18 and 19 
examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of being uninsured at T2. Table 5.5 displays the 
results for Models 20 and 21 examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of having public 
insurance at T2. And Table 5.6 displays the results of Models 22 and 23 examining poor and 
near-poor women’s odds of having private or employment based health insurance at T2. All 
independent variables included in these models are measured at T2; the change variables 
measure changes in statuses from either Wave 1 to 2, or Wave 2 to 3. The analyses are separated 
by women’s poverty status at T1. All tables provide the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence 
intervals for each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more than two 
response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance are also 
provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
When examining the odds of being uninsured at T2 (see Table 5.4), the model explains 
more of the variance for poor women (29 percent) than near-poor women (25 percent). The 
reverse is found for the private/employment based health insurance models (see Table 5.6); 
where 37.6 percent of the variance in private/employment based health insurance access is 
explained in the model for near-poor women, 33 percent of the variance is explained in the 
model for poor women. In the public health insurance model there is a negligible difference in 
the amount of variance explained, with models for both poor and near-poor women explaining 
about 40 percent of the variance (see Table 5.5).  
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As described below, the results provide evidence of the differential effects of several 
variables on poor and near-poor women’s risk of being uninsured and access to public and 
private forms of health insurance at T2. For example, although citizenship plays a more 
significant role in shaping near-poor women’s risk of being uninsured, welfare changes play a 
much more significant role in shaping poor women’s risk of being uninsured. In regards to 
women’s access to public insurance, I find that although full-time employment has similar 
effects on both poor and near-poor women’s access to Medicaid, it has a much larger effect on 
near-poor women’s ability to access public health insurance, while stable marriage appears to 
play a more significant role in shaping poor women’s access to such programs. Poor women in 
San Antonio appeared to be particularly at risk of being uninsured and the least likely to have 
public health insurance benefits. Taken together, the results provide evidence that policy contexts 
and public programs play an important role in protecting low-income women, yet various 
welfare, work, and family changes play different roles in shaping poor and near-poor women’s 
access to these benefits. 
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Table 5.4 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Uninsured T2 
(0=Has Insurance, 1=Uninsured) 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 1.716 0.060 49.278  0.139 0.012 1.556 
Months 0.992 0.907 1.086  1.052 0.986 1.124 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 2.525 0.723 8.811  1.095 0.403 2.973 
Hispanic 3.504 0.966 12.707  2.352 0.900 6.145 
Other 1.084 0.198 5.943  1.410 0.312 6.383 
US Citizen 0.356** 0.172 0.739  0.585 0.318 1.078 
Kids 0.799* 0.651 0.981  0.984 0.861 1.125 
Age 1.018 0.990 1.046  1.002 0.982 1.024 
Income 0.812 0.657 1.003  0.821 0.668 1.008 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 2.818** 1.484 5.352  4.549*** 2.693 7.684 
San Antonio 3.654*** 1.919 6.957  10.280*** 6.075 17.395 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.729 0.404 1.317  0.858 0.557 1.320 
College 0.490 0.175 1.374  0.684 0.329 1.424 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.386 0.788 2.436  0.823 0.517 1.309 
Fair/Poor 0.544 0.261 1.135  0.893 0.522 1.529 
Health Problem 0.220** 0.081 0.602  0.289** 0.137 0.609 
Health Need 8.299*** 4.286 16.069  6.003*** 3.750 9.610 
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment 0.275** 0.114 0.663  0.824 0.324 2.093 
Got FT Employment 1.328 0.506 3.484  0.587 0.318 1.083 
Stayed Employed FT 0.377** 0.198 0.719  0.377* 0.178 0.797 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare 0.714 0.303 1.687  0.580* 0.349 0.963 
Moved On Welfare 0.345 0.072 1.657  0.178*** 0.076 0.414 
Stayed On Welfare 0.479 0.086 2.676  0.230*** 0.116 0.457 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 0.430 0.136 1.361  1.485 0.722 3.053 
Got Married 0.944 0.405 2.200  0.537 0.227 1.272 
Stayed Married 0.725 0.364 1.443  1.004 0.559 1.805 
N 1119    2150   
Log-likelihood -486.011    -932.812   
Chi
2 
103.487    230.352   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.251    0.291   




Table 5.5 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Public HI T2 
(0=No Medicaid, 1=Has Medicaid) 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 1.233 0.042 35.868  7.558 0.792 72.118 
Months 1.004 0.919 1.097  0.959 0.903 1.018 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.609 0.238 1.556  0.942 0.464 1.911 
Hispanic 0.441 0.173 1.126  0.816 0.405 1.643 
Other 1.545 0.293 8.147  1.353 0.412 4.445 
US Citizen 1.458 0.737 2.882  2.077** 1.253 3.442 
Kids 1.260* 1.040 1.525  1.205** 1.054 1.376 
Age 0.952*** 0.928 0.977  0.972** 0.953 0.991 
Income 0.726** 0.592 0.890  0.848 0.710 1.013 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 0.359** 0.186 0.691  0.243*** 0.159 0.369 
San Antonio 0.148*** 0.071 0.309  0.042*** 0.025 0.068 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.868 0.469 1.608  0.722 0.483 1.079 
College 0.601 0.198 1.827  0.506* 0.259 0.991 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.897 0.512 1.574  0.890 0.578 1.371 
Fair/Poor 0.772 0.383 1.554  1.516 0.949 2.420 
Health Problem 8.692*** 2.843 26.574  3.722*** 1.900 7.293 
Health Need 0.235*** 0.101 0.547  0.254*** 0.139 0.463 
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment 0.611 0.246 1.520  0.654 0.330 1.296 
Got FT Employment 0.261** 0.112 0.613  0.539* 0.316 0.920 
Stayed Employed FT 0.208*** 0.112 0.389  0.240*** 0.138 0.419 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare 2.089* 1.094 3.991  2.654*** 1.609 4.378 
Moved On Welfare 6.002*** 2.275 15.834  7.419*** 3.059 17.992 
Stayed On Welfare 4.421** 1.510 12.939  10.248*** 5.280 19.890 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 1.118 0.433 2.888  0.680 0.360 1.285 
Got Married 1.044 0.478 2.281  1.180 0.616 2.260 
Stayed Married 0.516 0.253 1.051  0.407** 0.221 0.751 
N 1119    2150   
Log-likelihood -430.398    -890.285   
Chi
2 
193.397    322.053   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.397    0.402   




Table 5.6 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on 
Private/Employer HI T2 (0=No Priv/Emp HI, 1=Has Priv/Emp HI) 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 0.497 0.037 6.593  0.760 0.025 22.833 
Months 1.004 0.935 1.077  0.993 0.907 1.086 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.824 0.293 2.314  0.862 0.328 2.263 
Hispanic 0.763 0.261 2.232  0.541 0.198 1.480 
Other 0.543 0.084 3.506  0.360 0.049 2.661 
US Citizen 1.604 0.783 3.288  1.052 0.453 2.442 
Kids 0.983 0.807 1.197  0.799** 0.676 0.945 
Age 1.030 0.997 1.065  1.032* 1.004 1.062 
Income 1.519*** 1.231 1.873  1.574*** 1.266 1.957 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.254 0.656 2.400  1.511 0.848 2.689 
San Antonio 1.684 0.913 3.107  3.055*** 1.602 5.828 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 1.885* 1.001 3.551  2.178** 1.209 3.924 
College 3.815* 1.217 11.961  3.408*** 1.653 7.026 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.923 0.519 1.642  1.461 0.876 2.435 
Fair/Poor 2.223* 1.147 4.308  0.746 0.377 1.479 
Health Problem 0.277* 0.096 0.795  0.491 0.133 1.807 
Health Need 0.259*** 0.119 0.562  0.196*** 0.082 0.469 
Employment Change (Stayed Less than FT Employed)     
Lost FT Employment 4.981*** 2.094 11.846  2.925* 1.094 7.823 
Got FT Employment 3.459* 1.278 9.365  3.845*** 1.993 7.416 
Stayed Employed FT 8.069*** 4.570 14.245  8.130*** 4.389 15.060 
Welfare Change (Stayed Off Welfare)       
Moved Off Welfare 0.544 0.203 1.458  0.448* 0.240 0.834 
Moved On Welfare 0.296 0.086 1.018  0.666 0.256 1.734 
Stayed On Welfare 0.044*** 0.007 0.261  0.059*** 0.015 0.227 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 2.602* 1.171 5.783  0.730 0.242 2.207 
Got Married 1.152 0.495 2.680  1.765 0.644 4.836 
Stayed Married 2.375* 1.217 4.635  2.125* 1.109 4.075 
N 1119    2150   
Log-likelihood -469.468    -673.051   
Chi
2 
153.278    173.228   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.376    0.330   






 Contrary to hypothesis H2b, I find that employment changes generally have similar 
effects on both poor and near-poor women’s access to insurance at T2.  For example, as Table 
5.6 shows, compared to women who stayed less than full-time employed, both poor and near-
poor women who are stably full-time employed or who experience any kind of change in full-
time employment (even loss of full-time work) are significantly more likely to have private or 
employment based health insurance. Nevertheless, although there is relatively little variation 
between poor and near-poor women in the effects of employment changes on their access to 
private benefits, close examination reveals that some employment changes have larger effects 
than others. For example, as might be expected, women (both poor and near-poor) who maintain 
full-time employment across waves have the greatest odds of having private or employment 
based health insurance compared to those who experience an employment change.  
 The effects of employment changes on poor and near-poor women’s access to public 
health insurance is also similar; compared to women who stayed less than full-time employed, 
both poor and near-poor women who are stably employed full-time or find new full-time 
employment are less likely to have public health insurance at T2. Despite similar effects for 
getting full-time work, consistent with hypothesis H2b, closer examination reveals that near-poor 
women see a much larger reduction in the odds of having public insurance than poor women. As 
table 5.5 shows, compared to women who stay less than full-time employed, poor women who 
move into full-time work by T2 are 46 percent less likely to have public health insurance (see 
Model 21; 0.539, p < .05) whereas near-poor women who move into full-time work by T2 are 
nearly 74 percent less likely to have public health insurance at T2 (see Model 20; 0.261, p < 
.001).  
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 Mixed results were observed for the effects of employment changes on poor and near-
poor women’s risk of being uninsured at T2. As Table 5.4 shows, and consistent with hypothesis 
H2a, compared to women who stayed less than full-time employed across waves, poor and near-
poor women who stayed full-time employed experienced an identical reduction in the odds of 
being uninsured (0.377, p < .05). Perhaps surprising though, and contrary to hypothesis H2a, 
compared to women who stayed less than full-time employed, near-poor women who lost full-
time employment across waves were also significantly less likely to be uninsured at T2 (see 
Model 18; 0.275, p < .01). A similar effect was not observed for poor women. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the heightened risks near-poor women face in their reduced access to 
public health insurance following finding full-time work may be mitigated somewhat by 
improved access to private benefits following finding new full-time work. 
Welfare 
Consistent with hypothesis H2b, I find support that poor women who experience welfare 
changes are more likely to benefit from the protections of public insurance than near-poor 
women who may not meet strict eligibility guidelines. As Table 5.4 shows, the effects observed 
in Model 13 (see Table 5.1), which showed that welfare transitions did not increase women’s 
risk of being uninsured, appear to be specific to poor women; compared to women who stayed 
off welfare across waves, poor women who stayed on welfare or experienced a change in their 
welfare status were all less likely to be uninsured at T2. Despite similar effects for all groups of 
poor women, close examination reveals important variation among welfare change categories. 
As might be expected, compared to women who stayed off of welfare across waves, poor women 
who stayed on welfare were 77 percent less likely to be uninsured (0.230, p < .001) whereas poor 
 122 
women who moved off of welfare across waves were only 42 percent less likely to be uninsured 
at T2 (0.580, p < .05).   
Table 5.5 shows that both poor and near-poor women who experienced welfare changes 
were more likely to have public health insurance than poor and near-poor women who stayed off 
of welfare across waves. Despite similarities in findings across categories of poor and near-poor 
women, close examination reveals notable differences in the size of the effects for poor and near-
poor women. Consistent with hypotheses H2b, Model 21 shows that all categories of poor 
women were more likely to have public health insurance at T2 than near-poor women (see 
Model 20). For example, compared to poor women who stayed off of welfare across waves, poor 
women who stayed on welfare across waves were over ten times more likely to have public 
health insurance at T2 (see Model 21; 10.248, p < .001), whereas compared to near-poor women 
who stayed off of welfare across waves, near-poor women who lost welfare over time were only 
about twice as likely to have public health insurance at T2 (see Model 20; 2.089, p < .05).  
Although these results might suggest that experiencing welfare changes is not detrimental 
to low-income women’s access to public health insurance, it is important to take into 
consideration the comparison group in the models presented. In separate analyses (not shown) 
which alter the comparison group to be women who stayed on welfare across waves, women 
who moved off of welfare across waves did not fare as well; compared to women who stayed on 
welfare, both poor and near-poor women who moved off of welfare across waves were 
significantly less likely to have public health insurance at T2, with near-poor women 
experiencing the greatest reduction in access to public health insurance.  
In terms of women’s access to private or employer based health insurance, I also find 
some support for hypothesis H2b. Perhaps unsurprising, and as Table 5.6 shows, compared to 
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women who stayed off of welfare across waves, both poor (see Model 23; 0.059, p < .001) and 
near-poor women (see Model 22; 0.044, p < .001) who stayed on welfare across waves were 
significantly less likely to have private or employer based health insurance at T2. Nevertheless, 
Model 23 also shows that poor women who moved off of welfare across waves were also 
significantly less likely to have private or employer based health insurance at T2 than near-poor 
women who stayed off of welfare (0.448, p < .05).  Taken together such findings show 
differential risks for both poor and near-poor women experiencing welfare transitions; poor 
women moving off of welfare may be less likely to have access to private or employer based 
insurance (see Model 23), but because they are more likely to have access to public health 
insurance despite their loss of welfare benefits (see Model 21) they may also be at less risk of 
being uninsured (see Model 19). Near-poor women who experience welfare changes, on the 
other hand, do not appear to benefit from the same protections against becoming uninsured (see 
Model 18).  
Family 
 Perhaps surprising, Table 5.4 shows that compared to those who stayed single across 
waves, experiencing marital transitions did not appear to have a significant effect on poor or 
near-poor women’s risk of being uninsured. Contrary to hypothesis H2c, Table 5.5 shows that 
the finding in Model 15 that stable marriage reduces women’s access to public health insurance 
is specific to poor women; compared to women who stayed single across waves, poor women 
who stayed married across waves were significantly less likely to have public health insurance at 
T2 (see Model 21; 0.407, p < .01). Also contrary to hypothesis H2c, Table 5.6 shows that 
compared to women who stayed single across waves, both poor (see Model 23; 2.125, p < .05) 
and near-poor women (see Model 22; 2.375, p < .05) who stayed married were significantly 
 124 
more likely to have private or employer based health insurance at T2. The only difference 
between the effects of poor and near-poor women’s marital transitions on their access to private 
health insurance was observed for near-poor women who left a marriage across waves who 
perhaps surprisingly were significantly more likely to have private insurance compared to near-
poor women who stayed single (see Model 22; 2.602, p < .05). Although we might assume that 
exiting a marriage would put near-poor women at greater risk of losing access to employer based 
health insurance as a dependent, it is possible that such a finding reflects the fact that near-poor 
women who have access to employment based benefits through their own work may feel more 
free to exit unsatisfactory marital relationships without risking their access to health insurance. 
Health  
Health related variables had similar effects for both poor and near-poor women’s risk of 
being uninsured or having access to public insurance. Despite these similarities, the effects of 
health variables tended to be more pronounced for near-poor women than poor women. For 
example, while having a health problem that affects women’s ability to work made poor women 
nearly four times more likely to have public health insurance than those who did not have similar 
health problems (see Model 21; 3.722, p < .001) having health problems made near-poor women 
nearly nine times more likely to have public health insurance than those who did not have similar 
health problems (see Model 20; 8.692, p < .001). Differences between poor and near-poor 
women in the effects of health related measures tended to be most pronounced in the 
private/employer-based health insurance models. As Table 5.6 shows, the finding in Model 17 
that having a health problem reduced women’s odds of having private or employer based 
insurance appears to be limited to near-poor women (see Model 22; 0.277, p < .05) as a similarly 
significant effect is not observed for poor women. In addition, Model 22 also shows that 
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compared to women with excellent or very good health, near-poor women with fair or poor 
health are significantly more likely to have private or employer based insurance at T2 (2.223, p < 
.05). Taken together, these findings suggest a much more complicated relationship between 
employment and health insurance access for near-poor women; although near-poor women who 
have health problems that affect their ability to work may be able to utilize public health 
insurance options to protect them against being uninsured, near-poor women who have poor 
health but are unable to qualify for public health insurance options may be compelled to maintain 
private/employment based benefits. 
Controls 
 The effects of several control variables varied across models for poor and near-poor 
women. For example, in Model 15 we saw that citizenship and income factors were both 
important predictors of women’s access to public health insurance at T2. But as Table 5.5 shows, 
the effects of these variables may be specific to certain categories of low-income women; 
whereas the effect of increased income in reducing women’s access to public health insurance is 
significant for near-poor women (see Model 20; 0.726, p < .01), the effect of citizenship in 
increasing women’s access to public health insurance is significant for poor women (see Model 
21; 2.077, p < .01).  
In addition to these differences, there were also consistent differences observed between 
poor and near-poor women in the effects of city controls on women’s access to insurance. For 
example, although both poor and near-poor women living in Chicago and San Antonio were 
significantly more likely to be uninsured than those living in Boston, the difference in the effect 
of living in San Antonio on poor and near-poor women’s risk of being uninsured was rather 
significant and confirmed by post estimation hypothesis tests (F(1, 1707) = 6.37, Prob > F = 
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0.012); poor women living in San Antonio were over ten times more likely to be uninsured at T2 
that poor women living in Boston (see Model 19; 10.280, p < .001) whereas near-poor women 
living in San Antonio were closer to four times more likely to uninsured at T2 compared to near-
poor women living in Boston (3.654, p < .001). A similar effect was observed for women’s 
access to public health insurance (see Table 5.5); although both poor and near-poor women 
living in Chicago and San Antonio were less likely to have public health insurance at T2 than 
those living in Boston, poor women living in San Antonio were significantly less likely to have 
access to public health insurance than near-poor women living in San Antonio – a difference that 
was also confirmed by post estimation hypothesis tests (F(1, 1707) = 8.02, Prob > F = 0.005). 
Finally, although poor women living in San Antonio were significantly more likely to have 
private or employer-based insurance than poor women living in Boston (see Model 23; 3.055, p 
< .001) a similar effect was not observed for near-poor women living in Chicago. Such findings 
may reflect Texas’s emphasis on market solutions to providing health care – an approach that 
leaves many poor women at greater risk of being uninsured, according to the findings of this 
analysis – and illustrates the importance of state-specific policy contexts for understanding low-
income women’s access to various forms of health insurance. 
 
Research Question 3 
Given the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on low-income women’s health 
insurance access, do health insurance changes play a significant role in determining low-
income women’s economic status over time?  
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Models 24-29 test for the effects of welfare, work, family, and health insurance changes 
on changes in low-income women’s poverty status at T2. Because of the role of health insurance 
in affecting families’ economic vulnerability, we can expect to observe that different forms of 
insurance instability will have differential effects on women’s poverty over time. Specifically, I 
expect to find that including measures of women’s insurance changes will improve the amount of 
variance in women’s poverty status explained, providing evidence that stable access to insurance 
plays an important role in women’s economic progress. I also expect to find becoming uninsured 
or staying uninsured results in greater risk of moving into poverty and reduced odds of moving 
out of poverty at T2 (H3a). Although I would like to observe that women’s stable access to 
public insurance reduces their odds of being in poverty at T2, it is likely that women’s movement 
off of public insurance is an indication of women’s economic progress and reduced risk of 
moving into poverty at T2 (H3b). Similarly, I also expect to find that transitioning into private or 
employment based insurance reduces women’s odds of moving into poverty at T2, although, 
once again, it is possible that because of variability in the extensiveness and cost of private 
insurance, access to this form of insurance may not have consistent effects on women’s 
economic progress over time (H3c). 
Tables 5.7-5.9 display the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 24-29 to 
determine if including measures of health insurance change helps us understand the factors that 
affect changes in women’s poverty status. Models 24-25 include a general measure of changes in 
women’s health insurance status (i.e., lost or got insurance across waves). Models 26-27 include 
a measure of women’s public health insurance changes. And Models 28-29 include a measure of 
women’s private or employment based health insurance changes. The dependent variable in 
these models measures whether a women experienced a change in poverty status over time or not 
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(0=no change in poverty status, 1=experienced a change in poverty status). Separate analyses are 
run for women who were not poor at T1 (Models 24, 26, and 28) and for those that were poor at 
T1 (Models 25, 27, and 29). Thus, for example, Model 24 tests the effects of welfare, work, 
family, and health factors on the odds of women’s movement into poverty at T2, whereas Model 
25 tests the effects of the same factors on women’s movement out of poverty at T2. All 
independent variables included in these models are measured at T2; the change variables 
measure changes in statuses from either Wave 1 to 2, or Wave 2 to 3. The tables provide the 
odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for each model. The reference categories for 
dummy variables with more than two response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds 
ratios and level of significance are also provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
Although the work, family, and welfare change variables focused on in this chapter 
explain as much as 40 percent of the variance in women’s access to public health insurance (see 
Model 15), they explain substantially less of the variance in low-income women’s poverty status, 
as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 values provided at the bottom of Tables 5.7-5.9. The models 
testing factors related to women’s movement into poverty over time (Models 24, 26, and 28) 
explain about 18 percent of the total variance in women’s poverty status changes at T2. Whereas 
the models testing factors related to women’s movement out of poverty over time (Models 25, 
27, and 29) only explain about 10 percent of the total variance in women’s poverty status 
changes at T2.   
Although not shown, comparisons of models without measures of health insurance 
changes show that including measures of health insurance changes only offers a slight 
improvement in our ability to predict changes in women’s poverty status at T2. Nevertheless, as 
described below, the models provide some evidence that changes in low-income women’s access 
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to employment and private insurance, as well as changes in their access to welfare and public 
health insurance, do play a role in their movement into and out of poverty over time.  As might 
be expected, getting or keeping full-time employment consistently affects the odds of women’s 
movement into and out of poverty over time, as does women’s access to stable marital 
relationships. Women’s welfare, public health insurance, and private health insurances changes 
are less consistent predictors of women’s poverty transitions over time – instead of causing 
women’s poverty transitions it is highly possible that these transitions are simply reflections of 
women’s poverty status transitions. 
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Table 5.7 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Models with Uninsured Measures on Poverty 
Change T2 (0=No Change, 1=Change) 
 Near-poor T1 Model 24 
(Move Into Poverty T2) 
 Poor T1 Model 25 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 2.892 0.213 39.319  0.776 0.103 5.876 
Months 0.972 0.905 1.044  1.005 0.953 1.060 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.786 0.360 1.714  0.789 0.396 1.573 
Hispanic 0.822 0.373 1.811  0.757 0.381 1.504 
Other 1.256 0.364 4.336  0.392 0.114 1.351 
US Citizen 1.227 0.656 2.298  0.825 0.494 1.379 
Kids 1.173 0.987 1.394  0.862** 0.776 0.957 
Age 0.992 0.971 1.014  0.996 0.979 1.013 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.317 0.781 2.221  0.816 0.559 1.191 
San Antonio 1.131 0.579 2.208  0.876 0.550 1.394 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Degree/GED 0.794 0.498 1.268  1.546* 1.102 2.169 
College 0.838 0.371 1.893  2.386** 1.418 4.013 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.040 0.603 1.793  0.942 0.642 1.383 
Fair/Poor 1.279 0.745 2.193  0.883 0.583 1.336 
Health Problem 0.771 0.404 1.474  1.167 0.711 1.918 
Health Need 0.799 0.402 1.587  1.362 0.806 2.301 
Employment Change  
(Stayed Less than FT Employed) 
 
   
Lost FT Employment 0.535 0.245 1.171  1.721 0.744 3.982 
Got FT Employment 0.225** 0.080 0.629  2.438** 1.425 4.169 
Stayed Employed FT 0.187*** 0.108 0.323  2.749*** 1.686 4.484 
Welfare Change  
(Stayed Off Welfare)  
 
   
Moved Off  Welfare 1.913 0.960 3.812  0.706 0.462 1.078 
Moved On Welfare 2.624* 1.150 5.984  1.047 0.560 1.958 
Stayed On Welfare 2.421* 1.079 5.434  0.600 0.360 1.001 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 0.685 0.325 1.443  1.493 0.648 3.442 
Got Married 0.597 0.272 1.312  1.610 0.903 2.872 
Stayed Married 0.358** 0.188 0.682  1.801* 1.089 2.977 
Insurance Change  
(Stayed Insured)  
 
   
Got Insurance 0.554 0.298 1.028  1.478 0.922 2.369 
Lost Insurance 1.102 0.539 2.252  0.902 0.512 1.587 
Stayed Uninsured 0.719 0.309 1.674  0.683 0.389 1.198 
N 1119    2148   
Log-likelihood -610.426    -1298.908   
Chi
2 
111.420    87.262   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.176    0.091   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 5.8 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Models with Public HI Measures on Poverty 
Change T2 (0=No Change, 1=Change) 
 Near-poor T1 Model 26 
(Move Into Poverty T2) 
 Poor T1 Model 27 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 3.103 0.236 40.841  0.940 0.117 7.532 
Months 0.968 0.901 1.040  1.001 0.948 1.058 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.816 0.393 1.697  0.747 0.373 1.499 
Hispanic 0.881 0.420 1.851  0.691 0.347 1.378 
Other 0.955 0.213 4.285  0.376 0.105 1.355 
US Citizen 1.240 0.657 2.341  0.924 0.544 1.568 
Kids 1.157 0.973 1.376  0.879* 0.790 0.977 
Age 0.999 0.977 1.022  0.993 0.975 1.011 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.402 0.829 2.370  0.676* 0.457 0.999 
San Antonio 1.369 0.704 2.662  0.580* 0.362 0.929 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Degree/GED 0.830 0.521 1.320  1.563* 1.099 2.222 
College 0.959 0.404 2.272  2.292** 1.358 3.867 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.079 0.616 1.889  0.936 0.643 1.363 
Fair/Poor 1.376 0.801 2.365  0.875 0.574 1.336 
Health Problem 0.562 0.281 1.124  1.365 0.827 2.252 
Health Need 0.868 0.437 1.726  1.091 0.644 1.850 
Employment Change  
(Stayed Less than FT Employed)   
 
   
Lost FT Employment 0.570 0.269 1.208  1.697 0.751 3.836 
Got FT Employment 0.261* 0.093 0.733  2.372** 1.352 4.160 
Stayed Employed FT 0.243*** 0.136 0.434  2.486*** 1.522 4.061 
Welfare Change  
(Stayed Off Welfare)    
 
   
Moved Off  Welfare 1.801 0.923 3.513  0.848 0.544 1.322 
Moved On Welfare 1.661 0.648 4.258  1.334 0.697 2.552 
Stayed On Welfare 2.221 0.997 4.950  0.787 0.473 1.309 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 0.678 0.331 1.390  1.402 0.648 3.037 
Got Married 0.629 0.287 1.378  1.665 0.918 3.020 
Stayed Married 0.422* 0.215 0.829  1.603 0.953 2.697 
Public Insurance Change 
(Stayed Off Medicaid)   
 
   
Lost Public HI 1.921 0.944 3.912  0.816 0.456 1.461 
Got Public HI 3.440** 1.644 7.196  0.793 0.457 1.376 
Stayed On Public HI 2.327** 1.256 4.310  0.480** 0.298 0.775 
N 1119.000    2148.000   
Log-likelihood -599.002    -1296.773   
Chi
2 
113.458    101.295   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.191    0.093   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 5.9 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Models with Private/Employer HI Measures on 
Poverty Change T2 (0=No Change, 1=Change) 
 Near-poor T1 Model 28 
(Move Into Poverty T2) 
 Poor T1 Model 29 






 Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Time 2.647 0.179 39.074  0.764 0.099 5.915 
Months 0.972 0.903 1.046  1.008 0.955 1.063 
Race/Ethnicity (White)       
Black 0.760 0.362 1.592  0.757 0.382 1.501 
Hispanic 0.758 0.361 1.595  0.766 0.391 1.501 
Other 1.010 0.275 3.716  0.444 0.134 1.469 
US Citizen 1.315 0.722 2.394  0.869 0.521 1.449 
Kids 1.196* 1.007 1.420  0.888* 0.800 0.986 
Age 0.995 0.973 1.018  0.992 0.974 1.010 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.198 0.728 1.974  0.781 0.540 1.130 
San Antonio 1.043 0.562 1.935  0.717 0.466 1.104 
Education (No Degree)       
HS Degree/GED 0.810 0.507 1.293  1.443* 1.019 2.044 
College 0.976 0.388 2.455  2.040** 1.204 3.457 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.034 0.598 1.789  0.888 0.602 1.309 
Fair/Poor 1.434 0.834 2.466  0.867 0.575 1.307 
Health Problem 0.666 0.345 1.285  1.291 0.803 2.075 
Health Need 0.701 0.382 1.285  1.427 0.856 2.376 
Employment Change 
(Stayed Less than FT Employed)   
 
   
Lost FT Employment 0.638 0.299 1.364  1.546 0.686 3.482 
Got FT Employment 0.262* 0.095 0.727  2.082* 1.184 3.660 
Stayed Employed FT 0.257*** 0.143 0.463  1.946* 1.147 3.301 
Welfare Change (Stayed 
Off Welfare)    
 
   
Moved Off  Welfare 2.098* 1.080 4.074  0.800 0.527 1.213 
Moved On Welfare 2.193 0.937 5.133  1.225 0.642 2.337 
Stayed On Welfare 2.638* 1.143 6.089  0.739 0.449 1.216 
Marital Change (Stayed Single)       
Left Marriage 0.692 0.330 1.451  1.500 0.665 3.383 
Got Married 0.600 0.268 1.342  1.549 0.862 2.781 
Stayed Married 0.389** 0.199 0.760  1.551 0.919 2.620 
Private/Employer HI Change (Stayed 
Off Private/Employer)   
 
   
Lost Priv/Employ HI 1.978 0.935 4.184  1.156 0.524 2.551 
Got Priv/Employ  HI 0.569 0.257 1.259  2.823*** 1.569 5.078 
Kept Priv/Employ HI 0.538 0.267 1.082  3.104** 1.443 6.677 
N 1119.000    2148.000   
Log-likelihood -598.709    -1279.504   
Chi
2 
102.272    90.476   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.192    0.105   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work, Welfare, and Family 
 Consistent across all models, and as might be expected, I find that getting and keeping 
full-time work is both associated with a significant reduction in the odds of low-income women’s 
movement into poverty and a significant increase in the odds of women’s movement out of 
poverty over time. As Tables 5.7-5.9 show, although those who were stably married were 
consistently less likely to move into poverty over time than those who were single, experiencing 
marital transitions appeared to be a less consequential predictor of women’s poverty changes.  
Welfare transitions also had less consistent effects on women’s poverty transitions across 
models, playing a significant role in shaping women’s movement into poverty in several models 
but not predicting women’s movement out of poverty over time. For example, in Model 24, 
which includes a general measure of women’s insurance status, compared to those who stayed 
off of welfare over time, those who moved on to welfare (2.624, p < .05) and those who stayed 
on welfare (2.421, p < .05) were significantly more likely to move into poverty at T2. In Model 
28, which includes a measure of women’s private/employer insurance transitions, we find that 
women who moved off of welfare were also significantly more likely to move into poverty at T2 
(2.098, p < .05). Although it may not be surprising that women who move into and stay on 
welfare are more likely to move into poverty over time, finding that women’s movement off of 
welfare increases their risk of moving into poverty provides compelling evidence of the 
economic risks low-income women may encounter when leaving welfare. Furthermore, the lack 
of effects of welfare transitions on women’s movement out of poverty over time suggest that 
exiting welfare may not necessarily indicate women’s economic progress over time.  
Health 
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 Although I observed in parts one and two of this chapter that several health factors play 
an important role in shaping women’s access to various forms of insurance, surprisingly, none of 
the women’s health status measures were significant predictors of women’s poverty transitions 
over time. Nevertheless, I did find some evidence that certain kids of health insurance transitions 
may be related to women’s poverty changes over time. Contrary to hypothesis H3b, I find little 
evidence that loss of public insurance represents women’s movement out of poverty. As Table 
5.8 shows, I find that compared to those who lack access to Medicaid over time, getting on 
(3.440, p < .01) and staying on public health insurance (2.327, p < .01) are actually associated 
with increased odds of moving into poverty over time (see Model 26), while staying on public 
health insurance is also associated with a reduction in the odds of women’s movement out of 
poverty over time (see Model 26.1; 0.480, p < .01).  
Nevertheless, I do find evidence to support hypothesis H3c, that gaining private or 
employment based insurance increases women’s odds of moving out of poverty over time. As 
Table 5.9 shows, I find that compared to those who lack access to private insurance over time, 
staying on private insurance (3.104, p < .01) or getting private insurance (2.823, p < .001) is 
associated with an increase in odds of moving out of poverty over time (see Model 29). Contrary 
to hypothesis H3a, I found no relationship between women’s general insurance transitions and 
their poverty changes over time (see Table 5.7). Taken together these results suggest that 
women’s private/employer health insurance transitions are better indicators of women’s 
movement out of poverty over time, whereas women’s public insurance transitions are better 
indicators of women’s movement into poverty over time.  
Finally, as Table 5.8 shows, when including measures of public health insurance 
transitions, I find that compared to women living in Boston, those living in Chicago (0.676, p < 
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.05) and San Antonio (0.580, p < .05) are significantly less likely to move out of poverty over 
time. Once again, such findings suggest that state-specific policy contexts play a significant role 
in shaping women’s access to benefits, which in turn affect their economic opportunities and 
progress over time. 
 
Summary 
In regards to my first research question I find that low-income women’s welfare, work, 
and family changes do indeed have important effects on women’s insurance status at T2, that 
certain changes are more important in predicting low-income women’s health insurance status 
than others, and that the effects of these changes do vary by the type of insurance examined. 
Full-time employment changes were important across models, yet had differential effects 
depending on the type of insurance examined. For example, the positive effects of full-time 
employment in reducing women’s risk of being uninsured appeared to be limited to those who 
are stably employed full-time. Although full-time employment typically had larger effects on 
women’s access to insurance, women both newly employed full-time and stably employed full-
time experienced a similar reduction in access to public health insurance at T2, as well as 
increased odds of having private or employer-based insurance. Although it may be tempting to 
assume that low-income women who gain access to full-time work over time are able to meet 
their needs for health insurance in the private market, the fact that I do not observe a reduction in 
odds of being uninsured for women who are newly employed full-time suggests that at least 
some women may be at increased risk due to loss of public health insurance benefits. In this way 
a positive life change, like gaining full-time work, may initially have negative consequences for 
low-income women. 
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I find mixed evidence that the delinking of welfare and public health insurance benefits 
that occurred with welfare reform has been successful in protecting women who are experiencing 
welfare changes from also losing their public health insurance benefits. Models 13 and 15 show 
that even women with only temporary access to welfare appear to have improved odds of being 
on public insurance and reduced odds of being uninsured compared to those who have no access 
to welfare. Nevertheless, variation in odds between groups shows that women with stable access 
to welfare have the best outcomes in terms of access to public health insurance and reduced risk 
of being uninsured at T2. While these results provide some support for successful delinking, in 
separate analyses I find that compared to women who are stably on welfare across waves, 
women who lose welfare benefits are significantly more likely to be uninsured and less likely to 
have public health insurance benefits. In this case the comparison group really matters – while 
women who lose welfare over time may have better access to public health insurance options 
than women with no access to welfare, losing welfare benefits still puts women at greater risk of 
being uninsured than women with stable access to welfare as these women may not immediately 
be able to gain access to private or employer-based health insurance (see Model 17). 
Surprisingly, marital changes did not appear to have significant effects on women’s 
access to insurance. I find that the benefits and risks associated with marriage in regards to 
women’s access to public and private forms of health insurance are restricted to those who are 
stably married as similar effects are not observed for the newly married. Statistically significant 
negative effects were also not observed for women exiting marital relationships. While stable 
marriage over time appears to increase low-income women’s access to private or employment 
based insurance options, it also simultaneously reduces their odds of having access to public 
health insurance. The lack of finding that marriage reduces low-income women’s risk of being 
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uninsured illustrates the contradictory effects of marriage on low-income women’s access to 
insurance; while some women benefit from marriage, others suffer a marriage penalty when it 
comes to health insurance access. 
In regards to my second research question, I find some support that certain changes affect 
poor and near-poor women differently, while other changes have similar effects on both groups 
of women. For example, compared to women who stayed less than full-time employed across 
waves, poor and near-poor women who stayed full-time employed experienced an identical 
reduction in the odds of being uninsured at T2 (see Table 5.4). Also contrary to what I expected 
to find, while there was significant variation between categories of employment change in 
predicating women’s access to private benefits (i.e., stable full-time employment increases 
women’s odds of having private benefits more than new full-time employment), there was little 
variation between poor and near-poor women in the effects of these changes. Although 
employment changes have similar effects on poor and near-poor women’s access to public health 
insurance (i.e., both stable and new full-time employment reduces women’s access to public 
health insurance) closer examination revealed that near-poor women experienced a much larger 
reduction in the odds of having public insurance than poor women (74 percent versus 46 percent, 
see Models 20 and 21).  
More notable and consistent differences between poor and near-poor women were 
observed for the effects of welfare changes on women’s access to insurance. Although both poor 
and near-poor women who experienced welfare changes were more likely to have public health 
insurance than women with no welfare access over time, poor women appeared to benefit most 
as evidenced by greater odds of having public insurance across all welfare change categories 
than near-poor women (see Table 5.5). Furthermore, the effects observed in Model 13, which 
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showed that welfare transitions did not increase women’s risk of being uninsured, appear to be 
specific to poor women; compared to women with no welfare access across waves, poor women 
who stayed on welfare or experienced a change in their welfare status were all less likely to be 
uninsured at T2. Although this sounds hopeful for poor women, variations between categories of 
poor women suggest that welfare transitions do in fact put poor women losing welfare benefits at 
greater risk of being uninsured; compared to poor women who stayed off welfare across waves, 
poor women who stayed on welfare across waves were 77 percent less likely to be uninsured at 
T2, while poor women who moved off welfare were only 42 percent less likely to be uninsured 
at T2 (see Model 19). This may be due to the fact that poor women experiencing the loss of 
welfare across time were also significantly less likely to have private/employer health insurance 
at T2 (see Model 23).  
Taken together such findings show differential risks for both poor and near-poor women 
experiencing welfare transitions; poor women moving off of welfare may be less likely to have 
access to private or employer based insurance (see Model 23), but because they are more likely 
to have access to public health insurance despite their loss of welfare benefits (see Model 21) 
they may also be at less risk of being uninsured (see Model 19). Near-poor women who 
experience welfare changes, on the other hand, do not appear to benefit as much from the same 
protections against becoming uninsured as poor women (see Model 18). Further evidence to 
support greater risk for women (especially near-poor women) moving off of welfare can be 
found by altering the comparison group in the analyses; although not shown, compared to 
women who stayed on welfare, both poor and near-poor women who moved off of welfare 
across waves were significantly less likely to have public health insurance at T2, with near-poor 
women experiencing the greatest reduction in access to public health insurance over time.  
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I also found some evidence that the risks and benefits of stable marriage may be different 
for poor and near-poor women. Although both poor and near-poor women who are stably 
married are more likely to have private health insurance than poor and near-poor women who 
remain single over time (see Table 5.6), the finding in Model 15 that stable marriage reduces 
low-income women’s access to public health insurance appears to be specific to poor women as 
a similar marriage penalty was not observed for near-poor women (see Table 5.5). The only 
difference between the effects of poor and near-poor women’s marital transitions on their access 
to insurance was observed for private health insurance, where near-poor women who left a 
marriage across waves were significantly more likely to have private insurance compared to 
near-poor women who stayed single (see Model 22). Although we might assume that exiting a 
marriage would put near-poor women at greater risk of losing access to employer based health 
insurance as a dependent, this finding may reflect the fact that near-poor women who have 
access to employment based benefits through their own work may feel more free to exit 
unsatisfactory marital relationships without risking their access to health insurance. Taken 
together, the results suggest that various welfare, work, and family changes play different roles 
in shaping poor and near-poor women’s access to health insurance. 
In regards to my third research question, I find that including measures of health 
insurance changes only offer a slight improvement in our ability to predict changes in women’s 
poverty status at T2. Nevertheless, I do find some evidence that changes in low-income women’s 
access to employment and private insurance, as well as changes in their access to welfare and 
public health insurance, do play a role in their movement into and out of poverty over time.  For 
example, getting or keeping full-time employment consistently reduces the odds of moving into 
poverty while increasing the odds of moving out of poverty over time. Being stably married also 
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reduces low-income women’s risk of moving into poverty over time. Women’s welfare, public 
health insurance, and private health insurances changes were less consistent predictors of 
women’s poverty transitions over time. Although it may be unsurprising that women who move 
into and stay on welfare are more likely to move into poverty over time (see Model 24), finding 
that women’s movement off of welfare increases their risk of moving into poverty (see Model 
28) provides compelling evidence of the economic risks low-income women may encounter 
when leaving welfare. Furthermore, the lack of effects of welfare transitions on women’s 
movement out of poverty over time suggest that exiting welfare may not necessarily indicate 
women’s economic progress over time.   
Similarly, I find little evidence that loss of public health insurance represents women’s 
movement out of poverty over time, as getting on and staying on public health insurance are 
associated with increased risk of moving into poverty over time and a reduction in the odds of 
moving out of poverty over time (see Models 26 and 27). I do find evidence that keeping or 
gaining private or employment based insurance are associated with an increase in the odds of 
women’s movement out of poverty over time (see Model 29). Nevertheless, instead of causing 
women’s poverty transitions it is highly possible that these transitions are simply reflections of 
women’s poverty status transitions; women’s private/employer health insurance transitions may 
be better indicators of women’s movement out of poverty over time, whereas women’s public 
insurance transitions may be better indicators of women’s movement into poverty over time.  
In addition to the effects of welfare, work, and family changes on women’s access to 
insurance and poverty status, consistent with the results of Chapter 4, I also find evidence that 
public health insurance programs play an important role in both providing insurance to women 
with health problems and protecting low-income women from having unmet health needs. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that women in Chicago and San Antonio are more likely to be uninsured, 
less likely to have public health insurance, and less likely to move out of poverty over time 
illustrates how the protective benefits of public programs for some women may be limited due to 
state specific rules and regulations. Poor women in San Antonio appeared to be particularly at 
risk of being uninsured and the least likely to have public health insurance benefits. 
Nevertheless, Model 23, for example, also showed that poor women living in San Antonio were 
significantly more likely to have private or employer-based insurance than poor women living in 
Boston. Taken together, the results provide evidence that state specific policy contexts play a 
critical role in shaping low-income women’s access to public programs and health insurance 




TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
In Chapter 5 I examined how measures of change in women’s welfare, work, family, and 
insurance status across two time points affect women’s access to various types of insurance and 
poverty status. In this chapter I take a different approach to examining the nature of low-income 
women’s lives by using trajectory measures, which consider changes across all three data 
collection time points, to predict women’s health insurance and poverty status. Some argue that 
trajectories are better able to represent the dynamic nature of people’s lives. Instead of measuring 
one’s status at a certain time point, trajectories give us important information about an 
individual’s experience prior to their current status, which may help explain variation between 
respondents who share a similar status at any given time point.  
How a person arrived at a certain place may play an important role in their ability to 
access certain opportunities. By comparing models using cross-sectional measures with models 
using trajectory measures I can determine if experiencing changes in any particular status 
impacts women’s health insurance access and poverty differently than one’s current marital, 
employment, or welfare status. One benefit of using trajectory measures is that they may provide 
a more nuanced understanding of the factors that affect women’s access to insurance. For 
example, we know that one’s marital status affects their options for health insurance, but does 
experiencing several marital changes similarly affect women’s options? Are the financial and 
personal disruptions caused by marital changes more or less consequential for low-income 
women’s access to insurance? Using a series of logistic regression analyses we can determine 
how welfare, work, and family trajectories affect low-income women’s insurance access, if the 
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effects of these trajectories vary for different groups of low-income women, and whether health 
insurance trajectories affect low-income women’s economic stability.  
 
Research Question 1 
What is the relative importance of individual-level welfare, work, and family trajectories in 
predicting low-income women’s health insurance status over time? 
 
Because there are different pathways to various forms of health insurance, we might 
expect to observe differential effects for various factors by the type of insurance instability being 
examined. In general, I expect to find that employment, marital, and welfare trajectories that 
reflect greater disruption and less continuity will have more significant effects on women’s 
access to both private and public forms of insurance and also put women at greater risk of being 
uninsured. Specifically, I expect to find that employment trajectories that reflect stable and 
continuous access to full-time work will increase women’s odds of having private or 
employment based insurance while reducing their odds of being uninsured or having public 
insurance (H1a). I also expect to find that women with trajectories displaying either stable access 
to welfare or new access to welfare are more likely to have access to public insurance and less 
likely to be uninsured or have private or employment based insurance (H1b). Finally, I expect to 
observe that trajectories that do not lead to formal marriage will have minimal effects on 
women’s access to private or employment based insurance or uninsured status, while increasing 
women’s odds of access to public insurance. In addition, despite the potential for resource 
pooling among cohabiting couples, across all models I suspect that cohabitation will not have the 
same level of effects on women’s access to insurance as stable, formal marriage (H1c).  
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 Tables 6.1-6.3 display the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 30-35. 
Unlike Chapters 4 and 5, the data are not stacked in the following models since changes are 
being measured across all three time points. The result is a much smaller sample size as each 
respondent is only represented once. Models 30 and 31 use women’s insurance status (insured or 
uninsured) at Wave 3 as the dependent variable. Models 32 and 33 use women’s public health 
insurance status at Wave 3 as the dependent variable. And Models 34 and 35 use women’s 
private or employment based health insurance status at Wave 3 as the dependent variable. 
Models 31, 33, and 35 test the effects of welfare, work, and family trajectories on low-income 
women’s health insurance access. Models 30, 32, and 34 provide cross-sectional comparisons in 
order to determine if more dynamic measures of women’s are more useful for our understanding 
of women’s insurance access. All cross-sectional independent variables included in these models 
are measured at Wave 3; the trajectory variables measure changes in statuses across all three 
waves. The results tables provide the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for each 
model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more than two response categories are 
indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance are also provided in parentheses in 
the text where appropriate.  
As Tables 6.1-6.3 show, the trajectory models explain slightly more variance than their 
cross-sectional counterparts as indicated by the pseudo-R
2
 values provided at the bottom of the 
tables. Although the difference in the amount of variance explained is very small (21.1 percent 
versus 22.5 percent) in the uninsured models (see Table 6.1), the difference is slightly more 
substantial in the public (see Table 6.2; 37.1 percent versus 40.8 percent) and private/employer 
health insurance models (see Table 6.3; 34.6 percent versus 36.4 percent).
7
   
                                                 
7
 Log-likelihood and BIC tests, which assess model fit (analyses not shown), provide mixed support for the 
trajectory models over the cross-sectional models, suggesting that measures of women’s welfare, work, and family 
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As described below, the results also provide evidence that using trajectory measures 
provides a more nuanced understanding of how the dynamic nature of low-income women’s 
lives may affect their access to health insurance. In most models the effects of the trajectory 
variables are consistent with their cross-sectional counterparts. Nevertheless, variation in the 
odds between trajectory categories shows that certain work, welfare, and family trajectories may 
have more (or less) pronounced effects. For example, the benefits and risks associated with 
marriage in regards to women’s access to public and private forms of health insurance appear to 
be restricted to those who are stably married as similar effects are not observed for the newly 
married. In contrast, more mixed effects are observed for employment trajectories. For example, 
low-income women’s access to private or employment based insurance appears to be improved 
by both new and continuous full-time work, whereas only women who are continuously 
employed full-time experience a reduction in access to public health insurance options. Finally, I 
also find some evidence that the delinking of welfare and public health insurance benefits has 
been somewhat successful in protecting women who are experiencing welfare changes from also 
losing their public health insurance benefits; even women who move on and off of welfare 
appear to have improved odds of being on public insurance and are less likely to be uninsured 
compared to those who have no access to welfare.  
                                                                                                                                                             
trajectories are more helpful in explaining low-income women’s access to public health insurance at Wave 3 than 
their access to private/employer health insurance or their risk of being uninsured. 
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Table 6.1 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Cross-sectional and Trajectory Variables for Uninsured 
Wave 3 (0=Has Insurance, 1=Uninsured) 
 Cross-sectional Model 30  Trajectory Model 31 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2     0.988 0.908 1.076 
Months 3     1.048 0.973 1.128 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 2.031 0.663 6.221  2.094 0.706 6.212 
Hispanic 4.395* 1.424 13.568  4.047* 1.358 12.061 
Other 1.463 0.212 10.118  1.323 0.190 9.208 
US Citizen 0.586 0.316 1.085  0.639 0.334 1.224 
Kids 0.977 0.849 1.125  0.989 0.856 1.143 
Age 1.011 0.988 1.035  1.005 0.982 1.029 
Income 0.836 0.693 1.010  0.825* 0.684 0.996 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.735* 1.028 2.927  1.972* 1.157 3.360 
San Antonio 3.056*** 1.786 5.230  3.424*** 1.946 6.025 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.710 0.458 1.102  0.654 0.417 1.024 
College 0.529 0.250 1.118  0.459* 0.214 0.984 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.007 0.616 1.648  0.992 0.605 1.625 
Fair/Poor 0.800 0.468 1.368  0.795 0.463 1.364 
Health Problem 0.182*** 0.089 0.374  0.176*** 0.084 0.368 
Health Need 6.198*** 3.705 10.366  7.120*** 4.200 12.071 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 0.813 0.475 1.391     
Employed FT 0.466** 0.261 0.831     
On Welfare 0.236*** 0.110 0.508     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 1.403 0.707 2.785     
Separated 0.698 0.369 1.319     
Married 0.858 0.497 1.482     
Employment Trajectory (Continuous Unemployed)      
Became Unemployed     0.870 0.459 1.649 
Kept or Got PT Work     0.744 0.398 1.390 
Continuous FT Employed     0.492 0.219 1.106 
Moved into FT Work     0.388* 0.188 0.799 
Welfare Trajectory (Continuously Off Welfare)      
Moved Off Welfare     0.529* 0.309 0.904 
Continuously On Welfare     0.302* 0.097 0.940 
Moved On Welfare     0.139*** 0.055 0.348 
Marital Trajectory (Continuously Single)       
Became Single     1.135 0.599 2.151 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting     1.502 0.754 2.990 
Continuously Married     0.795 0.388 1.631 
Moved into Marriage     0.933 0.480 1.812 
Continuously Separated     0.966 0.341 2.734 
Moved into Separation     0.680 0.323 1.432 
N 1642    1642   
Log-likelihood -780.651    -766.270   
Chi
2 
122.923    150.629   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.211    0.225   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 6.2 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Cross-sectional and Trajectory Variables for Public HI 
Wave 3 (0=No Medicaid, 1=Has Medicaid) 
 Cross-sectional Model 32  Trajectory Model 33 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2     0.986 0.906 1.072 
Months 3     0.991 0.925 1.061 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.829 0.399 1.722  0.760 0.342 1.691 
Hispanic 0.521 0.247 1.101  0.546 0.239 1.249 
Other 0.930 0.258 3.353  1.022 0.238 4.397 
US Citizen 1.603 0.934 2.750  1.318 0.748 2.321 
Kids 1.215* 1.044 1.414  1.156 0.998 1.339 
Age 0.953*** 0.932 0.975  0.965** 0.943 0.988 
Income 0.771** 0.645 0.921  0.773** 0.645 0.927 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 0.558* 0.345 0.903  0.472** 0.278 0.799 
San Antonio 0.109*** 0.060 0.197  0.106*** 0.058 0.197 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.848 0.538 1.338  0.942 0.591 1.502 
College 0.639 0.298 1.368  0.784 0.358 1.717 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.064 0.644 1.757  1.143 0.679 1.923 
Fair/Poor 1.049 0.638 1.726  1.019 0.611 1.701 
Health Problem 8.525*** 3.553 20.456  8.955*** 3.505 22.882 
Health Need 0.286*** 0.159 0.515  0.255*** 0.139 0.469 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 1.041 0.579 1.874     
Employed FT 0.364*** 0.207 0.641     
On Welfare 4.849*** 2.394 9.819     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 0.796 0.444 1.428     
Separated 1.426 0.741 2.747     
Married 0.532* 0.307 0.920     
Employment Trajectory (Continuous Unemployed)      
Became Unemployed     1.291 0.664 2.513 
Kept or Got PT Work     1.226 0.605 2.485 
Continuous FT Employed     0.158*** 0.061 0.409 
Moved into FT Work     0.581 0.288 1.170 
Welfare Trajectory (Continuously Off Welfare)      
Moved Off Welfare     2.715*** 1.738 4.242 
Continuously On Welfare     5.568*** 2.078 14.918 
Moved On Welfare     8.350*** 3.230 21.588 
Marital Trajectory (Continuously Single)       
Became Single     0.831 0.457 1.513 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting     0.756 0.416 1.372 
Continuously Married     0.382* 0.162 0.899 
Moved into Marriage     0.892 0.454 1.753 
Continuously Separated     0.650 0.218 1.936 
Moved into Separation     1.569 0.750 3.279 
N 1642    1642   
Log-likelihood -708.260    -666.518   
Chi
2 
201.627    246.444   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.371    0.408   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 6.3 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Cross-sectional and Trajectory Variables for 
Private/Employer HI Wave 3 (0=No Priv/Emp HI, 1=Has Priv/Emp HI) 
 Cross-sectional Model 34  Trajectory Model 35 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2     0.968 0.889 1.055 
Months 3     0.932 0.856 1.015 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.669 0.276 1.617  0.596 0.218 1.629 
Hispanic 0.520 0.205 1.315  0.441 0.154 1.262 
Other 1.136 0.321 4.022  1.044 0.263 4.141 
US Citizen 1.886 0.861 4.130  2.160 0.974 4.791 
Kids 0.794* 0.666 0.947  0.833* 0.699 0.992 
Age 1.042** 1.015 1.070  1.030 1.000 1.062 
Income 1.406** 1.097 1.803  1.395** 1.095 1.776 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.319 0.727 2.392  1.279 0.678 2.414 
San Antonio 2.196** 1.236 3.903  2.075* 1.123 3.837 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 3.139** 1.577 6.247  2.851** 1.430 5.684 
College 4.868*** 1.941 12.207  4.514** 1.797 11.338 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.771 0.440 1.351  0.796 0.453 1.401 
Fair/Poor 1.160 0.615 2.190  1.267 0.665 2.411 
Health Problem 0.386 0.095 1.569  0.402 0.104 1.558 
Health Need 0.301** 0.145 0.624  0.341** 0.166 0.701 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed PT 2.488* 1.130 5.480     
Employed FT 9.166*** 4.514 18.613     
On Welfare 0.415* 0.174 0.989     
Marital Status (Single)        
Cohabiting 1.180 0.533 2.611     
Separated 1.271 0.650 2.487     
Married 2.361* 1.170 4.762     
Employment Trajectory (Continuous Unemployed)      
Became Unemployed     0.678 0.214 2.152 
Kept/Got PT Work     2.027 0.719 5.715 
Continuous FT Employed     11.193*** 4.026 31.115 
Moved into FT Work     6.106*** 2.364 15.768 
Welfare Trajectory (Continuously Off Welfare)      
Moved Off Welfare     0.607 0.313 1.178 
Continuously On Welfare     0.044** 0.005 0.365 
Moved On Welfare     0.492 0.204 1.190 
Marital Trajectory (Continuously Single)       
Became Single     0.928 0.447 1.926 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting     1.153 0.513 2.591 
Continuously Married     2.758* 1.136 6.692 
Moved into Marriage     1.670 0.798 3.494 
Continuously Separated     1.609 0.566 4.570 
Moved into Separation     1.371 0.661 2.842 
N 1642    1642   
Log-likelihood -600.738    -583.640   
Chi
2 
152.863    186.918   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.346    0.364   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work 
 As Tables 6.1-6.3 show, the effects of employment factors on women’s access to health 
insurance are fairly consistent across both the trajectory and cross-sectional models. 
Nevertheless, use of trajectory measures reveals some important nuances in the effects of 
women’s employment histories on their access to various forms of insurance. For example, in 
cross-sectional Model 30 we see that being employed full-time reduces women’s odds of being 
uninsured (0.466, p < .01). Yet, in trajectory Model 31, and contrary to hypothesis H1a, we find 
that the effects of full-time employment on reducing women’s odds of being uninsured are 
limited to the newly employed full-time; compared to women who were continuously 
unemployed, only women who moved into full-time work by Wave 3 were significantly less to 
be uninsured (0.388, p < .05). Although contrary to hypothesis H1a, this finding may suggest 
that low-income women are being very selective in deciding which jobs to take, only opting for 
new full-time work if it will give them access to private or employer based benefits given the 
risk full-time employment imposes on women’s access to public health insurance benefits (see 
below). 
 Consistent with hypothesis H1a, I find that the effects of full-time employment on 
reducing women’s access to public health insurance (as shown in Table 6.2, cross-sectional 
Model 32; 0.364, p < .001) are actually limited to those who are stably employed full-time across 
all three waves (as shown in trajectory Model 33; 0.158, p < .001) as new or part-time 
employment trajectories did not similarly affect women’s access to public health insurance. Also 
consistent with hypothesis H1a, stable full-time employment trajectories were also associated 
with increasing women’s odds of having access to private or employer-based health insurance 
(see Table 6.3, Model 35; 11.193, p < .001). Perhaps surprising though, even new employment 
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trajectories were also associated with improved odds of having access to private insurance 
options (6.106, p < .001), although stable full-time employment trajectories nearly double 
women’s chances of having private insurance over new full-time employment trajectories (see 
Table 6.3). 
Welfare 
 The relationship between women’s welfare access and health insurance access was also 
consistent across both cross-sectional and trajectory models. Nevertheless, once again, the 
trajectory models provide other important information regarding women’s attachments to the 
welfare state. Although trajectory Model 35 (see Table 6.3) shows that the effects of women’s 
welfare status on reducing their access to private or employment based health insurance are 
limited to those continuously on welfare (0.044, p < .01), the effects of welfare on women’s odds 
of being uninsured and access to public health insurance are observed across all welfare 
trajectories. As predicted in hypothesis H1b,  both continuous and new access to welfare 
increased women’s odds of being on public insurance (see Table 6.2, Model 33) and also 
reduced their odds of being uninsured (see Table 6.1, Model 31). Nevertheless, contrary to 
hypothesis H1b, even women who experienced trajectories leading to loss of welfare benefits 
were less likely to be uninsured (see Model 31; 0.529, p < .05) and more likely to have public 
health insurance (see Model 33; 2.715, p < .001) than women who were continuously off 
welfare. Although there are considerable differences in odds for women who moved off of 
welfare compared to women who were stably on welfare or new to welfare (in the direction that 
we would predict), such results provide some limited evidence of successful delinking of welfare 
benefits from public health insurance benefits. 
Family 
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 As shown in Table 6.1, no significant effects were observed for either the cross-sectional 
or trajectory measures in predicting women’s risk of being uninsured. As expressed in hypothesis 
H1c, this may be due to the complex effects of marriage and resource pooling on low-income 
women’s access to insurance; although marriage may decrease women’s odds of being uninsured 
by allowing them access to private benefits as dependents, it may also simultaneously increase 
women’s odds of being uninsured by limiting their access to public health insurance benefits. 
Although not shown, separate analyses using transformations of income were analyzed in an 
attempt to capture this effect, but none were found to be adequate or to affect the results of the 
analysis significantly, thus, they were not included in the final models presented here. 
 Despite the lack of significant findings for relationship measures in the uninsured models, 
as predicted in hypothesis H1c, marital status did have a significant and consistent effect on 
women’s access to public and private health insurance options across both cross-sectional and 
trajectory models. For example, as Table 6.2 shows, compared to those who are single, married 
women are significantly less likely to have public health insurance (see Model 32; 0.532, p < 
.05) and more likely to have private or employer-based insurance (see Model 34; 2.361, p < 05). 
Nevertheless, the trajectory models reveal that these effects are limited to women who are 
continuously married across all three time points (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3) as similar effects are 
not observed for the newly married. Also consistent with hypothesis H1c, no significant effects 
were observed for cohabiters, suggesting a lack of benefit to informal resource pooling for 
women’s access to health insurance options.  
Health 
 Whether or not trajectory or cross-sectional models were used, the effects for health 
variables remained consistent across all models. For example, compared to women without a 
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health need, women who had a health need they felt they could not afford to address were 
significantly less likely to have private or employer based insurance (see Table 6.3) or to have 
public insurance (see Table 6.2), and significantly more likely to be uninsured (see Table 6.1). 
Reverse, yet consistent, effects were observed for women with health problems. Compared to 
women who did not have a health problem, women who did have a health problem that affected 
their ability to work faced significantly reduced odds of being uninsured (see Table 6.1) and 
significantly greater odds of having public health insurance (see Table 6.2). Such findings 
suggest that low-income women with health problems benefit greatly from access to public 
health insurance programs and that these programs are successful in protecting women against 
having unmet health needs due to cost. 
Controls 
 Very few differences in the effects of control variables across the cross-sectional and 
trajectory models were observed. Consistent findings support that Hispanic respondents and 
those living in Chicago and San Antonio were significantly more likely to be uninsured (see 
Table 6.1). Similarly, increased income and living in Chicago and San Antonio were also 
associated with reduced odds of having access to public health insurance (see Table 6.2). As 
might be expected, the number of children women had decreased their odds of having private or 
employer based benefits, while increased income was associated with improved odds of having 
private or employer based benefits (see Table 6.3). Finally, compared to women living in Boston, 
women living in San Antonio also experienced greater odds of having private or employer based 
insurance (see Table 6.3) despite the fact that women in San Antonio were also the most likely to 
be uninsured (see Table 6.1).  
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Research Question 2 
Are there significant differences between women who are poor and near-poor at Wave 1 in 
the effects of welfare, work, and family trajectories on their health insurance access over 
time? 
 
The results of the following analyses suggest that some of the effects of various welfare, 
work, and family trajectories on women’s health insurance access may be specific to certain 
categories of low-income women. Analyzing separate models for poor and near-poor women (as 
opposed to simply adding an interaction variable for poverty status in a combined model) allows 
me to determine if the variables in question operate differently for poor and near-poor women. In 
the following analyses (Models 36-41) I test for differences in the effects of welfare, work, and 
family trajectories on low-income women’s health insurance access at Wave 3 by poverty status 
at Wave 1.  
Although all low-income women experience significant vulnerabilities, because poor 
women may have greater access to public programs and supports, we can expect to observe 
significant differences between poor and near-poor women in the importance of various welfare, 
work, and family trajectories in shaping their access to each form of insurance. Specifically, I 
expect to find that trajectories leading to or reflecting stable full-time employment will have less 
significant effects for poor than near-poor women given poor women’s ability to qualify for 
public health insurance (H2a). I also expect to find that even when poor women experience less 
stable welfare trajectories (i.e., lose welfare benefits) they will experience less significant 
impacts on their health insurance access than near-poor women who, when loosing welfare 
benefits, may be at greater risk of losing public health insurance and being uninsured than poor 
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women (H2b). Finally, I expect to observe that trajectories representing stable marriage or 
movement into marriage will have more profound effects for near-poor women by increasing 
their access to private insurance while reducing their access to public insurance. I also expect to 
find that trajectories reflecting stable or new cohabitation may not provide the same level of 
benefits for near-poor women that stable marriage provides given women’s ability to access 
private insurance benefits as dependents through marriage (H2c).  
 Table 6.4 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 36 and 37 
examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of being uninsured at Wave 3. Table 6.5 displays 
the results for Models 38 and 39 examining poor and near-poor women’s odds of having public 
insurance at Wave 3. And Table 6.6 displays the results of Models 40 and 41 examining poor 
and near-poor women’s odds of having private or employment based health insurance at Wave 3. 
Models 36, 38, and 40 display results for near-poor women, whereas Models 37, 39, and 41 
display results for poor women. All independent variables included in these models are measured 
at Wave 3; the trajectory variables measure changes in statuses across all three waves of data 
collection. The results tables provide the odds ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals for each 
model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more than two response categories are 
indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance are also provided in parentheses in 
the text where appropriate.  
As Tables 6.4-6.6 show, all models for near-poor women explain more of the variance in 
insurance status than the models for poor women. This may be partially the result of fewer 
observations in the near-poor models as more women were considered poor at Wave 1 than not 
poor. In near-poor Model 36 over 29 percent of the variance in women’s risk of being uninsured 
is explained by the model, whereas in poor Model 37, 24 percent of the variance is explained. 
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Like in previous chapters, much more of the variance in women’s access to public and private 
health insurance is explained by the models. For example, in near-poor Model 38 over 55 percent 
of the variance in women’s access to public health insurance is explained, while only 37 percent 
of the variance is explained in the poor Model 39. Similarly, in near-poor Model 40, 43 percent 
of the variance in private/employer health insurance is explained by the model, whereas in poor 
Model 41 nearly 33 percent of the variance is explained. In the following section I focus my 
discussion on differences between groups of women in the effects of the trajectory variables only 
noting other significant variables where doing so may help explain the effects of the trajectory 
variables.  
As described below, Tables 6.4-6.6 show some differences in the effects of various 
welfare, work, and family trajectories on poor and near-poor women’s access to insurance, 
suggesting that some of the effects observed in the first part of this analysis can partially be 
explained by women’s poverty status. For example, the observation that there are few differences 
between the various effects of welfare trajectories on women’s access to public insurance and 
risk of being uninsured appear to be limited primarily to poor women. In addition, although 
employment trajectories had fairly consistent results for both poor and near-poor women, 
differences in the size of the effects varied somewhat with near-poor women experiencing 
greater effects on their access to public and private benefits than poor women. Such differences 






Table 6.4 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Uninsured Wave 3 
(0=Has Insurance, 1=Uninsured) 
 Near-poor W1 Model 36  Poor W1 Model 37 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2 0.985 0.824 1.176  0.992 0.899 1.096 
Months 3 1.120 0.974 1.288  1.014 0.933 1.102 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 1.326 0.196 8.983  2.414 0.662 8.796 
Hispanic 3.729 0.573 24.273  4.429* 1.180 16.629 
Other 3.327 0.141 78.454  0.573 0.036 9.206 
US Citizen 0.270* 0.089 0.817  0.839 0.380 1.854 
Kids 0.642* 0.418 0.987  1.036 0.896 1.198 
Age 1.017 0.966 1.070  1.007 0.981 1.033 
Income 0.957 0.660 1.387  0.779* 0.621 0.976 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 2.338 0.771 7.090  2.208* 1.174 4.151 
San Antonio 4.188** 1.611 10.887  3.898*** 1.964 7.737 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.476 0.192 1.180  0.672 0.396 1.139 
College 0.360 0.072 1.788  0.497 0.212 1.165 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 0.755 0.292 1.953  1.089 0.617 1.923 
Fair/Poor 0.526 0.196 1.412  0.848 0.445 1.616 
Health Problem 0.135** 0.036 0.507  0.163*** 0.069 0.385 
Health Need 9.377*** 3.533 24.888  6.314*** 3.493 11.411 
Employment Trajectory 
(Continuous Unemployed)    
 
   
Became Unemployed 3.135 0.824 11.928  0.616 0.289 1.315 
Kept or Got PT Work 0.884 0.193 4.053  0.719 0.353 1.464 
Continuous FT Employed 0.643 0.168 2.452  0.380 0.117 1.235 
Moved into FT Work 0.208* 0.055 0.791  0.534 0.236 1.209 
Welfare Trajectory  
(Continuously Off Welfare)   
 
   
Moved Off Welfare 0.886 0.278 2.831  0.436** 0.246 0.775 
Continuously On Welfare     0.316* 0.101 0.985 
Moved On Welfare 0.247* 0.063 0.973  0.106*** 0.032 0.354 
Marital Trajectory 
(Continuously Single)    
 
   
Became Single 1.434 0.512 4.018  0.965 0.446 2.089 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting 3.358 0.701 16.097  1.526 0.708 3.287 
Continuously Married 0.695 0.194 2.496  0.892 0.367 2.168 
Moved into Marriage 0.754 0.187 3.036  1.171 0.520 2.636 
Continuously Separated 0.550 0.106 2.865  1.077 0.341 3.397 
Moved into Separation 0.839 0.196 3.590  0.679 0.286 1.612 
N 427    1205   
Log-likelihood -177.240    -557.828   
Chi
2 
66.951    112.946   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.293    0.240   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 6.5 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Public HI Wave 3 
(0=No Medicaid, 1=Has Medicaid) 
 Near-poor W1 Model 38  Poor W1 Model 39 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2 1.017 0.834 1.240  0.968 0.881 1.064 
Months 3 0.854* 0.752 0.969  1.016 0.938 1.100 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.309 0.059 1.620  1.274 0.461 3.522 
Hispanic 0.166* 0.032 0.858  0.954 0.330 2.760 
Other 0.070 0.004 1.258  4.899 0.690 34.801 
US Citizen 1.205 0.336 4.323  1.463 0.749 2.857 
Kids 1.233 0.820 1.854  1.114 0.959 1.294 
Age 0.913** 0.858 0.971  0.975 0.950 1.000 
Income 0.589* 0.385 0.900  0.806* 0.649 1.000 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 0.486 0.160 1.479  0.436* 0.232 0.821 
San Antonio 0.049*** 0.014 0.172  0.105*** 0.051 0.213 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.575 0.183 1.804  1.072 0.636 1.808 
College 1.220 0.255 5.838  0.836 0.329 2.124 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.531 0.586 4.002  1.045 0.570 1.916 
Fair/Poor 0.747 0.253 2.205  1.068 0.596 1.913 
Health Problem 38.029*** 8.279 174.688  7.862*** 2.767 22.340 
Health Need 0.066*** 0.018 0.239  0.316*** 0.162 0.616 
Employment Trajectory 
(Continuous Unemployed)    
 
   
Became Unemployed 0.421 0.072 2.455  1.771 0.840 3.736 
Kept or Got PT Work 0.910 0.205 4.034  1.351 0.627 2.911 
Continuous FT Employed 0.075** 0.011 0.499  0.204** 0.069 0.604 
Moved into FT Work 0.316 0.082 1.222  0.707 0.306 1.637 
Welfare Trajectory  
(Continuously Off Welfare)   
 
   
Moved Off Welfare 2.569 0.952 6.935  2.736*** 1.627 4.600 
Continuously On Welfare     5.327** 1.878 15.110 
Moved On Welfare 5.282** 1.642 16.988  11.844*** 3.370 41.626 
Marital Trajectory 
(Continuously Single)    
 
   
Became Single 1.668 0.482 5.767  0.815 0.398 1.667 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting 0.147** 0.039 0.560  1.044 0.533 2.045 
Continuously Married 0.380 0.062 2.315  0.451 0.165 1.232 
Moved into Marriage 0.879 0.220 3.515  0.940 0.445 1.988 
Continuously Separated 0.148 0.003 7.066  0.761 0.239 2.420 
Moved into Separation 1.848 0.525 6.508  1.507 0.637 3.565 
N 427    1205   
Log-likelihood -117.339    -523.007   
Chi
2 
123.846    194.545   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.554    0.374   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 6.6 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Poor and Near-poor Women on Private/Employer 
HI Wave 3 (0=No Priv/Emp HI, 1=Has Priv/Emp HI) 
 Near-poor W1 Model 40  Poor W1 Model 41 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Int 
Months 2 0.951 0.807 1.122  0.961 0.874 1.057 
Months 3 1.023 0.901 1.162  0.901 0.808 1.005 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 2.765 0.628 12.170  0.338 0.109 1.051 
Hispanic 1.310 0.330 5.193  0.261* 0.077 0.890 
Other 4.074 0.549 30.250  0.292 0.040 2.155 
US Citizen 2.297 0.773 6.825  2.074 0.679 6.340 
Kids 1.291 0.877 1.901  0.804* 0.655 0.987 
Age 1.072* 1.014 1.133  1.015 0.975 1.056 
Income 1.263 0.835 1.911  1.486* 1.058 2.087 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.324 0.434 4.042  1.230 0.554 2.733 
San Antonio 2.057 0.848 4.993  2.064 0.975 4.372 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 4.341** 1.605 11.737  2.441* 1.047 5.690 
College 4.430* 1.026 19.120  4.333** 1.503 12.490 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.081 0.430 2.718  0.730 0.380 1.403 
Fair/Poor 1.500 0.539 4.179  1.102 0.432 2.811 
Health Problem 0.429 0.101 1.828  0.440 0.079 2.459 
Health Need 0.490 0.167 1.439  0.274** 0.123 0.611 
Employment Trajectory 
(Continuous Unemployed)    
 
   
Became Unemployed 1.506 0.233 9.714  0.617 0.150 2.539 
Kept or Got PT Work 2.802 0.418 18.785  2.161 0.637 7.323 
Continuous FT Employed 18.074** 2.531 129.047  14.683*** 4.122 52.302 
Moved into FT Work 23.492** 3.190 173.025  3.562* 1.203 10.545 
Welfare Trajectory  
(Continuously Off Welfare)   
 
   
Moved Off Welfare 0.192* 0.052 0.712  0.859 0.401 1.840 
Continuously On Welfare     0.057* 0.006 0.526 
Moved On Welfare 0.259 0.058 1.167  0.532 0.154 1.837 
Marital Trajectory 
(Continuously Single)    
 
   
Became Single 0.574 0.181 1.821  1.124 0.510 2.479 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting 1.752 0.265 11.583  0.854 0.293 2.487 
Continuously Married 3.656 0.849 15.750  2.228 0.678 7.319 
Moved into Marriage 1.420 0.385 5.231  1.426 0.538 3.781 
Continuously Separated 4.357 0.536 35.409  1.213 0.369 3.993 
Moved into Separation 0.903 0.315 2.591  1.656 0.717 3.827 
N 427    1205   
Log-likelihood -165.175    -382.613   
Chi
2 
87.873    133.648   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.430    0.326   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work 
 Consistent with hypothesis H2a, I find that trajectories leading to full-time employment 
had more significant effects for near-poor women’s access to health insurance than poor women. 
The finding in Model 31 that moving into full-time work by Wave 3 reduces women’s odds of 
being uninsured appears to be specific to near-poor women; compared to women who were 
continuously unemployed across all three waves, near-poor women who moved into full-time 
work by Wave 3 were significantly less likely to be uninsured (see Model 36; 0.208, p < .05). 
The fact that a similar effect was not observed for those who were continuously employed may 
suggest that women seeking employment may only select work that provides health insurance.  
 More consistent results were observed for poor and near-poor women in the public and 
private health insurance models. For example, compared to women who were continuously 
unemployed across all three waves, both poor (see Model 39; 0.204, p < .01) and near-poor 
women (see Model 38; 0.075, p < .01) who were continuously employed full-time were 
significantly less likely to have public health insurance at Wave 3. The size of the effects varied 
somewhat though. Perhaps unsurprising, yet consistent with hypothesis H2a, near-poor women 
who were continuously employed full-time were 92.5 percent less likely to have public health 
insurance whereas poor women who were continuously employed full-time were only 79.6 
percent less likely to have public health insurance as at Wave 3 (see Table 6.5). Similarly, 
compared to women who were continuously unemployed, both poor and near-poor women who 
were continuously employed full-time or moved into full-time work were significantly more 
likely to have private or employment based health insurance at Wave 3 (see Table 6.6). 
Nevertheless, consistent with hypothesis H2a, near-poor women were much more likely to 
access these benefits than their poorer peers. For example, near-poor women moving into full-
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time employment were 23 times more likely to have private/employer based insurance (see 
Model 40; 23.492, p < .01) whereas poor women who moved into full-time work were only three 
times more likely to have private/employer based insurance than those who were continuously 
unemployed (see Model 41; 3.562, p < .05). Differences in the effects for poor and near-poor 
women illustrates how each group may differentially utilize alternative strategies to secure health 
insurance benefits; whereas near-poor women must rely on greater access to private benefits, 
poor women are more likely to have access to public health insurance benefits. 
Welfare 
 The findings in part 1 of this analysis that all welfare trajectories are associated with 
reduced odds of being uninsured (see Model 31) and increased chances of having public health 
insurance (see Model 33) appear to be specific to poor women. Consistent with hypothesis H2b, 
I find that fragmented welfare trajectories may not have as large of an impact on poor women as 
near-poor women. Compared to women who were continuously off welfare across all three 
waves, poor women with both fragmented and continuous welfare trajectories were all less likely 
to be uninsured (see Model 37) and more likely to have public health insurance at Wave 3 (see 
Model 39). Similar effects were observed for near-poor women, but only those who moved onto 
welfare by Wave 3, while no significant effects were observed for near-poor women who moved 
off of welfare by Wave 3.
8
  
Once again though, variations between categories of women provide important 
information about variation in the size of the risks various groups of women face. For example, 
as Model 37 shows, while poor women who moved off of welfare were 56 percent less likely to 
be uninsured at Wave 3 compared to poor women who were continuously off welfare (0.436, p < 
                                                 
8
 Estimates were not produced for near-poor women continuously on welfare because only a small number of near-
poor women fell into this category. 
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.01), poor women who moved on to welfare were over 89 percent less likely to be uninsured at 
Wave 3 (0.106, p < .001). Similarly, comparisons between poor and near-poor women show that 
poor women who moved onto welfare were nearly 12 times more likely to have public health 
insurance compared to women who were continuously off welfare (11.844, p < .001) while near-
poor women who moved on to welfare were only 5 times more likely to have public health 
insurance at Wave 3 (see Table 6.5; 5.282, p < .01).  
Another difference was observed between poor and near-poor women’s access to private 
or employer-based health insurance. As might be expected, compared to women continuously off 
welfare, poor women who were continuously on welfare were significantly less likely to have 
private or employment based health insurance (see Model 41; 0.057, p < .05), while near-poor 
women who moved off of welfare were significantly less likely to have private or employment 
based health insurance (see Model 40; 0.192, p < .05). The lack of a corresponding increase in 
near-poor women moving off of welfare’s access to public health insurance (see Model 38) once 
again reveals a hierarchy of risk, with poor women with stable access to welfare at least risk of 
being uninsured and most likely to have access to public health insurance compared to near-poor 
women with unstable access to welfare benefits.  
Family 
 Contrary to hypothesis H2c, few effects were observed for marital trajectories on 
women’s access to health insurance. In fact, no significant results were observed for any of the 
relationship trajectories on women’s risk of being uninsured (see Table 6.4) or their access to 
private/employer based health insurance (see Table 6.6). Perhaps surprisingly, although a 
significant effect for the continuously married was observed in the public health insurance Model 
33, a similar effect was not observed in the public health insurance models separated by poverty 
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status (see Table 6.5). Instead, Model 38 shows that compared to the continuously single, near-
poor women who started or stayed cohabiting across all three waves were significantly less likely 
to have public health insurance at Wave 3 (0.147, p < .01). Consistent with hypothesis H2c, this 
finding does provide some evidence that resource pooling through cohabitation may have 
particularly negative consequences for near-poor women in reducing their access to public health 
insurance options. Nevertheless, the lack of a similar finding for the stably married may indicate 
that some other effect is operating here. 
 
Research Question 3 
Given the effects of welfare, work, and family trajectories on low-income women’s health 
insurance access, do health insurance trajectories play a role is shaping low-income 
women’s economic status over time?  
 
 Discontinuities in low-income women’s work, welfare, and family trajectories may not 
only put them at greater risk of having health insurance instability, but may also make them more 
vulnerable to economic insecurity over time. In addition to the economic costs of discontinuous 
welfare, work, and family trajectories, unstable health insurance trajectories may also play a role 
in shaping women’s economic outcomes over time. In this section of the analysis I expect to find 
that health insurance trajectories leading to the loss of insurance will result in greater odds of 
moving into poverty at Wave 3 (H3a). Because of strict eligibility guidelines, we might also 
expect to find that stable public insurance trajectories, instead of boosting women’s economic 
progress, may actually represent women’s sustained poverty over time (H3b). Finally, I also 
expect to find that trajectories which represent both stable access to and movement into private 
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or employment based insurance will support women’s economic progress over time by reducing 
their odds of moving into poverty at Wave 3 (H3c). 
Table 6.7 displays the results of the logistic regression analyses for Models 42 and 43, 
which test how including measures of welfare, work, family, and health insurance trajectories 
helps us understand changes in women’s poverty status over time. The dependent variable in 
these models measures whether a women experienced a change in poverty status over time or not 
(0=no change in poverty status, 1=experienced a change in poverty status). Separate analyses are 
run for women who were not poor at T1 (Model 40) and for those that were poor at T1 (Model 
41). Thus, for example, Model 42 tests the effects of welfare, work, family, and health 
trajectories on the odds of women’s movement into poverty at Wave 3, whereas Model 43 tests 
the effects of the same factors on women’s movement out of poverty at Wave 3. All independent 
variables included in these models are measured at Wave 3; the trajectory variables measure 
changes in Wave 1 statuses by Wave 3. The table provides the odds ratios and 95 percent 
confidence intervals for each model. The reference categories for dummy variables with more 
than two response categories are indicated in parentheses. Odds ratios and level of significance 
are also provided in parentheses in the text where appropriate.  
The pseudo- R
2
 values of Models 42 and 43 suggest that the trajectory model explains 
more of the variance in women’s movement into poverty than their movement out of poverty 
over time; while Model 42 explains over 30 percent of the variance in women’s movement into 
poverty, Model 43 only explains just over 16 percent of the variance in women’s movement out 
of poverty by Wave 3. This difference in explanatory power may also be related to the difference 
in sample size for each model as there were significantly fewer women who were not in poverty 
at Wave 1 than there were women who were in poverty at that time. In addition, it is important to 
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note that more women moved out of poverty than moved into poverty by Wave 3.  In the 
analysis below I focus my discussion on the effects of the welfare, work, family, and health 
insurance trajectories on changes in women’s poverty status at Wave 3. 
As described below, I find some variations in the effects of various welfare, work, family 
and health insurance trajectories on women’s movement into and out over poverty over time. For 
example, as Model 42 shows, while continuous full-time employment and marriage help reduce 
the risk of low-income women moving into poverty by Wave 3, moving off of welfare and 
moving into public health insurance significantly increase women’s risk of moving into poverty 
by Wave 3. In Model 43 we see that other trajectories play a more significant role in affecting 
women’s movement out of poverty over time. For example, although, as might be expected, 
continuous full-time employment increases women’s odds of moving out of poverty over time, 
both part-time work and new full-time employment trajectories also improve women’s odds of 
moving out of poverty over time. Consistent with this finding, gaining private or employer health 
insurance is also associated with greater odds of moving out of poverty over time. Finally, I also 
find that in addition to marriage, cohabitation also provides positive benefits for low-income 
women by increasing their odds of moving out of poverty over time. 
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Table 6.7 Logistic Regression Results Comparing Models on Poverty Change by Wave 3 (0=No Change, 
1=Change in Poverty Status) 
 Near-poor W1 Model 42 
(Movement Into Poverty T2) 
 Poor W1 Model 43 
(Movement Out of Poverty T2) 
Wave 3 Predictors Odds Ratio 95% Conf Interval  Odds Ratio 95% Conf Interval 
Months 2 0.805** 0.692 0.936  0.979 0.907 1.056 
Months 3 1.023 0.908 1.152  1.019 0.952 1.090 
Race/Ethnicity (White)        
Black 0.371 0.089 1.540  0.980 0.357 2.688 
Hispanic 0.269 0.065 1.112  1.413 0.524 3.809 
Other 0.783 0.100 6.120  0.528 0.104 2.667 
US Citizen 0.743 0.208 2.653  1.471 0.678 3.193 
Kids 1.062 0.740 1.525  0.856* 0.738 0.994 
Age 1.010 0.958 1.066  0.995 0.970 1.021 
City (Boston)        
Chicago 1.460 0.477 4.475  0.666 0.397 1.115 
San Antonio 3.334* 1.172 9.481  0.548 0.294 1.020 
Education (No Degree)        
HS Degree/GED 0.828 0.334 2.048  1.839** 1.176 2.876 
College 0.299* 0.091 0.981  1.399 0.649 3.013 
Health (Excellent/Very Good)       
Good 1.383 0.572 3.344  0.920 0.564 1.500 
Fair/Poor 0.927 0.363 2.366  0.753 0.441 1.288 
Health Problem 1.174 0.232 5.948  1.187 0.619 2.274 
Health Need 2.112 0.726 6.146  1.527 0.846 2.754 
Employment Trajectory 
(Continuous Unemployed)    
 
   
Became Unemployed 0.369 0.100 1.356  1.537 0.835 2.827 
Kept or Got PT Work 0.919 0.186 4.553  2.097* 1.084 4.060 
Continuous FT Employed 0.119** 0.028 0.510  3.504* 1.149 10.690 
Moved into FT Work 0.388 0.096 1.571  2.534* 1.205 5.331 
Welfare Trajectory  
(Continuously Off Welfare)   
 
   
Moved Off Welfare 3.387* 1.200 9.560  1.053 0.646 1.716 
Continuously On Welfare 16.789* 1.106 254.937  1.443 0.636 3.277 
Moved On Welfare 4.999 0.480 52.090  0.957 0.416 2.205 
Marital Trajectory (Continuously Single)       
Became Single 0.861 0.288 2.576  1.269 0.679 2.374 
Started/Stayed Cohabiting 0.550 0.129 2.351  3.254** 1.383 7.657 
Continuously Married 0.289* 0.091 0.917  2.845* 1.213 6.676 
Moved into Marriage 0.898 0.225 3.586  1.918 0.933 3.945 
Continuously Separated 0.614 0.123 3.061  0.685 0.286 1.644 
Moved into Separation 0.564 0.170 1.876  1.484 0.814 2.706 
Insurance Trajectory 
(Continuously Uninsured)    
 
   
Became Uninsured 3.311 0.793 13.835  1.312 0.538 3.197 
Continuous Public HI 5.782 0.939 35.611  0.774 0.305 1.961 
Moved into Public HI 9.631* 1.708 54.292  1.404 0.561 3.512 
Continuous Priv/Emp HI 2.676 0.622 11.510  3.574 0.861 14.829 
Got  Private/Employer HI 1.782 0.433 7.332  3.543* 1.222 10.272 
N 425    1142   
Log-likelihood -204.278    -638.171   
Chi
2 
85.635    95.014   
Pseudo-R
2 
0.304    0.164   
Note: Reference categories in parentheses; *Significant at p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Work Trajectories 
 As might be expected, compared to those who were continuously unemployed across all 
three waves, those with a continuous full-time employment trajectory were significantly less 
likely to move into poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 42; 0.119, p < .01) and significantly more 
likely to move out of poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 43; 3.504, p < .05). Model 43 also shows 
that women experiencing new full-time work trajectories were also more likely to move out of 
poverty over time compared to those who were continuously unemployed (2.534, p < .05). 
Perhaps more surprising is the finding that women experiencing stable or new part-time work 
trajectories were also more likely to move out of poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 43; 2.097, p < 
.05). Nevertheless, while stable part-time employment may be sufficient to technically elevate 
low-income women out of poverty over time, Models 31 and 35 of this chapter suggest that the 
benefits of part-time work do not translate into improved access to private health insurance or 
reduced risk of being uninsured. 
Welfare Trajectories 
  Although welfare trajectories did not appear to be significant predictors of women’s 
movement out of poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 43) they do appear to have significant effects on 
women’s movement into poverty over time (see Model 42). As might be expected, compared to 
women who were continuously off welfare over time, women who were continuously on welfare 
were significantly more likely to move into poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 42; 16.789, p < .05). 
Perhaps more surprising though, compared to women who were continuously off welfare, 
women who moved off of welfare by Wave 3 were also significantly more likely to move into 
poverty a Wave 3 (see Model 42; 3.387, p < .05). This finding suggests that trajectories leading 
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to the loss of welfare put women at significant risk of economic insecurity following the loss of 
benefits. 
Family Trajectories 
  Marriage trajectories also influenced women’s odds of moving into and out of poverty 
over time. Compared to those who were continuously single across all three waves, women who 
were continuously married were significantly less likely to move into poverty at Wave 3 (see 
Model 42; 0.289, p < .05) and more likely to move out of poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 43; 
2.845, p < .05). It appears that the benefits of resource pooling through marriage in improving 
women’s economic standing may also be accrued through cohabitation; although new or stable 
cohabitation did not appear to affect women’s odds of moving into poverty over time (see Model 
42), new or stable cohabitation trajectories were associated with increasing women’s odds of 
moving out of poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 43; 3.254, p < .01). Once again though, as Models 
31 and 35 show, the benefits of cohabitation in improving low-income women’s economic 
resources do not translate into improved access to private health insurance or reduced risk of 
being uninsured at Wave 3. 
Insurance Trajectories 
 Contrary to hypothesis H3b, I did not find evidence that compared to the continuously 
uninsured women experiencing stable public insurance trajectories were more or less likely to 
move into or out of poverty over time. Nevertheless, consistent with the hypothesis, I did find 
that compared to the continuously uninsured women who moved into public health insurance by 
Wave 3 were significantly more likely to move into poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 42; 9.361, p 
< .05). Also consistent with hypothesis H3c, Model 43 shows that compared to the continuously 
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uninsured, women who moved into private or employer based health insurance by Wave 3 were 
significantly more likely to move out of poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 43; 3.543, p < .05).  
Contrary to hypothesis H3a, I found no evidence to suggest that health insurance 
trajectories leading to the loss of insurance resulted in greater odds of moving into poverty at 
Wave 3.
9
 As described in previous analyses, the lack of significant findings may be a result of 
the complex relationship between economic progress and insurance access; while becoming 
uninsured due to loss of public health insurance benefits may be a result or indicator of economic 
progress, becoming uninsured due to loss of private/employer health insurance benefits may be a 
result or indicator of economic decline. Nevertheless, despite the consistency of the findings that 
movement into public health insurance is associated with movement into poverty over time while 
movement into private or employer based health insurance is associated with movement out of 
poverty over time, as described in previous analyses, based on the given models it is difficult to 
determine if movement into these forms of insurance was part of the cause of changes in 
women’s poverty status, or if these health insurance transitions were merely reflections of 
changes in women’s poverty status over time. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I find evidence that utilizing trajectory measures helps provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the way low-income women’s lives affect their access to health 
insurance, that certain welfare, work, and family trajectories have greater consequences for low-
income women’s access to health insurance than others, and that the significance of these factors 
                                                 
9
 This finding was also observed in a separate analysis, not shown, using the continuously private/employer insured 
as the comparison group. Nevertheless, I did find that compared to those continuously on private/employer health 
insurance, those continuously on public health insurance were significantly less likely to move out of poverty over 
time (0.213, p < .030). 
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varies by type of insurance examined. In addition, I find evidence of important similarities and 
differences between poor and near-poor women in the effects of these trajectories on their access 
to insurance. Finally, I also find evidence that utilizing welfare, work, family, and insurance 
trajectories helps to explain some of the variance in low-income women’s movement into and 
out of poverty over time.  
Specifically, in regards to my first research question I find that the benefits and risks 
associated with coupling in regards to women’s access to health insurance appear to be restricted 
to those who are stably married as similar effects are not observed for the newly married or new 
or continuous cohabiters. Compared to the continuously single, stably married low-income 
women are significantly less likely to have public health insurance (see Model 32) and more 
likely to have private or employer-based insurance (see Model 34). Although it may be tempting 
to assume that those who lose access to public health insurance benefits due to marriage are 
automatically able to gain access to private health insurance benefits as dependents, there is 
insufficient evidence to support this conclusion as stable marriage trajectories do not produce 
significant results in the uninsured Model 31. A lack of significant effects for stable marriage on 
women’s risk of being uninsured may be due to the complex effects of marriage and resource 
pooling on low-income women’s access to insurance; although marriage may decrease some 
women’s odds of being uninsured by allowing them access to private benefits as dependents, it 
may also simultaneously increase other women’s odds of being uninsured by limiting their 
access to public health insurance benefits.  
In contrast, more mixed effects are observed for employment trajectories. For example, 
although I find evidence that continuous employment trajectories reduce women’s access to 
public health insurance options (see Model 32), I also find that continuous full-time employment 
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trajectories are associated with increased access to private or employment based insurance (see 
Model 35). Despite these complimentary findings, they do not necessarily indicate that low-
income women with stable employment trajectories are less likely to be uninsured, as Model 31 
shows that only women who moved into new full-time work by Wave 3 were significantly less 
likely to be uninsured. This may be related to the finding that even women who move into new 
full-time work are more likely to have access to private or employer based insurance than those 
who are continuously unemployed (see Model 35). Together, these findings may suggest that 
low-income women are being very selective in deciding which jobs to take, only opting for new 
full-time work if it provides access to benefits given the risk long-term full-time employment 
poses on women’s access to public health insurance benefits (see Model 32). 
I also find some evidence that the delinking of welfare and public health insurance 
benefits has been somewhat successful in protecting women who are experiencing welfare 
changes from also losing their public health insurance benefits. As might be expected, both 
continuous and new access to welfare increased women’s odds of being on public insurance (see 
Model 33) and also reduced their odds of being uninsured (see Model 31). Perhaps surprisingly, 
even women who experienced trajectories leading to loss of welfare benefits were also less likely 
to be uninsured (see Model 31) and more likely to have public health insurance (see Model 33) 
than women who were continuously off welfare. Although this provides some evidence of 
successful delinking of welfare benefits from public health insurance benefits, considerable 
differences in the odds of being uninsured and having access to public health insurance between 
women in different welfare trajectories suggests that women who lose access to welfare over 
time are indeed at greater risk of being uninsured and losing access to public health insurance 
than women who are stably on welfare over time. 
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In regards to my second research question I find that some of the effects observed in the 
first part of this chapter can partially be explained by women’s poverty status. For example, the 
observation that there are few differences between the various effects of welfare trajectories on 
women’s access to public insurance and risk of being uninsured appear to be limited primarily to 
poor women. Compared to women who were continuously off welfare across all three waves, 
poor women with both fragmented and continuous welfare trajectories were all less likely to be 
uninsured (see Model 37) and more likely to have public health insurance at Wave 3 (see Model 
39). Some similar effects were observed for near-poor women, but only for those who moved 
onto welfare by Wave 3. Furthermore, close evaluation reveals notable differences in the size of 
the effects for poor and near-poor women with poor women moving onto welfare being much 
less likely to be uninsured and much more likely to have public health insurance than near-poor 
women moving onto welfare (see Models 36 and 38). In addition, Model 40 shows that near-
poor women who moved off of welfare were significantly less likely to have private or 
employment based health insurance. 
The finding in Model 31 that moving into full-time work by Wave 3 reduces women’s 
odds of being uninsured also appears to be specific to near-poor women; compared to women 
who were continuously unemployed across all three waves, near-poor women who moved into 
full-time work by Wave 3 were significantly less likely to be uninsured (see Model 36). The fact 
that a similar effect was not observed for those who were continuously employed may suggest 
that women seeking employment may only select work that provides health insurance. Where 
employment trajectories produced consistent results for both poor and near-poor women, 
differences in the size of the effects show that continuous and new full-time employment 
trajectories are more consequential for near-poor women’s access to public and private benefits 
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than poor women (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). Such differences highlight the unique opportunities 
and risks poor and near-poor women face and illustrate how each group may differentially utilize 
alternative strategies to secure health insurance benefits; whereas near-poor women must rely on 
greater access to private benefits, poor women are more likely to have access to public health 
insurance benefits.  
 Finally, in regards to my third research question I find some variations in the effects of 
various welfare, work, family and health insurance trajectories on women’s movement into and 
out over poverty over time. For example, Model 42 shows that several employment trajectories 
improved women’s odds of moving out of poverty over time; part-time work and new full-time 
work appear to provide similar economic benefits to continuous full-time work in improving 
women’s odds of moving out of poverty. Nevertheless, while stable part-time employment, for 
example, may be sufficient to technically elevate low-income women out of poverty over time, 
Models 31 and 35 of this chapter suggest that the benefits of part-time work do not translate into 
improved access to private health insurance or reduced risk of being uninsured. 
 Although welfare trajectories did not appear to be significant predictors of women’s 
movement out of poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 43) they do appear to have significant effects on 
women’s movement into poverty over time (see Model 42). For example, compared to women 
who were continuously off welfare, women who moved off of welfare by Wave 3 were 
significantly more likely to move into poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 43). This finding suggests 
that trajectories leading to the loss of welfare put women at significant risk of economic 
insecurity following the loss of benefits. 
 Marriage trajectories also influenced women’s odds of moving into and out of poverty 
over time. Compared to those who were continuously single, women who were continuously 
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married were significantly less likely to move into poverty (see Model 42) and more likely to 
move out of poverty at Wave 3 (see Model 43). In addition, I find some evidence that the 
benefits of resource pooling through marriage may also be accrued through cohabitation as new 
or stable cohabitation trajectories were associated with increasing women’s odds of moving out 
of poverty by Wave 3 (see Model 43). Once again though, as Models 31 and 35 show, the 
benefits of cohabitation in improving low-income women’s economic resources do not translate 
into improved access to private health insurance or reduced risk of being uninsured at Wave 3. 
Finally, although I did find that women who moved into public health insurance by Wave 
3 were significantly more likely to move into poverty (see Model 42) and women who moved 
into private or employer based health insurance were significantly more likely to move out of 
poverty (see Model 43), as described in previous analyses, it is difficult to determine if 
movement into these forms of insurance was part of the cause of changes in women’s poverty 
status, or if these health insurance transitions were merely reflections of changes in women’s 
poverty status over time. In addition, the lack of significant findings for trajectories leading to 
loss of insurance may be a result of the complex relationship between economic progress and 
insurance access; while becoming uninsured due to loss of public health insurance benefits may 
indicate economic progress, becoming uninsured due to loss of private/employer health 
insurance benefits may indicated economic decline. Further work is needed in this area to 
adequately determine the effects of welfare changes on women’s poverty status. 
In addition to the effects of various welfare, work, and family trajectories on women’s 
access to insurance and economic progress, I also find evidence of important city differences in 
the risks of being uninsured and access to private and public forms of health insurance. 
Consistent across analyses, Hispanic respondents and those living in Chicago and San Antonio 
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were significantly more likely to be uninsured (see Table 6.1). Similarly, increased income and 
living in Chicago and San Antonio were also associated with reduced odds of having access to 
public health insurance (see Table 6.2). Despite the fact that women living in San Antonio were 
more likely to have private or employer based insurance than women living in Boston (see Table 
6.3), women in San Antonio were also the most likely to be uninsured (see Table 6.1), a finding 
that appears consistent with the state’s emphasis on limited state government and market-based 
solutions to improving health insurance access. The implications and possible explanations of 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation I have tested the effects of several different kinds of longitudinal 
welfare, work, family, and health insurance measures on women’s access to health insurance and 
economic progress over time in an effort to better understand how the dynamic nature of low-
income women’s lives affects their access to care and well-being. In Chapter 4, I observe that 
low-income women’s welfare, work, and family statuses at one time point have long-term effects 
on their health insurance access and poverty status over time. Thus, knowing the work, family, 
and welfare characteristics of low-income women at one time point can allow us to make 
predictions about their access to insurance and economic prospects “down the road” and may 
allow us to implement appropriate interventions. 
In Chapter 5, I observe that utilizing measures of welfare, work, and family change 
across two time points provide us with even more information about low-income women’s 
access to health insurance. The analyses show that certain changes appear more consequential 
than others, putting low income women at greater risk of being uninsured while other changes 
appear to increase women’s odds of gaining access to other forms of insurance. I also observe 
that welfare, work, family and insurance changes have differential effects on women’s odds of 
moving into and out of poverty over time. These findings suggest that static measures of 
women’s characteristics, although important, may not tell the whole “story,” as experiencing 
changes in welfare, work, family, and insurance characteristics have independent effects on 
women’s access to insurance and economic progress. 
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Finally, in Chapter 6, I observe how welfare, work, family, and health insurance 
trajectories – which measure changes over three time points – also offer improvements over 
cross-sectional measures by providing a more nuanced picture of how low-income women’s 
long-term welfare, work, and family histories affect their access to various forms of insurance 
and economic progress over time. These findings corroborate the findings in earlier chapters 
which suggest that welfare, work, and family factors have long-term consequences for low-
income women and that certain changes may put women at more (or less) risk of negative 
outcomes at later time points.  
In addition to these findings, in each chapter I also observe that many of the effects of 
various welfare, work, and family characteristics are specific to certain categories of low-income 
women; while some factors appear to be more consequential for poor women, others reveal the 
unique risks of near-poor women who may struggle economically, yet fail to qualify for public 
programs. Together, comparisons between poor and near-poor women illustrate the diversity of 
low-income women’s lives and the unique challenges and coping strategies groups of low-
income women may rely on in order to meet their health care and economic needs. In addition to 
group differences, I observe that race/ethnic, citizenship, and geographic characteristics shape 
the policy contexts in which low-income women must operate as they navigate the welfare, 
work, family, and health insurance changes they encounter over time. 
In this chapter I summarize the major findings across all three data analysis chapters 
(Table 7.1 provides a summary and comparison of the results across chapters). I also discuss 
possible explanations for the results and the implications of the findings. Finally, I address the 
theoretical and policy implications of the findings, the limitations of the analyses presented, and 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Family Factors and Change 
Existing research shows that women’s marital status has direct effects on their access to 
insurance by providing access to private insurance options as a dependent. Nevertheless, research 
specific to low-income families provides evidence of a marriage penalty for low-income families 
who may lose access to public benefits – but be unable to afford private benefits – due to strict 
eligibility guidelines. The results of my analyses suggest that the effects of marriage on low-
income women’s access to insurance may not be readily apparent; in Chapters 5 and 6 we see 
that movement into marriage does not have the same effects on low-income women’s access to 
insurance as stable or long-term marriage does – a finding supported by the results of Chapter 4 
where we observe significant lagged effects for marriage over time.  
Consistent across the lagged effects, change, and trajectory models, I find that stable or 
long-term marriage is associated with improved access to private or employer-based health 
insurance benefits and reduced access to public insurance for low-income women. Although we 
might be tempted to assume that those who lose access to public health insurance benefits due to 
marriage are automatically able to gain access to private health insurance benefits as dependents, 
I find insufficient evidence to support this conclusion as stable marriage trajectories do not 
significantly reduce low-income women’s odds of being uninsured. The lack of effects for stable 
marriage on low-income women’s risk of being uninsured may be due to the complex effects of 
marriage and resource pooling on low-income women’s access to insurance; although marriage 
may decrease some women’s odds of being uninsured by allowing them access to private 
benefits as dependents, it may also simultaneously increase other women’s odds of being 
uninsured by limiting their access to public health insurance benefits. Combined with the fact 
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that men’s access to insurance has become more precarious over time, the benefits of marriage in 
protecting low-income women in particular from being uninsured may be diminished. 
Indeed, the benefits and risks associated with coupling in regards to low-income 
women’s access to health insurance appear to be restricted for the most part to those who are 
stably married as similar effects were not observed for the newly married or new or continuous 
cohabiters. Where an effect for new or continuous cohabitation was observed (Model 38) 
provides us with important information about how marriage may disproportionately affect 
different categories of low-income women. Model 38 shows that compared to the continuously 
single, near-poor women who started or stayed cohabiting across all three waves were 
significantly less likely to have public health insurance at Wave 3. This finding provides some 
evidence that resource pooling through cohabitation has particularly negative consequences for 
near-poor women, while Model 21 provides similar evidence that long-term marriage has more 
pronounced effects for poor women in reducing their access to public health insurance options.  
 
Employment Factors and Change 
Although we often assume full-time employment will provide access to health insurance 
benefits, the kinds of work that many low-income women have access to often does not provide 
affordable benefits, putting them at substantially greater risk of being uninsured than other 
groups of workers. Across the lagged effects, change, and trajectory models I observe fairly 
consistent effects for total household income in increasing women’s access to private or 
employer-based insurance while reducing women’s access to public health insurance. Similarly, 
I find evidence that continuous full-time employment trajectories reduce women’s access to 
public health insurance options (see Model 32) while increasing their access to private or 
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employment based insurance (see Model 35). This appears to produce fairly consistent results 
across models that stable full-time employment trajectories also reduce low-income women’s 
odds of being uninsured. Perhaps surprising, although less consistent across models, new or 
temporary access to full-time work and even part-time employment opportunities were also 
associated with improved access to private or employment-based health insurance benefits (see 
Model 17). Nevertheless, close examination reveals that stable or long-term full-time 
employment provides low-income women with the best increase in access to private or 
employment based benefits. In addition, the benefits of stable full-time employment appear to be 
most pronounced for near-poor women who may be more likely to rely on the private insurance 
market due to an inability to qualify for public health insurance options.  
 
Welfare Factors and Change 
 Close examination of the findings presented in these analysis reveal mixed support for 
the successful delinking of welfare and Medicaid benefits following 1996 Welfare Reform. 
Consistent across the lagged effects, change, and trajectory models, low-income women’s long-
term access to welfare benefits is associated with increased likelihood of having public health 
insurance and decreased likelihood of having private or employment based health insurance. 
This appears to produce an overall positive effect in reducing women with stable welfare 
access’s odds of being uninsured. Once again though, close examination is warranted as 
comparisons between poor and near-poor women consistently suggest that poor women with 
stable welfare access benefit most from the greatest increase in odds of having access to public 
health insurance and greatest reduction in odds of being uninsured.  
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 In addition to variations between poor and near-poor women, it is important to note 
consistent differences in the effects of specific welfare trajectories and change categories on low-
income women’s access to insurance; although women with discontinuous welfare histories also 
benefit from improved access to public health insurance, the best outcomes are observed among 
those with stable welfare trajectories who appear to be the least likely to be uninsured and most 
likely to have access to public health insurance benefits. Although we may be tempted to assume 
these results prove a successful delinking of public health insurance and welfare benefits, close 
examination reveals the importance of considering the comparison group when interpreting 
analyses. In the context of low-income women’s welfare changes and trajectories, the 
comparison group really matters for adequately understanding their access to health insurance; 
while women with discontinuous welfare trajectories may be doing better than their peers who 
lack access to welfare over time, they do not fare as well as their peers who sustain stable access 
to welfare over time. In addition, comparisons between poor and near-poor women also suggest 
that poor women benefit most from the benefits of access to welfare whereas near-poor women 
experience greater variability in the effects of discontinuous welfare trajectories on their access 
to public health insurance and risk of being uninsured.  
 
The Effects of Health Factors 
Although general health can affect one’s ability to work and secure health insurance 
benefits in the private and public markets, surprisingly I found few consistent effects for 
measures of general health on women’s access to insurance and economic progress over time. 
Nevertheless, other health measures did produce significant results. Consistent across the lagged 
effects, change, and trajectory models was the finding that women who experienced health 
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problems that affected their ability to work were significantly more likely to be on public health 
insurance and less likely to be uninsured than women who did not have health problems. 
Similarly, women who had health needs that went unmet due to cost were significantly more 
likely to be uninsured and less likely to have either public health insurance or private or 
employer based health insurance. Some differences between poor and near-poor women in the 
significance of health measures suggest that near-poor women are more negatively affected by 
health problems that affect their ability to work (see Model 8), and in these cases public 
programs become an important source of health insurance for these women (see Model 6). These 
results provide compelling evidence that public health insurance programs play a vital role in 
both providing insurance to low-income women with health problems and protecting them from 
having unmet health needs. Low-income women without insurance, on the other hand, and in 
particular near-poor women, are at great risk of being unable to meet their healthcare needs due 
to the cost of care (see Model 4). 
 
Variations between Low-income Women  
It may be tempting to treat low-income women as a unified homogenous category for 
analysis, yet we know that the degree of women’s economic vulnerability has a profound effect 
on the kinds of programs women have access to. Although both poor and near-poor women may 
experience similar vulnerabilities, I find evidence that there are in fact important differences 
between low-income women that put some at greater (or less) risk of inadequate access to 
insurance. My findings reveal a hierarchy of risk, with poor women with stable access to welfare 
at least risk of being uninsured and most likely to have access to public health insurance 
compared to near-poor women with unstable access to welfare benefits (see Tables 6.4-6.6). The 
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findings also suggest a more complicated relationship between employment and health insurance 
access for near-poor women which makes them more vulnerable to welfare, work, and family 
changes. Although near-poor women who have health problems that affect their ability to work 
may be able to utilize public health insurance options to protect them against being uninsured, 
near-poor women who have poor health but are unable to qualify for public health insurance 
options may be compelled to maintain private/employment based benefits since they experience 
a much greater reduction in access to public health insurance following finding full-time work 
(see Model 22). Such differences highlight the unique opportunities and risks poor and near-poor 
women face and illustrate how each group may differentially utilize alternative strategies to 
secure health insurance benefits; whereas near-poor women must rely on greater access to 
private benefits, poor women are more likely to have access to public health insurance benefits. 
Because low-income women’s economic status is rarely stagnant, they may find themselves 
utilizing both sets of strategies across the life course. 
 
Low-income Women’s Economic Progress 
The economic vulnerability created by welfare, work, and family changes has direct 
consequences for women’s economic progress over time. I find that including measures of 
welfare, work, family, and health insurance access does a better job of explaining women’s 
movement into poverty than out of poverty. For example, although welfare changes appeared to 
have little effect on women’s access to various forms of insurance, I find evidence that moving 
off welfare puts women at greater risk of moving into poverty over time (see Models 28 and 42). 
In contrast, the lack of effect for welfare transitions on women’s movement out of poverty over 
time suggest that exiting welfare may not necessarily indicate women’s economic progress over 
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time. As might be expected, access to greater resources plays an important role in elevating low-
income women out of poverty over time. In fact, I find that even part-time and new full-time 
work trajectories were associated with improved economic outcomes for women over time (see 
Model 43). Despite the lack of consistent effects for cohabitation on women’s access to 
insurance, my findings also suggest that resource pooling through both marriage or cohabitation 
may improve women’s economic progress by increasing women’s odds of moving out of poverty 
over time (see Models 11 and 43).   
In addition to demonstrating the effects of welfare, work, and family transitions on 
women’s economic progress, I hoped to also be able to show that women’s insurance transitions 
affect their economic well-being over time. Nevertheless, I found that including measures of 
health insurance access and change only offered slight improvements in my ability to explain 
changes in women’s poverty status over time. In addition, while I do find statistically significant 
relationships between some types of insurance transitions and women’s poverty status – for 
example, getting private insurance benefits increases women’s odds of moving out of poverty 
(see Models 29 and 43) while getting public insurance benefits increases women’s odds of 
moving into poverty over time (see Models 26 and 42) – these results may not actually reflect a 
causal relationship between women’s insurance transitions and poverty transitions. Instead, 
women’s insurance transitions may serve as indicators of women’s poverty status; women in 
poverty are simply more likely to have public health insurance and while women not in poverty 




My findings also consistently show that women in Chicago and San Antonio are more 
likely to be uninsured and less likely to have public health insurance than those living in Boston. 
In addition, the effects of city of residence are most notable for women living in San Antonio – 
especially the poor and Hispanics – who appear to face greater risks in terms of lack of access to 
health insurance than other groups of women. The state’s emphasis on market solutions to 
providing health care are also supported by the finding that poor women living in San Antonio 
were significantly more likely to have private or employer-based insurance than poor women 
living in Boston (see Models 23 and 35). Such findings illustrate the importance of state-specific 
policy contexts for understanding low-income women’s access to various forms of health 
insurance and women’s health outcomes (see also Zimmerman and Legerski 2010). These 
findings also illustrate the importance of separately examining different forms of insurance 
access; while Texas’ approach to limiting state programs and encouraging market solutions may 
make women there more likely to have private insurance, such an approach also limits women’s 
access to public programs, leaving them at greater risk of being uninsured. My findings also 
suggest that even more moderate policy approaches to extending health insurance to low-income 
women, like those supported in Illinois, restrict low-income women’s access to public programs 
and result in greater risk of being uninsured than more state-centered policy solutions like those 
embraced in Massachusetts. 
 
Implications 
These results have implications for scholarly theory and well as public policy. In terms of 
implications for scholarly theory, my findings support a welfare regime perspective which 
emphasizes the need to examine interactions between state, market, and family factors. The 
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complex relationship between health insurance access and marriage, for example, illustrates the 
need to consider the connections between institutions; while the relationship between marriage 
and the state penalizes low-income women, the relationship between marriage and the market 
rewards women with access to benefits as dependents. Nevertheless, a critical link is missing 
here; as demonstrated by the findings above, the lack of an adequate market-state link in regards 
to health insurance provision creates notable gaps in coverage for low-income women as they 
experience various welfare, work, and family changes. This research highlights the need to 
consider these relationships as we develop our research agendas and use our findings to develop 
better public policy. 
Although much has been said by feminist scholars about the effects of welfare reform on 
the welfare-reliant woman’s access to health insurance, and more attention is currently being 
focused on the plight of the wage-reliant woman as the economy changes and women become 
more responsible for being the primary breadwinners (and thus benefit providers) for their 
families, much less has been said about the family-reliant woman and her changing access to 
health insurance. My findings clearly illustrate that stable, long-term marriage plays a role in 
shaping women’s access to both public and private forms of insurance. Nevertheless, as 
described above, the relationship between the family, state, and market has produced 
contradictory effects for the family-reliant woman. Ineffective and contradictory state policy – 
which ironically promotes marriage among the low-income while penalizing married women by 
limiting their access to public health insurance options – illustrates the lack of attention to the 
complexities of women’s lives and the vulnerabilities that marriage may create for low-income 
women. 
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 These findings also have important implications for public policy. The health care 
reforms scheduled to be implemented as early as June 2010 promise to extend health care 
coverage to 32 million Americans while cutting the federal deficit by $124 billion (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2010b, 2010c). Some of the reforms included will benefit women generally, 
while others aim to help low-income individuals in particular. For example, currently 40 states 
allow gender based premium rating in the individual health insurance market, which often results 
in women paying higher premiums for the same coverage as men (Codispoti, Courtot, and 
Swedish 2008). Although technically illegal, gender rating has also been incorporated into the 
group health insurance market by insurance companies who charge higher premiums in 
industries dominated by women (Courtot and Kaye 2009). The new health care reform law 
prohibits gender rating by only allowing premium rating based on age (with some limitations), 
family size, tobacco use, and geographic residence (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b).  
Health care reform will also benefit women by prohibiting denial of coverage based on 
“pre-existing medical conditions.” Perhaps surprising, in eight states there are no regulations 
prohibiting insurance companies from classifying a woman’s history of domestic violence as a 
pre-existing condition for which she can be denied health insurance coverage (Courtot and Kaye 
2009). This is particularly consequential during a recession, when domestic violence may be 
more prevalent due to economic strain. In addition, in 45 states there are no regulations 
prohibiting insurance companies from classifying previous Cesarean-sections as a pre-existing 
medical condition (Courtot and Kaye 2009). This is also particularly consequential for women in 
light of recent estimates showing nearly one-third of all US births are via C-section (Menacker 
and Hamilton 2010). The new reform law also benefits women by requiring that insurance plans 
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provide a minimum standard of comprehensive care, including maternity, mental health, and 
preventative care services such as mammograms (National Women’s Law Center 2010).  
The health care reform law also includes several provisions that will benefit low-income 
families. For example, Medicaid eligibility will be expanded to include individuals who in the 
past may have been disqualified from participation by eliminating the categorical requirements 
for eligibility and expanding the income threshold to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b). Requirements for employers to provide health insurance may 
also benefit low-income women who are employed in companies with 50 or more employees, 
but may be less beneficial for those employed less than full-time and/or in small companies. 
Nevertheless, establishment of insurance exchanges and non-profit co-ops, as well as availability 
of premium and cost-sharing subsidies for families with incomes up to 400 percent of the FPL 
promise to help reduce gaps in coverage for low-income women (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2010b; Collins et al. 2008b; Holahan, Cook, and Dubay 2007). Further expanding health 
insurance options for low-income women, the reform law also allows states to create a health 
insurance plan just for uninsured individuals with incomes below 200 percent of the FPL (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2010b). In addition, the law includes incentives for states to develop 
“Community-based Collaborative Care Network Programs” to support, coordinate, and integrate 
services for low-income uninsured and underinsured populations (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2010b:2).  
Despite the potential benefits of health care reform for women generally and low-income 
families in particular, by building on the existing health insurance system the reforms fail to 
challenge the two-tired structure of private/employer-based plans and public health insurance 
benefits which means gaps in coverage will remain and millions of Americans will continue to 
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find themselves un- or under-insured (Burman et al. 2008:56). Although there was insufficient 
support for a truly universal system of healthcare financing and provision in Washington during 
the health care reform debates of 2009-2010, it is undeniable that federal oversight is critical to 
make access more equitable across state borders. As illustrated in this dissertation, “state 
autonomy” has put some women at elevated risk of being uninsured simply based on where they 
live, and states should be accountable for failing to meet the needs of women. 
 
Limitations 
The results of the analyses presented here are limited to low-income women living in 
low-income neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio. In addition, the small sample 
sizes utilized in the Chapter 6 trajectory models, especially in parts 2 and 3 of the analysis which 
requires separation by poverty status at Wave 1, may limit the explanatory power of Models 36, 
38, and 40, which test the effects of various factors on near-poor women’s access to health 
insurance. A larger proportion of the sample was poor at Wave 1 than not poor. In addition, as 
time went on, more women moved out of poverty than moved into poverty. Although the sample 
sizes of all models meet common recommendations for minimum sample size based on the 
number of independent variables (see Long 1997:54), the small number of women who were not 
poor at Wave 1 and who moved into poverty by Wave 3 warrants some caution in the 
interpretation and extrapolation of the findings. 
 The Chapter 5 change measures and Chapter 6 trajectory measures were created using 
reports of women’s welfare, work, family, health, and poverty statues at each wave. Despite the 
utility of using measures of change to understand women’s access to various forms of insurance 
and poverty status over time (as illustrated in the analyses), because the measures created do not 
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include changes between waves they ultimately represent conservative estimates of change. It is 
highly possible that at least some women experienced even greater numbers of changes between 
waves than the statistics presented in these analyses reveal. Although it would be ideal to 
construct measures that take into consideration the full extent of changes these women 
experienced over time, this level of detailed data was simply not available for all variables at all 
waves. 
The statistical analyses presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 all utilize data that were imputed 
using a single imputation method for missing values on four key demographic variables: marital 
status, citizenship, education, and income. Although it is generally agreed that single imputation 
methods are superior to mean substitution or listwise deletion of missing values (Acock 2005; 
Enders 2006; Schafer and Graham 2002), there is more debate over whether a single imputation 
method is as adequate as a multiple imputation approach which pools the results of several 
imputations to produce estimates with unbiased standard errors. Despite the statistical benefits of 
using a multiple imputation method, many researchers suggest that the amount of time and 
computational power it takes to run multiple imputations and pool the results warrants use of a 
single imputation method for setting up and testing preliminary analyses (Acock 2005). 
Although I plan to use multiple imputation for missing values as I prepare the results of these 
analyses for publication, to facilitate completion of the dissertation I have chosen to use a single 
imputation method to produce the results presented here.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
Although there are many consistencies in the models described above regarding the 
effects of various welfare, work, and family changes on women’s access to health insurance and 
 191 
economic progress, a thorough qualitative study of how women make work, family, and welfare 
decisions based on their needs for health insurance would help to illuminate the findings and 
identify the causal mechanisms at play. Such a qualitative investigation would not only give low-
income women voice in expressing the challenges they encounter as they negotiate their 
relationship between the state, market, and family, but it would also allow scholars to develop 
better explanatory models and policy makers to devise better public policy solutions to the 
barriers low-income women face in securing adequate health insurance over the life course.  
In addition, although the results of the analyses predicting changes in women’s poverty 
status presented here are useful (particularly in Chapter 6, part 3) the small amount of total 
variance explained by the models suggests that there are other important characteristics that must 
be considered and measured and in order to better explain why some low-income women are 
able to make economic progress over time while others are not able to. The results of previous 
research and my own analyses suggest that access to health insurance may be an important part 
of this explanation. Nevertheless, the measures used in the analyses presented here appear to be 
limited in their overall explanatory power. In future analyses I would like to develop better 
models for predicting low-income women’s economic progress over time. Such a task will 
require identifying and measuring some of the causal mechanisms responsible for the 
relationship between both individual and household health, insurance access, and economic well-
being.  
Understanding the factors that both inhibit and foster low-income women’s economic 
progress over time may have important public policy implications, but it would also be 
worthwhile to examine the effects of these factors on women’s health status over time. Despite 
contemporary efforts to curtail low-income women’s access to social supports, evidence that 
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welfare, work, family, and health insurance changes affect women’s health outcomes may 
provide compelling evidence for expanding women’s long-term access to stable social programs 
and forms of health insurance.  
Exploring the nuances of specific state policy characteristics on low-income women’s 
access to insurance is another area of research that I would like to pursue further in future 
research. In particular, I would like to examine the effects of state-level policy characteristics, 
such as specific policy requirements and program sanctions, on women’s outcomes across states 
over time. The states are often described as “laboratories of democracy” in that they allow us to 
observe the outcomes of state-level experimentation in social policy and program development. 
What were the specific policy characteristics of Massachusetts, Illinois, and Texas that created 
such significant variation in women’s access to various forms of insurance and economic well-
being over time? The benefit of such an analysis lies in the potential to develop effective public 
policies at both the state and federal levels that will improve women’s access to various forms of 
health insurance and assist in their well-being and independence from exploitive work, family, 
and state relationships. 
As feminist scholars suggest, and other analyses have shown (see Angel, Frias, and Hill 
2005), the demographic characteristics of states play an important role in shaping the policy 
contexts and health outcomes of a region. Although I did not conduct a focused race analysis in 
this dissertation, race is a fundamental component of the structure and meaning of health care 
policy and access in the U.S. (see Quadagno 2005). Thus, racial differences in the effects of 
welfare, work, and family changes and the racialized nature of specific state policies ought to be 
considered further in future analyses. How is race introduced into the eligibility requirements of 
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public and private health insurance programs? How does gender and race based economic 
discrimination affect women’s access to insurance? 
Finally, given the passage of federal health care reform it will be imperative to monitor 
the effects of various social policies on women’s health and access to care over the next decade. 
How will mandating health insurance coverage, expanding Medicaid eligibility, creating high 
risk pools, and regulating the private health insurance market affect women’s access to health 
insurance and care? Despite promises to expand coverage to millions of Americans, who will 
remain uninsured? Will the needs of low-income women be met under such reforms? What new 
forms of vulnerability might be created? As specific reforms are implemented it will be vital to 
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